A strange thing is happening in politics. People who in earlier times could have been expected to vote for the right-wing party are now more likely to be supporting the party on the left, while those who would have voted for the left in times past are now more inclined vote for the right.
This is something the insiders – the political scientists, pollsters and party professionals – know all about, but the politicians prefer not to admit. So it’s news to the rest of us.
You could see it alluded to in all the learned explanations of why Donald Trump romped home in the presidential election that was too close to call. But you can also see it in our own elections. Indeed, it’s a “secular” (long-term) trend occurring in the politics of most rich countries.
Did you see some commentator saying the Republicans were now the party of the working class? What! It’s truer than it sounds. Our own Farrah Tomazin wrote that the election saw “the realignment of the Republicans as a party that appeals to the working class while the Democrats have increasingly become the party of college-educated, upper-income suburban voters, especially women”.
A distinguished American professor of anthropology added that “Trump voters trend older, white, rural, religious and less educated”. It seems most “voters of colour” still voted Democrat, but enough Latinos and others defected to Trump to give him an easy win.
And, as I say, you see a similar role reversal going on here in Oz. Professor Ian McAllister of the Australian National University, who oversees its Australian Election Study, a large sample survey of voters following every federal election, says we’ve been gradually moving the same way since the 1990s.
His study, following the federal election in May 2022, found it showed a continuation of “major sociodemographic shifts in voting patterns based on gender, generation and social class, with significant implications for the future of the major parties”.
Historically, the two big parties represented the rival interests of voters playing different roles in the economy. Labor looked after the workers supplying their labour, while the Liberals looked after those small and big businesspeople supplying their capital.
The standard division between the working, middle and upper classes was based on people’s occupational status: blue-collar, white-collar, owners and managers.
But that economy-based division is being replaced by more people voting according to their social values and identity. McAllister says this shift is being driven by rising levels of education. Whether someone has a university education is now the best single predictor of how they vote.
As a general rule, those people with a university degree end up with values and preferences that are quite different from those of people who don’t have a degree, or left school early.
So, just as college-educated Americans are more likely to vote Democrat, Australians with a degree are more likely to vote Labor. People without tertiary education are more likely to vote Republican, Liberal or National Party.
It follows – again as a broad generalisation – that the more highly educated are more likely to live nearer the centre of big cities, where the better-paid jobs tend to be, while the less highly educated are more likely to be found in the outer suburbs and the regions.
Over the 34 years to 2023, the proportion of adults with a university degree has risen from 8 per cent to almost one-third. Each year, more than half of students completing high school go on to uni.
So, as each year passes, people in the oldest generation, who are less likely to be graduates, die, while the youngsters taking their place in the electorate are more likely to be graduates.
In his report on the 2022 federal election, McAllister found that Labor still attracted more working-class votes, although its share of them had fallen to just 38 per cent. The Coalition lost votes from university-educated voters, high-income voters and home owners – groups that, in the previous election, were more likely to have supported it.
A much higher proportion of girls are going on to uni these days, which helps explain why more women vote Labor than for the Coalition. And higher education does much to explain why Labor’s support is much stronger among younger voters.
McAllister has found that, as the Millennials get older – some are now in their early 40s – they’re less likely to drift to the right the way earlier generations did as they aged.
You might see the Liberals’ loss of six heartland seats to the teals as a clear example of the secular trend we’re discussing: Liberal voters who cared about climate change, a federal anti-corruption commission and more women in parliament, switching their vote to the teals.
But McAllister found it was more complicated than that. Only about one-fifth of former Liberal voters changed their vote. What got the teals across the line was strategic voting by those seats’ minority Labor and Greens voters. Knowing their party was never going to win, they threw their weight behind the teals, who did have a chance of winning.
As voters around the rich world become less likely to vote according to their economic class and more likely to vote according to their social and cultural values, political scientists have developed a fancy new theory that characterises parties on the left as GAL and parties on the right as TAN.
GAL stands for green, alternative (relaxed about gender fluidity, for instance) and libertarian (“my body, my choice”). TAN stands for traditional (“I liked it the way it was” and “the world should be run by men”), authoritarian (“we need strong leadership”) and nationalist (“why are they letting in all those strange immigrants?”).
So when, in coming months, you see Peter Dutton banging on about inflation, all those terrible immigrants and all the crime on the streets, and campaigning hard in the outer suburbs and regions, the media will tell you he’s borrowing from the Trump playbook. But now you’ll know there’s a lot more to it.
