It's official: supermarkets are overcharging. So change the subject

Why does a government release a highly critical report on the conduct of Woolworths and Coles on the Friday before a budget that will lead straight into an election campaign? Short answer: not for any worthy reason.

One worthy reason could have been to show Anthony Albanese and Treasurer Jim Chalmers really wanted to do something about fixing the cost of living, by making the question of what we should do about our overcharging grocery oligopoly a major issue for discussion in the campaign.

Since the remedies proposed by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission in its report seem so inadequate, should the two grocery giants be broken up? As, indeed, Opposition Leader Peter Dutton says he would do if elected.

As the business press so indelicately put it, the competition watchdog’s mild-mannered recommendations despite all its evidence of what the punters see as “price gouging” meant the supermarket giants had “dodged a bullet”. But should they have? Let’s discuss it.

Sorry, I’ve been observing the behaviour of politicians for too long to believe Labor’s motives for releasing the report at such a time could possibly be so pure. It’s more likely the reverse: Labor wants to close the issue down.

What Labor did last week looks suspiciously like what’s known in the trade as “taking out the trash”. When you’ve got an embarrassing report you hope won’t get much notice from the media, you release it on a Friday, when the media’s busy packing up for the weekend. The reporters ought to return to the topic on Monday, but they don’t because of their obsession with newness. Spin doctors 1; press gallery 0.

Or governments can achieve the same result by releasing an embarrassing report at a time when everyone’s attention is turned to a much bigger issue – say, a budget, or an election campaign.

But why didn’t Labor just keep the report to itself until after the election? Because, I suspect, it wanted to show it had been on the job, investigating complaints about supermarket overcharging.

And it probably wanted to arm itself to reply to Dutton’s promise to break up the two giants. “We had the competition watchdog investigate the matter, and it explicitly declined to recommend divestment. But it did make 20 recommendations, and we’ve accepted them all.”

(The last time I heard that one was before the 2019 federal election, when the Morrison government released the report of the royal commission into misconduct in banking and said it had accepted all its recommendations. After the election it dropped many of them.)

But if even Labor isn’t game to touch the thought of breaking up Coles and Woolies, why are the Liberals promising to do it? Because they wouldn’t really.

Why does the notion of divestment frighten Labor? Because it doesn’t want to get offside with business. However, in the case of the two supermarket giants, their interests are defended inside Labor’s corridors of power by their union, “the shoppies”, aka the Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association.

Trouble is, the report’s findings show there’s a lot to try sweeping under the carpet. The two chains account for two-thirds of all supermarket sales, and their market share has increased since 2008 despite the advent of Aldi. Their profitability is among the highest in the world and their profit margins have increased over the past five financial years.

“Grocery prices in Australia have been increasing rapidly over the last five financial years,” the report says. “Most of the increases are attributable to increases in the cost of doing business across the economy, including particularly production costs for suppliers, which has increased supermarkets’ input costs.

“However, Aldi, Coles and Woolworths have increased their product [margins] and earnings-before-interest-and-tax margins during this time, meaning that at least some of the grocery price increases have resulted in additional profits.”

So if the Libs don’t seize on the report’s findings to step up their claim to want to do something real and lasting about the cost of living, it will be a sign they’re not genuine in their professed desire to break up the grocery oligopoly. A sign both sides of politics want the report and its disturbing findings buried ASAP.

But it’s not just the political duopoly that doesn’t want to know about the pricing power of the grocery market’s big two. Most of the nation’s economics profession don’t want to think about it either. Why not? Because it’s empirical evidence that laughs at their conventional model – whether mental or mathematical – of how the economy works.

There’s a host of contradictions in their model, and the profession long ago decided that the easiest way to leave its beliefs unchallenged and unchanged was to avoid thinking about them. (And for all those economists snorting with derision as they read yet more of Gittins’ nonsense, I have five words: “theory of the second best”. Those words strike terror into the heart of every conventional economist.)

Economists divide their discipline into micro (the study of how individual markets work) and macro (study of how the whole market economy works), but they’ve given up trying to make the two approaches fit together. This groceries report is a classic example of how the two lines of thinking don’t fit.

Every microeconomist studying “imperfect competition” (aka “industrial organisation”) knows oligopoly brings market power and allows firms to avoid competition on price. But every macroeconomist assumes – explicitly or implicitly – that market power isn’t a relevant problem.

As we saw with the conventional wisdom on the domestic causes of the recent inflation surge, the Reserve Bank assumed it was caused by excessive monetary and budgetary stimulus. That is, it was caused by “demand-pull” not “cost-push” inflation pressure.

The fact that, through our own neglect, we have one of the most oligopolised economies in the developed world, is assumed away. We’ve allowed our economy to become inflation-prone, while economists in general, and the supposedly inflation-obsessed Reserve Bank, have said not a word.

But not to worry. We’ll compensate for our negligence by punishing people with home loans all the harder.

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Maybe the inflation surge didn't happen the way we've been told

According to Reserve Bank deputy governor Andrew Hauser last week, we’ve entered a world characterised not just by volatility, complexity and uncertainty, but also by “ambiguity” – a world where “you don’t know the model”, meaning that “judgment and instinct are as important as formal analysis”.

At last, someone is talking sense.

Academic economists may be locked into their maths and econometric models, but practising economists know it ain’t that simple. Economics is as much an art as a science.

Economics would be much easier if only human consumers and businesspeople behaved like rational automatons, reacting automatically and mechanically to known incentives, as you implicitly assume they do when you use a set of equations to guide you through the inevitable uncertainty caused by the lamentable truth than the humans who constitute the economy are . . . human.

Keynes reminded his fellow academics of the need to take account of people’s “animal spirits”. Anyone familiar with markets knows they tend to alternate between periods of optimism and pessimism. I prefer to say that maths without psychology will usually get it wrong.

Contrary to the assumption of the simple model that dominates the thinking of almost all economists, humans are not rugged individualists who decide for themselves the best thing to do, then do it without regard to what anyone else is doing.

In reality, consumers and businesspeople are heavily influenced by what other people are doing. We’re susceptible to herd behaviour, fads and fashions. And we live in a permanent state of uncertainty.

In their landmark book, Radical Uncertainty: Decision-making Beyond the Numbers, John Kay and Mervyn King say it’s not true, as economists assume, that businesses are “profit maximising”. That’s not because they wouldn’t like maximum profits, but because they don’t know the magic price to charge that would do the trick.

As the punters often forget, when a firm raises its price, it’s taking a risk. It’s taking a bet that what it gains in higher revenue won’t be cancelled out by the sales it loses from customers unwilling to pay the higher price.

In the real world, firms feel their way with price increases, hoping to avoid going over the top and ending up worse off. But get this: they feel a lot more comfortable putting up their prices when everyone else is putting up theirs. You know, like our firms were doing a year or two ago.

Hauser says that, at present, “we don’t know the model” but, in fact, the Reserve and everyone else are using the same orthodox, mainstream model to explain why, after staying low for almost 30 years, the annual rate of inflation took off in late 2021 and reached a peak of 7.8 per cent by the end of 2022.

As I’ve written incessantly, this first inflation surge in three decades was caused by the COVID-19 pandemic (with a little help from Russia’s attack on Ukraine). The pandemic caused worldwide disruptions to supply, in turn causing the prices of many goods to leap. The second factor was the massive monetary and budgetary stimulus the authorities let loose to keep the economy alive during the lockdowns.

This conventional wisdom is easily accepted because it blames most of the problem on the government. Inflation surged because the authorities cut interest rates and increased government spending by far more than proved necessary. All of us borrowed more and spent more, causing demand to run ahead of supply and prices to rise.

But I’ve long suspected this isn’t the whole story, or even the main story. So, since even the Reserve Bank isn’t sure we’ve got the right model to explain what’s happening in the economy, let me show you my model, which puts most emphasis on psychological factors.

When people in many countries were confined to their homes, they could still use the internet to buy goods, but they couldn’t spend on personally delivered services. So spending on goods surged to levels far greater than businesses were used to supplying. And, since most manufactured goods are imported, we got shortages of ships and shipping containers to go with shortages of cars, silicon chips, building materials and much else.

When Russia’s invasion of Ukraine caused oil and gas prices to soar as well, the media went for weeks with stories of how much prices would be rising. Reporters would go to industry lobby groups, whose shills would regretfully affirm that, yes, prices would be rising hugely. The ABC gave much publicity to some wiseguy claiming the price of a cup of coffee would jump to $8. Great story; pity it was BS.

I could see what was happening at the time. Businesses were using the media to soften up their customers for big price rises. They were setting up a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Only in recent times have academic economists begun to understand the important role played in the economy by “signalling” – a role not captured by their equations. Not only were firms signalling to customers that, due to causes entirely beyond their control, big price rises were unavoidable, they were signalling to all their mates that now would be a great time to whack up their own prices.

But my alternative explanation doesn’t start there. Remember that, for seven whole years before this latest price surge, the inflation rate was stuck below the bottom of the 2 to 3 per cent target range, despite the Reserve’s efforts to get it up.

Why was inflation unacceptably low? My theory is it was another self-fulfilling prophecy. Businesses weren’t game to raise their prices because no other businesses were raising theirs. Everyone was waiting for some inflationary event to give them some cover, but nothing turned up.

Until the pandemic’s supply disruptions and the Russia-induced jump in oil and gas prices turned up. As soon as it did, everyone breathed a sigh of relief and began wondering how big an increase they could get away with.

The irony is that the pandemic-induced supply disruptions – and even, to an extent, the oil and gas price rises – proved temporary and were reversed. Leaving all the unrelated price rises to stand.

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In 50 years, Trump will be remembered as just a puzzling footnote

I know I’m a bit late, but welcome to 2025. Before we get on with a year of absolutely gratuitous economic angst courtesy of a great American conman’s second coming, let’s take a breath and realise we’re already a quarter of the way through what many still think of as the “new” century.

How time flies while you’re preoccupied with one crisis – one damn thing – after another. I hate to undercut the media’s business model, but old age has taught me that most of the things we find so momentous at the time don’t leave much of a mark on the course of history.

In the heat of battle, we imagine the distant future having been irreversibly shaped by the latest unexpected excitement. A global trade war, for instance. Sorry, a beginner’s error.

Late last year I learnt that, in 1975, “15 leading Australians” had produced a book titled Australia 2025, which examined “the changing face of their country 50 years from now”. It was published by Electrolux, maker of vacuum cleaners.

What a great way to kick off another year of columns, I thought as I asked our library to disinter this gem from the archives. To be honest, I expected it would be great fun. All those fearless predictions about how, by 2025, we’d be flying to work in our spaceships. Or maybe by then computers would mean everyone was working from home.

Wrong. The chapter on the economy was written by someone I dimly remember, BHP’s chief economist at the time, John Brunner. He was far too smart to get caught making fanciful predictions about spaceships or anything else much. He devoted most of his 10 pages to explaining why anything he predicted was likely to be wrong.

He listed all the country’s recent problems, which many more impetuous observers could be tempted to foresee changing our future, while then expressing his doubts. For example, at that time, and still under the Whitlam government, we had a big problem with double-digit inflation. Would this problem be with us for another 50 years?

Brunner recorded all the reasons for thinking it might: “the increasing power of the unions, more generous unemployment benefits, vulnerability of capital-intensive industry to strikes” and “perhaps most potent of all, the commitment of governments to full employment”.

Even so, Brunner doubted it. And he was right. “What?” you say. “We’ve had a problem with high inflation in just the past few years.”

True. But much of the reason we’ve found it so disconcerting is that we’ve become so unused to high inflation. This latest, pandemic-caused surge in prices ended a period of about 30 years in which inflation stayed low, in Australia and all other rich countries.

Why is it so rare for the problem of the moment to be the thing that shapes the next 50 years? Because, as Brunner well understood, when big problems emerge, ordinary businesses and consumers look for ways around them, while governments look for ways to fix them. Action leads inevitably to reaction. And market economies like ours are adept at finding solutions to problems.

Consider Brunner’s list of reasons for predicting eternal high inflation. Powerful unions? Globalisation stopped that. So did the deregulation of wage-fixing. Generous unemployment benefits? Tell that to the Australian Council of Social Service. These days, every sensible person thinks the dole is too low.

As for “the commitment of governments to full employment”, it became a commitment in name only just a few years after Brunner was writing. Overseas economists invented an escape clause they called the “non-accelerating inflation” rate of unemployment, or NAIRU, and naturally, our government and its econocrats jumped at it.

For about the first 30 years after World War II, our rate of unemployment rarely got above 2 per cent. Allow for the workers who happened to be between jobs at any given time and that really was full employment.

But by 1975, inflation was in double digits and the unemployment rate had jumped to 4.6 per cent. The governments of the rich economies dumped the full-employment objective and turned every effort towards getting inflation down.

Thanks mainly to all the extra money the Morrison government spent during the pandemic, our unemployment rate fell to 3.5 per cent early in the Albanese government’s term. As I hope you remember hearing, this was the lowest unemployment had fallen to “in about 50 years”.

Quite accidentally, we’d got back to something like full employment. But get this. If you wonder why the Reserve Bank is so reluctant to cut interest rates, it’s because its battered old NAIRU machine keeps telling it unemployment is still too low.

This brings me to a bit of Brunner wisdom worth repeating 50 years later. “One of the superstitions to which modern man is particularly susceptible is the idea that what comes out of the computer must represent the law and the prophets [the Old Testament].”

“But of course what comes out of a computer depends on what goes into it and if you feed in neo-Malthusian assumptions you will get gloomy answers.” (Thomas Malthus was a notoriously pessimistic English economist from the 18th century.)

Finally, this: “Probably no profession spends more time contemplating the future than the economics profession and yet few are worse equipped for the task. For whatever facility they may have for manipulating economic variables, economists really know very little indeed about what determines economic magnitudes, particularly in the long run.

“The long-term rate of economic growth, for instance, will be determined by a host of political, technological and cultural factors which no economist has any special claims to be able to predict.”

Ah. They don’t make business economists like him any more.

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Think the measurement of inflation's a bit off? You're probably right

By MILLIE MUROI, Economics Writer

If you’ve ever looked at the latest inflation figures and thought to yourself it doesn’t really reflect the ballooning or shrinking prices you’ve been paying, you’re probably right.

Like most measures of our economy’s health, the consumer price index (CPI) – our main inflation gauge – is only a rough estimate of what’s happening to prices. It tracks changes in the costs of a vast range of things but also skips over some key items we spend on.

This week, we learned prices at the end of last year were climbing at the slowest annual rate since March 2021 at 2.4 per cent (a much more reassuring figure than the 7.8 per cent we were seeing two years ago). But if you feel like the prices you’re paying are moving to a different tune, they probably are.

The index, measured by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, basically tracks the change in the price of a typical “basket” of goods and services that we, as households, consume. Think: a big shopping trolley that carries a lot more than what you’d find in a supermarket. Sure, it includes eggs and fruit, but it also includes things like school fees, specialist visits and subscriptions to your favourite streaming platform.

Of course, you probably don’t spend on the exact same things, or buy the exact same amount, as people on the other side of the country – or even your neighbours – which is why the inflation measure isn’t a perfect fit for specific households.

The CPI is based on the average spending habits of everyone (well, at least those living in the capital cities). Then, based on this data, the bureau gives different “weightings” – a measure of an item’s relative importance in the total basket – to different items and categories. Things we spend a lot of our money on – like housing costs and food – get a bigger weighting in the index, meaning any changes in prices in those categories will shift the dial more when it comes to the final inflation figure.

Since the things we tend to spend on change over time, the bureau frequently updates these weightings.

The first ever “basket” in 1948, for example, put the proportion of our spending on food and non-alcoholic beverages at nearly one third, with dairy products alone taking up nearly a quarter of our food budget. Women’s clothing, meanwhile, accounted for about 10 per cent of our total spending. Combined with spending on men’s attire at nearly 5 per cent, our total spending on clothing back then took a bigger bite out of our budget than the 12 per cent we used to spend on housing!

Today, food and non-alcoholic drinks account for 17 per cent of the typical household’s spending, and both dairy products and women’s clothing just 1 per cent each – the latter being largely thanks to the rise of mass-produced and cheap imported garments. It’s perhaps little surprise that the biggest share of our spending is now on housing at more than 20 per cent, while transport, including our spending on cars, burns about 11 per cent (transport spending was measured through fares – such as the price of train tickets – which took up about 6 per cent of the typical household budget in 1948 before cars became widespread).

So, how does the bureau know what we’re spending on?

One way is through the household expenditure survey, which is conducted roughly every five years and gives the bureau an indication of how much we’re spending on different goods and services. It’s the reason why, for many years, the CPI weightings – only changed about every five years. Now, as collecting information has become easier and more digital, the weightings are updated every year and rely on various sources including retail trade and transaction data.

The bureau gets its pricing data by monitoring the prices of thousands of products. It looks for this information through everything from websites, to supermarket and department store data, as well as pricing data it receives from government authorities, energy providers and real estate agents.

Combining the pricing and weighting data gives us the consumer price index which is released in its complete form every three months. Since September 2022, the bureau has also published a monthly CPI reading, although the goods and services measured each month tend to alternate, giving us an incomplete picture of what’s going on.

As we’ve talked about, the CPI isn’t an accurate measure of our cost of living, although we all assume it is.

A better measure is the bureau’s “selected living-cost indexes” which break down changes in the cost of living for different types of households. Working households, for example, saw their annual living costs rise by 4.7 per cent last September quarter, while self-funded retirees only experienced a 2.8 per cent increase.

That’s mostly because different household types tend to splash cash on different things. Self-funded retirees and age pensioners might, for instance, spend slightly more on health, meaning any price changes there may bump their cost of living more than it would for working households.

But by far the biggest reason for the difference between working households and older cohorts is that working households are more likely to have a mortgage they are paying off. This means changes in interest rates – which are included in the selected living cost indexes but not the CPI – have a bigger impact on their overall cost of living.

It’s also one of the biggest shortcomings of the CPI. In the early 1990s, the Reserve Bank started using interest rates to target inflation: a practice that’s now become very familiar to us all. But later that decade, the bank asked the bureau to remove interest rates from the consumer price index. Why? Because the bank didn’t want the instrument it was using to control the rise in prices — interest rates — to be included among the price rises being measured. Your instrument should be separate from your target.

Instead, since 1998, the CPI has measured housing prices through changes in components such as rents, the cost of building new homes, and the cost of maintenance and repairs. But that means for the roughly one third of Australian households with a mortgage, the CPI is not a very good measure of the price pressures they are facing.

While the CPI is a rough estimate of the cost of living pressures we’re facing, if you feel like the pinch you’re feeling is harder or softer than the latest figures suggest, you’re probably right.

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Why we'd be mugs to focus on the cost of living at the election

It’s a good thing I’m not a pessimist because I have forebodings about this year’s federal election. I fear we’ll waste it on expressing our dissatisfaction and resentment rather than carefully choosing the major party likely to do the least-worst job of fixing our many problems.

Rather than doing some hard thinking, we’ll just release some negative emotion. We’ll kick against the pricks – in both senses of the word.

We face a choice between a weak leader in Anthony Albanese (someone who knows what needs to be done, but lacks the courage to do much of it) and Peter Dutton (someone who doesn’t care what needs to be done, but thinks he can use division to snaffle the top job).

By far the most important problem we face – the one that does most to threaten our future – is climate change. We’re reminded frequently of that truth – the terrible Los Angeles fires; last year being the world’s hottest on record – but the problem’s been with us for so long and is so hard to fix that we’re always tempted to put it aside while we focus on some lesser but newer irritant.

Such as? The cost of living. All the polling shows it’s the biggest thing on voters’ minds, with climate change – and our children’s future – running well behind.

Trouble is, kicking Albanese for being the man in charge during this worldwide development may give us some momentary satisfaction, but it will do nothing to ease the pain. Is Dutton proposing some measure that would provide immediate relief? Nope.

Why not? Because no such measure exists. There are flashy things you could do – another big tax cut, for instance – but they’d soon backfire, prompting the Reserve Bank to delay its plans to cut interest rates, or even push them a bit higher.

We risk acting like an upset kid, kicking out to show our frustration without thinking about whether that will help or hinder their cause.

Rather than finding someone to kick, voters need to understand what caused consumer prices to surge, and what “the authorities” – in this case, Reserve Bank governor Michele Bullock and the board, not Albanese – are doing to stop prices rising so rapidly.

The surge was caused by temporary global effects of the pandemic – which have since largely gone away – plus what proved to be the authorities’ excessive response to the pandemic, which is taking longer to fix.

It’s primarily the Reserve Bank that’s fixing the cost of living, and doing it the only way it knows: using higher mortgage interest rates to squeeze inflation out of the system. But doesn’t that hurt people with mortgages? You bet it does.

What many voters don’t seem to realise is that, by now, the pain they’re continuing to feel is coming not from the disease but the cure. Not from further big price rises but from their much higher mortgage payments.

So it’s the unelected central bank that will decide when the present cost-of-living pain is eased by lowering interest rates, not Albanese or Dutton. A protest vote on the cost of living will achieve little. Of course, if you think it would put the frighteners on governor Bullock, go right ahead. She doesn’t look easily frightened to me.

But there’s another point that voters should get. When people complain about the cost of living, they’re focusing on rising prices (including the price of a home loan). What matters, however, is not just what’s happening to the prices they pay, but what’s happening to the wages they use to do the paying.

When wages are rising as fast as prices – or usually, a little faster – most people have little trouble coping with the cost of living. But until last year, wages rose for several years at rates well below the rise in prices. Get it? What’s really causing people to feel cost-of-living pain is not so much continuing big price rises or even high mortgage payments, but several years of weak wage growth.

Why does this different way of joining the dots matter? Because, when it comes to wages, there is a big difference between Albanese and Dutton.

Since returning to government in 2022, Labor has consistently urged the Fair Work Commission to grant generous annual increases in the minimum award pay rates applying to the bottom fifth of wage earners.

This will have helped higher-paid workers negotiate bigger rises – as would Labor’s various changes to industrial relations law. Indeed, this is why wages last year returned to growing a fraction faster than prices.

These efforts to increase wage rates are in marked distinction to the actions of the former Coalition government. So kicking Albanese for presiding over a cost-of-living crisis risks returning to power the party of lower wages.

But here’s the trick: it also risks us taking a backward step on climate change. The party that isn’t trying hard enough could be replaced by a Coalition that wants to stop trying for another decade, while it thinks about switching from renewables to nuclear energy.

From the perspective of our children and grandchildren, the best election outcome would be a minority government dependent on the support of the pollies who do get the urgency of climate action: the Greens and teal independents.

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What's happened to the cost of living is trickier than you think

It’s been a year of wearying in the fight against inflation. But if you think you know what it all proves, you’re probably kidding yourself. The first mistake is to subject it to too much rational analysis.

While voters in Oz complain incessantly about “the cost of living”, the mug punters who put Donald Trump back in the White House were said to be on about “inflation”. Aren’t they the same thing? Well, maybe, maybe not.

A penny dropped for me when I heard some woman in America justify voting for Trump by saying that the prices went up and they never came back down. What? Since when does inflation go away because retail prices have come back down?

Well, only in economics textbooks. In the real world, inflation is the rate of increase in prices, and you fix it not by reducing the level of prices, but by reducing the rate at which they continue rising.

So what was that woman on about? Don’t ask an economist. Ask a psychologist, however, and they’ll tell you that the reason people give you for doing something – buying this house rather than that one; voting for Trump rather than Joe Biden – isn’t necessarily the real reason. Indeed, the person may not actually know why they jumped the way they did.

Their subconscious mind made a snap decision to favour A rather than B and then, when asked why, their conscious mind came up with a reason they thought would sound plausible. The woman’s subconscious may simply have liked the look of Trump rather than Biden. Or maybe a lot of the people she knew were voting for Trump, so she did too.

Biden and his supporters – plus many rational economists – couldn’t see why everyone was so upset about inflation. The rate of inflation had come back a long way, wages were growing solidly and all without unemployment worsening much. Pretty good job, I’d say. What’s the problem?

Ah, said the smarties, you don’t understand that people care far more about inflation than about unemployment. Inflation hits everyone, whereas unemployment affects only a few.

Is that what you think? If so, you’re probably too young to know what happens in a real recession. When unemployment is soaring and the evening news shows pictures of more workers getting the sack every night, believe me, the punters get terribly frightened they may lose their own job.

It’s a Top 40 effect. No matter how few tunes are selling, there’s always one that’s selling a fraction more copies than the others. That’s what’s topping the pops this week. If people aren’t worried about their jobs, they can afford to be worried about high prices. When they are worried about their jobs, they stop banging on about prices.

This means the managers of the economy – and the government of the day – are often in the gun. Whatever dimension of the economy, and people’s lives, isn’t travelling well at the time is what the punters will be complaining about.

But also, it’s worth remembering that whenever pollsters ask Aussies what’s worrying them, “the cost living” always rates highly – even at times when economists can’t see there’s a problem. Why? Ask a psychologist. It’s because retail prices have “salience” – they stick out in the minds of people who shop at the supermarket every week.

The one thing voters know is that prices keep rising. And they’ve never liked it. They don’t like it whether prices are rising by 2 per cent or 10 per cent – and the highly selective consumer price index they carry in their heads always tells them it’s nearer 10 per cent than 2.

Why? Salience. They remember every big price rise indelibly, but soon forget any falls in prices. And get this: in their mental CPI, all the prices that don’t change get a weighting of zero.

When Australian voters complain about the “cost of living” and American voters complain about “inflation”, are they talking about the same thing? Logically, they shouldn’t be, but actually, they are.

To a rational economist, determining what’s happening to the cost of living involves comparing what’s happening to prices on the one hand with what’s happening to wages and other income on the other. Strictly, the comparison should be with after-tax income.

But that’s not how voters in either country see it. They keep prices in one mental box, but wages in another. The pay rises they get are taken for granted as something they’ve earned by their own hard effort. But then, when I got to the supermarket, I discovered the cheating bastards had whacked up all their prices. I’ve been robbed!

Does this mean workers don’t mind if their take-home pay isn’t keeping with prices? Of course not. They feel the loss; they’re just confused about what’s causing it. I think that, for many people, what matters, and sticks in their mind, is how often they run out of money before their next payday.

My theory is that, because wages rose a bit faster than prices for so many years, many people have developed the unconscious habit of spending a little more each year. But when wages stop rising a little faster than prices – as they have done since March 2021 – people do feel it. They look around for someone to blame and the first thing they see is Woolies and Coles.

But there’s one factor causing pain that’s so well concealed that few people – even few economists – have noticed. One reason take-home pay has fallen well behind prices – a reason the unions and Labor thought was a great thing, and the Morrison government was too weak-kneed to stop – was the mandatory rises in employers’ contributions to their workers’ superannuation savings, which have lifted it from 9.5 per cent of your wage in 2021 to 11.5 per cent in July this year, and will take it to 12 per cent in July next year.

To the naked eye, it’s the employers who’re paying for this. But there’s strong evidence that the bosses reduce their ordinary pay rises to fit. If so, this will be a pain wage earners are feeling without knowing who to blame.

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Memo to RBA: If wages growth isn't the problem, what is?

 I can’t help wondering if the Reserve Bank isn’t misreading the economy. And it seems I’m not alone.

When you’re seeking to manage the economy through its ups and downs, it’s critically important to diagnose its problems correctly. If you’ve misread the symptoms, you can make things worse rather than better. Or, for instance, you can single out citizens who had the temerity to borrow heavily to buy their home and subject them to needless punishment.

Last week, several things made me start wondering if the Reserve needs a rethink. The first was a paper by America’s highly regarded Brookings Institution, that I should have got onto in August.

The world’s central banks – including ours – have concluded that this unexpected burst of inflation is explained partly by temporary disruption to the supply of goods caused by the pandemic (and Russia’s attack on Ukraine), and partly by excessive demand following the authorities’ excessive economic stimulus to counter the lockdowns.

Sorry, not true says the Brookings study, which looked at new data.

“The vast majority of the COVID-19 inflation surge is accounted for by supply-linked factors, especially a rise in company [profit] margins that followed severe delivery delays at the height of the pandemic. Demand-linked factors, notably indicators of labour market overheating, play almost no role.

“As a result, the argument that policy stimulus was excessive is weak,” the study says. And, since company profit margins have yet to return to their previous level, this suggests the inflation rate has yet to fall as the effects of the pandemic continue to unwind. If so, the US Federal Reserve may have overtightened.

Now, all that refers to the US economy and may not apply to ours. May not, but I doubt it.

Despite four successive quarters in which the economy’s rate of growth in “aggregate demand” has been very weak, our Reserve is delaying a reduction in interest rates because, it says, the level of demand is still higher than the level of supply. If so, the rate of inflation may not keep falling, or may even start rising.

How does the Reserve know the level of supply is too low? Mainly by looking at the measure of idle capacity in the jobs market – aka the rate of unemployment.

So, when we saw the figures for October last week, and they showed unemployment still stuck at an exceptionally low 4.1 per cent, no higher than it was in January, it wasn’t surprising that many concluded the Reserve wasn’t likely to start cutting the official interest rate until May next year.

But hang on. One good measure of the job market’s ability to supply more labour as required is the “participation rate” – the proportion of the working-age population willing to participate in the paid labour force by either having a job or actively seeking one.

Now, the econocrats have been predicting that the ageing of the population would cause the “part rate” to start falling for at least the past 20 years. But in that time, it has kept going up rather than down, and is now higher than ever. Last week’s figures show it’s risen by a strong 0.5 percentage points to 67.2 per cent over just the past year.

So where’s the evidence the economy’s reached the end of its capacity to supply more workers?

My guess is that all the Reserve’s unaccustomed talk about the level of supply being too low relative to demand is just a way for it to avoid admitting that its judgment about when to start cutting interest rates is still – as it has been for all macroeconomists for the past 40 years – heavily reliant on its calculation of the present NAIRU: the “non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment”, which is the lowest the unemployment rate can fall before shortages of labour cause wage inflation to start going back up.

I think the Reserve’s reluctance to cut is driven by its (undisclosed) calculation that the NAIRU is well above 4.1 per cent. But earlier this month, Treasury secretary Dr Steven Kennedy told a parliamentary committee that, though such calculations are “uncertain”, Treasury estimates that the NAIRU is “around 4.25 per cent, close to the current rate of unemployment”.

Another thing we learnt last week was that a key measure of the rate at which wages are rising, the wage price index, rose by 0.8 per cent during the September quarter, causing the annual rate to fall from 4.1 per cent to 3.5 per cent.

According to Adam Boyton and other economists at the ANZ Bank, this caused the six-month annualised rate of wages growth to be unchanged at 3.2 per cent. “Wages growth has slowed across awards, enterprise bargaining agreements and individual agreements, pointing to a broad-based slowdown,” they said.

This – combined with the lack of increase in the rate of unemployment over the past year, and allowing for the delay before what’s happening to unemployment affects wage rates – has led these economists to conclude the NAIRU is closer to 3.75 per cent.

Finally, Westpac chief economist Dr Luci Ellis noted last week that another measure of wages pressure, the cost of labour per unit (which takes account of changes in the productivity of workers), has fallen from an annualised rate of 7 per cent to 3.5 per cent in just the six months to September.

She said that even if the annual improvement in the productivity of labour averages a touch below 1 per cent, which would be worse than our recent performance, annual wages growth averaging 3.2 per cent – as it has for the past three quarters – is “well and truly consistent with inflation averaging 2.5 per cent or below”.

Get what all this says? Ever since the Reserve began raising interest rates in May 2022, it has worried about the possibility of excessive growth in wages keeping inflation above the Reserve’s target zone. In all that time, and particularly now, it’s shown absolutely no sign of doing so. Neither shortages of labour nor the (much reduced) power of the unions has caused a problem.

The Reserve needs to lose its hang-up about wages and think harder about the need to ease the pain on innocent bystanders.

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You can blame Albanese for all our woes - except the cost of living

I try not to be a pollie basher – we get the politicians we deserve – but I can’t remember a time when I’ve been more disillusioned and disheartened by the performance of both major parties. It’s fair to criticise them on every topic except the one that obsesses us: the cost-of-living crisis.

Let’s start with that. For several years, we had prices rising at a rate that was actually lower than the Reserve Bank and economists regarded as healthy: less than 2 per cent a year. But then, in the months before the federal election in May 2022, at which Scott Morrison and crew were tossed out, prices took off.

By the end of that year, consumer prices had risen by almost 8 per cent. As you remember, the Reserve Bank began trying to get inflation back under control the only, crude way it knows: to discourage households from spending so much by using higher interest rates – particularly on home loans – to leave us with less to spend on other things.

Why did the Reserve Bank start raising rates during the election campaign, rather than waiting until it was over? Because it foresaw that a change of government was likely and didn’t want anyone getting the idea that it was the new government that had caused the problem.

By the same token, it’s hard to blame the surge in prices on the Morrison government. Prices took off in all the rich economies for much the same reasons. First, because the pandemic caused major disruption to supply of many goods, and because Russia’s attack on Ukraine disrupted world gas and oil markets.

But second, because the efforts to prop the economy up during the lockdowns – by slashing interest rates almost to zero, and the shedloads of government spending on the JobKeeper scheme, the temporary doubling of unemployment benefits, and on many other things – proved to be wildly excessive. When people started spending all that extra money, demand for goods and services grew faster than businesses’ ability to supply them, so they whacked up their prices.

You could blame this gross miscalculation on Morrison & Co – except that it was the first pandemic the world had seen in a century, the medicos had no idea how bad it would be or how long it would take to develop a vaccine, and like all governments everywhere, our government and its econocrats decided it would be safer to do too much than too little.

Since then, the passing of the international supply disruptions and the Reserve Bank’s many interest-rate increases have succeeded in getting the rate of price increase down a long way. But the bank won’t start cutting interest rates until it’s convinced our return to the 2 to 3 per cent inflation target zone will last.

Despite the unceasing criticism of a largely partisan news media, the Albanese government’s part in helping get inflation back under control has been as good as it’s reasonable to expect.

One reason it’s taking so long is that both the government and the Reserve Bank have been trying to avoid causing a huge rise in unemployment, and in this, they’ve been spectacularly successful. The proportion of the working-age population with jobs is at a record high.

So if it’s not fair to blame Albanese and his ministers for the cost-of-living crisis, why am I so critical and disapproving of the government – not to mention the opposition?

Because on almost every other matter Albanese has touched, he’s done far less than he should have. And in their time on the opposition benches, the Liberals and their Coalition partners have laboured mightily to make themselves more extreme and less electable.

As always, we turned to a new government in 2022 full of hope that it would make a much better fist of dealing with our many problems. And it’s always been true that Albanese and his people knew what needed doing. It’s just that, somewhere along the line, he seems to have lost his bottle.

He’s done a bit to tackle each of our big problems, but with one exception, he’s stopped short of doing nearly enough. Everything gets a lick and a promise.

The one exception has been the government’s significant efforts to reduce job insecurity – to improve the wages and conditions of less-skilled workers – for which we can thank the unions. Under the Labor Party’s constitution, the union movement holds a mortgage over the party and its members of parliament.

On everything else, Albanese seems to live in fear of annoying some interest group somewhere. So he always does something, but never enough. When business and other interest groups lobby the government privately to tone down its planned changes, he invariably obliges.

You can see this in the government’s changes to gambling advertising, Medicare bulk-billing, the adequate taxation of mining and gas, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (no public hearings), the housing crisis, vocational education and training, aged care and so forth.

But on no issue has Albanese failed so badly as on the one most vital to our future: climate change. Sure, he’s shored up the Coalition government’s “safeguard mechanism” and legislated the target of reducing emissions by 43 per cent by 2030. At the same time, however, he’s acted to secure the future of natural gas extraction and authorised expansion of three big coal mines.

It’s as though he’s taking an each-way bet. He seems desperate to stay in office, but has no great plans to govern effectively.

Meanwhile, under Peter Dutton, the Liberals and their pro-mining National Party colleagues have used their time in opposition to make themselves negative, divisive and utterly unworthy to take over from a weak government. Their one substantive policy is to be off with the nuclear fairies.

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How weak competition forces up food prices along the supply chain

By Millie Muroi, Economics Writer

The first most of us see of our groceries is the end product – after all the planting, growing, shipping and packaging has happened. So when we’re hit with a big bill at the checkout, it’s easy to blame supermarkets for the expensive beef, carrot or turnip that ends up on our forks.

We know Coles and Woolies have received raps on their knuckles for their behaviour recently, including alleged false discounts to lure in customers. But it’s not just customers or the competition watchdog dishing out their disdain. And it’s far from just the supermarkets that have pointed questions to answer.

Dr Andrew Leigh, former economics professor and now assistant minister for competition and treasury, has had a deep-dive into the topic. It turns out the list of possible culprits when it comes to the costly lack of competition is longer than just the supermarkets – and it’s our farmers bearing the brunt of it.

Basically, while our household budgets are getting pushed by pricier produce, farmers are getting squeezed. They’re not just facing higher prices when it comes to key ingredients such as fertiliser and machinery, but also higher costs and unfair terms once their produce is ready to be processed, shipped off and sold.

How do we know this? There are a few key signs.

Concentration is one. “Industries with plenty of competitors tend to deliver better prices, more choices and stronger productivity growth,” Leigh said in a speech this week.

The fewer players there are in a market, the less competitive it tends to be. Less competition usually means lower wages, less choice for consumers and less innovation, with dominant businesses able to charge higher prices than they might otherwise be able to, since they don’t have to worry so much about being undercut or fighting to win over customers with bargains.

Analysis by economic research institute e61 last year found all Australian industries were more concentrated than those in the US, especially in mining, finance and utilities, in which the top four firms have more than 60 per cent market share.

Generally, we see a market as “concentrated” if the biggest four firms control one-third or more of it. In 2016, Leigh and his colleague Adam Triggs found more than half of industries in the Australian economy were concentrated markets. Since then, concentration in Australia has become worse.

Farming, though, is surprisingly competitive – at least for most commodities. So why are we still seeing higher prices at the check-out?

Part of it is thanks to supply chain issues, especially during the pandemic, which meant we couldn’t get as many materials and produce from overseas, reducing supply and driving up prices. Then there’s always the temperamental weather, which can dramatically cut harvests.

But it’s a growing domestic issue which is causing headaches for farmers.

Before anything even springs out of the ground or fattens up in a paddock, farmers are dealt a tricky hand. The largest four fertiliser companies, for example, control nearly two-thirds of the market and the top four hardware suppliers control roughly half of the market, according to Leigh’s analysis of data from IBIS World.

From high-tech harvesters to tractors and seeding equipment, machinery is a big cost paid by farmers. That means when there’s a lack of options and farmers aren’t able to shop around as much, their hip-pockets – and ours – are worse off.

If you think that lack of choice is bad, Leigh says it’s even worse when farmers go to repair and service their equipment.

Farming machinery makers have a lot of power – even more than carmakers – thanks to warranties forcing farmers to go to a specific dealer for servicing, and tech restrictions holding farmers back from accessing the parts, manuals and diagnostic software they need to make repairs themselves.

Then there are seeds. From these little things, big costs can grow. One paper from the US Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service in 2023 found the seed sector had become more concentrated. Between 1990 and 2020, the average seed price soared 270 per cent, and 463 per cent for genetically modified types.

The huge price increase partly accounts for the fact seeds have become better – for example, GMO varieties which have made farming more productive. But as Leigh points out, “there are not many other industries where the price of a key input has grown five-fold in 30 years.”

But that’s not all. Once the cattle has been raised or the blueberries grown, farmers have little choice or bargaining power when it comes to processing, transporting and selling produce.

When it comes to slaughtering cattle, the top five Australian processors accounted for about 57 per cent of the market in 2017, meaning cattle farmers had little choice in the prices and options they accepted. For fruit and vegetable processing, the biggest four companies hold about one-third of the market.

When the produce is ready to be sent out, farmers have even less choice. Two companies – ANL and Maersk – account for 85 per cent of the shipping freight industry in Australia, and four companies control 64 per cent of the market if farmers want to send things via rail.

Farmers, especially those who produce at a smaller scale, often become the “meat in a market concentration sandwich”. 

Farmers, especially those who produce at a smaller scale, often become the “meat in a market concentration sandwich”. Credit:Louise Kennerley

As Leigh points out, the risk of spoilage further limits viable options available to farmers.

Then there’s the supermarket sector, where Coles and Woolies control about two-thirds of the market – a higher share than every OECD country except New Zealand and Norway.

Concentration at all these points means farmers are at greater risk of facing power imbalances, which show up in things such as unfair contracts, where terms are obviously lopsided. Bigger players in these concentrated industries can generally muscle in with terms which are worse for farmers, such as restricting them from raising issues or selling things at unfairly cheap prices.

All of this not only puts pressure on farmers, but can reduce their ability and incentive to invest in improving their product and the way they do things.

As Leigh puts it, farmers, especially those who produce at a smaller scale, often become the “meat in a market concentration sandwich”.

There’s no easy fix in all this, but preventing too many mergers, where companies combine and gobble each other up to become even bigger, is key to promoting competition.

Of course, bigger companies are not always worse. Their scale can allow them to do things more cheaply. But too little competition can lead to pumped-up prices which flow all the way through from more expensive seeds and fertiliser to the prices charged by supermarkets.

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How supermarkets get away with raising their prices

 By Millie Muroi, Economics Writer, October 4,2024 

If Coles and Woolies wanted to get away with higher prices, they just had to tell us.

Alright, it’s not that simple. But there is a getaway car for any business wanting to keep customers coming – even after pumping up their prices. False discounting? No. Read on.

The high-inflation environment has sucked for a lot of us: growing grocery bills, surging insurance premiums and higher housing costs, to name a few. But the way we’ve perceived price increases – and the way we’ve responded to them – tell us (and businesses) a lot about how and when they can push prices up without getting customers cross.

Behavioural science consultancy Dectech took a look at the most recent spurt of inflation in the UK and how consumers saw – and changed their behaviour in response to – large price rises. They did their own testing, too, to see whether different justifications given for those pesky price hikes could change the way customers responded.

Now, you might expect customers to behave consistently to a price rise, regardless of the justification given for it. After all, an $8 packet of chips is still sucking more money out of your bank account than a $5 packet, regardless of the reason given for it.

But the thing about behavioural economics is that it often pokes holes in the neat economic models and theories we have in place to explain how we act. The law of demand, for example, states that as prices rise, customers buy less. Most economic models wouldn’t account for the fact that this depends on how companies explain those price hikes.

But the effect of the reasoning given for inflation can be more influential than the inflation itself, according to Dectech. An unexplained price rise, or a price rise for a “bad reason” can have a similar effect on customer behaviour as a 16 percentage point higher price rise for a “good reason”.

So, what’s the difference between “good” and “bad” reasons? Basically, it comes down to whether the price increase seems fair. Of course, this all comes down to perception. But one thing which helps to increase customers’ perceived “price fairness” is understanding how the price for a product was determined.

Despite the law of demand, pointing to increased demand for a price rise is a “bad” reason: it has the biggest negative effect on customer satisfaction and eagerness to buy a product. This is especially the case for a sector like telecommunications where the retailer doesn’t really have significant supply constraints.

By contrast, the best way to fend off angry customers is to either blame it on cost increases which “have to” be passed on, or to say the price increase covers extra costs needed for product development. Essentially, it has to be either something out of a business’s control, or aimed at improving the customer’s experience.

The worst thing a business can do is give no reason at all and hope no one notices (or, as Coles and Woolies have allegedly done, hide those price rises beneath false discounts, eroding customers’ trust). A 20 per cent price rise with the explanation that you’re investing in the product has the same effect on sales as a 4 per cent price rise with no explanation.

Even something as vague as “due to recent circumstances” is better than nothing. Did the dog eat your conveyor belt? Or is it because of a global supply shock? Who knows – but it works because at least the business is showing the decency to own the price increase. Openness and honesty count for something.

Time-poor and lazy

It also depends on the sector. Dectech’s study found raising prices “to invest in the product” worked especially well for the grocery and airline sectors – at least in the UK. Why? “People want to see better ready-made meals and new aeroplanes,” the authors said.

We also know humans aren’t big fans of change. We’re creatures of habit, often preferring to stick to routine or with what we know. Independent Australian economic research institute e61’s economist Matt Elias took a peek into consumer bank transactions linked to store locations and found there was a “persistent degree of inertia” when it comes to our supermarket choices.

Chances are, even if you have multiple options, you stick with one of the big two: Coles or Woolworths. It’s hard to pinpoint why, but Elias says it could reflect the fact that comparing prices between supermarkets can be tricky: there are so many items which are changing in price from week to week.

Consumers are also time-poor and – let’s face it – lazy. How often do you pull up the websites or catalogues of the major supermarkets to optimise your shopping? Probably not as much as you should or could.

Fluffy handcuffs

Brand loyalty can trap consumers, and unfortunately, it can reduce competition, handing more market power to big companies such as Coles and Woolworths. Why? Because when customers refuse to shop around, there’s less pressure on businesses to offer the best prices.

One way to combat this, Elias says, is to set up a government-supported digital price comparison platform, similar to the websites and apps we have to compare fuel prices. When these systems have been set up overseas, they’ve resulted in lower prices.

Loyalty cards or reward apps can worsen customers’ inertia, acting like fluffy handcuffs. They lock in consumers who would otherwise be more inclined to shop around for the best deal by offering enticing rewards for being faithful. Why cut prices when your customers are busy spending at your store to rack up points?

While economists like to assume people are perfect bargain-hunters, helping to keep companies on their toes and prices in check, the reality is blurrier. From inertia to justifications and loyalty cards, our behaviour is shaped by more than price. Being aware of some of what makes us tick (or sit back) can help businesses make money – but it can also help us save it.

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If there's no 'price gouging' how come interest rates are so high?

The nation’s economists have a dirty little secret. They all believe that what the punters denigrate as “price gouging” is actually a good thing, part of the mechanism by which a market economy returns to “equilibrium” (balance) after it’s been hit by an inflationary shock.

But they have a visceral hatred of terms such as “price gouging” and “profiteering”, and are always producing graphs and calculations purporting to prove that the recent surge in inflation – the worst in about 40 years – has produced no increase in company profits.

What they don’t seem to have noticed, however – or maybe are hoping none of us have noticed – is that you can’t argue that demand has been growing stronger than supply and so causing price increases, thus justifying using higher interest rates to slow down demand, and at the same time claim there’s no evidence that profits have risen.

Sorry, guys. You can’t have it both ways. If you claim there’s been no noticeable rise in profits, you’re contradicting the Reserve Bank’s main justification for its 13 increases in the official interest rate since May 2022. (Which is funny, considering the Reserve has been prominent among those seeking to deny that profits have risen.)

That main justification has been that much of the worsening in the rate of price increases has been caused by “excessive demand”, thus necessitating higher interest rates to discourage us from spending so much.

But how exactly does excessive demand lead to higher prices? It’s simple. When there are more people wanting to buy my product than I and my suppliers can keep up with, I could leave the price I’m charging unchanged, in which case it won’t be long before my shelves are empty, and I have nothing to sell.

That’s not the way it works in practice, however, nor the way it works in economic theory. I take advantage of strong demand to raise the price at which I’m selling the item. Why do I do this? Because, like all business people, I’m trying to maximise my profit.

The higher price means I won’t be selling my stock as fast as I was – so it will take longer for my shelves to empty – but I’ll still be better off.

Economists say that when demand exceeds supply, the stuff still available has to be rationed, one way or another. One way to ration supply is simply to keep selling at an unchanged price until everything is sold. After that, everyone who comes later misses out.

But when the seller raises their price, economists call this “rationing by [higher] price”. They believe this is always the better solution to the rationing problem because it does so in a way that uses the “market mechanism” to fix the problem.

The higher price encourages would-be buyers to reduce their demand – by wasting less of the product, or finding a cheaper substitute – while encouraging suppliers to produce more of the now-more-profitable product.

So because the higher price reduces demand while increasing the supply, the price mechanism causes the price of the item to fall back towards what it first was. Brilliant. Another win for market forces.

But this means a (possibly temporary) rise in prices is an essential part of the price mechanism. So a consequent rise in profits is also an inevitable part of the mechanism.

It’s gone out of fashion but, long ago, economists would say there were two causes of inflation: “cost-push” and “demand-pull”.

Sometimes firms raise their prices because they’re passing on the higher costs they’re paying for their inputs. At other times they’re raising their prices simply because the high demand for their product allows them to.

We now know from the work of behavioural economists that ordinary consumers accept it’s OK for businesses to raise their prices because of their higher costs. But they regard raising your prices just because shortages in supply let you get away with it as exploitative. (The classic example is charging more for umbrellas on rainy days.)

This dual, supply caused and demand-caused, explanation for inflation fits well with the Reserve’s analysis of the origins of the great surge in prices – in all the developed economies – in late 2021 and 2022.

Part of it was from disruptions to supply caused mainly by the COVID-19 pandemic, but also the Ukraine war, which pushed up the cost of building materials, various manufactured goods, shipping and oil and gas. But part of it was caused by the excessive stimulus applied to the economy by governments and central banks during the pandemic and its lockdowns, which had caused the demand for goods and services to run ahead of the economy’s ability to produce them.

Increasing interest rates can do nothing to increase supply, and the end of the lockdowns would see supply gradually return to normal, the Reserve reasoned. But higher rates could dampen the excess demand caused by all the extra government spending and rock-bottom interest rates that was applied to ensure the lockdowns didn’t lead to a lasting recession.

See how this analysis is undermined by claims there’s no sign of firms earning higher profits in the post-pandemic period? It implies that there’s no sign of excess demand, suggesting the surge in prices must have come only from supply disruptions and other cost increases.

In which case, the justification for maintaining high interest rates is greatly weakened. It implies that demand hasn’t been growing excessively and, rather than waiting for the supply problems to resolve themselves, we’re going to batter down demand to fit.

If so, that would be a very painful solution to a temporary problem. And, unlike the inflation problem we suffered in the 1970s, there’s no way this inflation surge can be blamed on excessive growth in wage costs.

Real wage growth had been weak long before the pandemic arrived. And in 2020, many workers were persuaded to skip an annual wage rise in the belief that we’d entered a lasting recession. As we subsequently discovered, government handouts to business meant many businesses sailed through the pandemic with few scratches.

Why so many economists want us to believe that, despite decades of increased market concentration – more industries dominated by just a few huge firms – and despite excessive monetary and budgetary stimulus, profits never increase, I’m blowed if I know.

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Why the Reserve Bank thinks it's too soon to cut interest rates

By Millie Muroi, Economics Writer 

When the Reserve Bank’s second-in-command – recently appointed deputy governor Andrew Hauser – took shots at his closest observers this week, he ruffled plenty of feathers.

“It’s a world of winners and losers, gurus and charlatans, geniuses and buffoons,” he proclaimed. Then he wagged a finger at those confidently commentating from the sidelines on the direction of the economy. “It’s a dangerous game,” he warned.

We know economists – including those at the Reserve Bank – are notoriously bad at knowing exactly what we (and therefore the economy) will do. So, why was Hauser so mad at those confidently making their own calls?

Brash statements made by the media, government and economists have real-world consequences. People often rely on that information to make decisions, from taking out mortgages to negotiating wages.

“What about Phil Lowe?” you may ask. Didn’t the former RBA governor promise in 2021 that interest rates would not go up until 2024? Well, sort of. It was actually couched in caveats which many people glossed over.

The Reserve Bank generally treads carefully because the words of its bosses can shift behaviour: a hidden weapon beyond its interest rate-setting superpower.

RBA governor Michele Bullock often declares she is “not providing forward guidance” when fielding questions from journalists trying to get a steer on interest rates. But last week, she gave the closest thing to guidance in a while: people’s expectation for rate cuts in the next six months doesn’t align with the RBA board’s feeling, she said. At least, “not at the moment.”

In doing so, Bullock flexed the bank’s hidden bicep. She signalled for all of us to rein in our expectations of a rate cut and, she would have hoped, our inflation expectations.

This is important because what people believe can become reality. If we expect inflation to stay high, this belief can feed into the wages we ask for, and the prices businesses charge.

That’s not to say the Reserve Bank doesn’t believe its own thinking. The only medicine it can explicitly prescribe is the level of interest rates, but the central bank busies itself with a lot of data gathering, discussions and number crunching to diagnose the state of the economy.

Core to the Reserve’s thinking is its observation that, collectively, we are consuming more than we can produce for an extended period of time. Sure, young people and mortgage holders have been tightening their belts as housing costs surge. But that’s been more than offset by older, affluent Australians splurging on things such as travel, by population growth and by government spending.

Now, the government has bones to pick with any suggestion that its spending is contributing to inflation. And Government Services Minister Bill Shorten this week trashed RBA chief economist Sarah Hunter’s assessment that the economy is “running a little bit too hot”.

However, it is important to note Hunter’s view isn’t necessarily that Australians are doing too well, or that the economy is bubbling along. It’s more a reflection of the limited spare capacity we have to cater for the spending – however little or much of it we may be doing.

We’re spending “too much” mostly by comparison to the limited resources we have to keep up with it: the people making our coffee in the morning and machines they use to brew it for us, for example.

Unless we become more productive, making more with the things we already have, the more we strain people and machines to meet our demands, and the pricier things will be to produce.

Productivity is especially difficult to improve for sectors such as hospitality, which rely heavily on people rather than machines (there’s only so many ways your barista can brew a coffee faster and better). And it’s why services inflation is proving so much more stubborn than goods inflation.

How does the Reserve Bank know how much spare capacity we have (and therefore how much pressure we might expect on prices)? It looks at something called the output gap: the difference between how much we’re producing and how much we could produce without putting too much pressure on prices.

Heaven for the Reserve Bank would be an output gap of zero. Any lower means we’re not using our resources as intensively as we could – including people who want to work, but can’t find jobs, or machines sitting idle.

Any higher, and we’re using our resources too intensively. This can be OK for a short period, but as workers demand higher wages, machines are run into the ground and businesses compete for a shrinking pool of resources, prices rise. For the past few years, this is the state the Reserve Bank thinks our economy has been in.

Measuring the output gap is tricky. We can’t really see it, and our capacity can change over time as our population changes, or we find better ways to do things. So, how does the RBA measure it?

How much the economy is producing is measured through statistics such as Gross Domestic Product. The trickier task is pinning down how much the economy could produce without adding to inflation. To do this, the Reserve Bank uses economic models which spit out results based on things such as what’s happened in the past and the data plugged into them: relatively straightforward numbers such as population, as well as educated assumptions about other factors influencing the economy.

The bank also asks businesses about their capacity usage through surveys and by chatting with them through its liaison program. Then, there’s also the inflation figure itself.

While the output gap is just one gauge, it is given considerable weight in the Reserve Bank’s decisions. So far, the gap is narrowing, the bank says, but it’s likely we’re still pushing our resources past the ideal level to pull inflation back into line.

There’s not much the central bank can do to increase potential output, or capacity, in the economy, which is why it is instead focusing on weakening our demand, or spending.

While a rate cut now would be like an iron infusion for an anaemic economy, help preserve jobs, and bring mortgage holders relief, the bank is clearly on the warpath against its public enemy number one: inflation.

Keep in mind, though, no one is perfect. The Reserve Bank is careful to stress that the output gap, like most of its other measures, is “subject to considerable uncertainty.”

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One reason for our inflation problem: weak merger law

Nothing excites the business section of this august organ more than news of another merger between two public companies. “Merger” is the polite word for it; usually the more accurate word is “takeover”.

So, is the dominant firm offering a good price for the firm being acquired? And should the shareholders in the dominant firm be pleased or worried about the deal? Will it benefit them, or just the company executives who organised it? A bigger company equals higher salaries and bonuses, no?

The financial press tends to regard takeovers as all good fun. Part of the thrills and spills or living and investing in a capitalist economy. But such mergers change the shape of the economy that provides us with our living. Do they make the economy better or worse?

According to the Albanese government’s Assistant Minister for Competition Dr Andrew Leigh, a former economics professor, some mergers improve the economy, whereas some worsen it.

As he explained in a speech this week, mergers are part of the market mechanism that allows financial capital to go where it’s most needed and will do most good to the consumers, workers and savers who make up an economy.

Most mergers are a healthy way for firms to achieve economies of scale and scope, and to access new resources, technology and expertise, Leigh says.

But mergers can do serious economic harm when firms are motivated by a desire to squeeze competitors out of the market and so capture a larger share of the particular market.

So “the small number of proposed mergers that raise competition concerns warrant close scrutiny” to see whether they should be allowed to proceed, he says.

The point is that, according to economic theory, the main thing ensuring ordinary people benefit from living and working in a capitalist economy is strong competition between the profit-making businesses providing our goods and services, which limits their ability to charge excessive prices and make excessive profits.

Competition obliges businesses to pass on to customers much of the savings they make from using improved technology to increase their economies of scale, while preserving the quality of service provided to their customers.

Similarly, competition between a reasonable number of alternative employers is needed to ensure their workers are fairly paid.

This is why laws controlling mergers are one of the main pillars of policy to keep competition between firms effective, along with prohibitions on the forming of cartels and other collusion between supposedly rival firms, and the misuse of “market power” – the power to keep prices above the competitive level.

Leigh says merger law is unique among those pillars because it’s the preventative medicine of competition law. While the other pillars deal with anticompetitive practices that are already being used, it deals with the likely effect of future anticompetitive actions the merger could make possible.

Fine. Trouble is, reformers have been batting for about 50 years to get effective restrictions on the ability of Australian companies to proceed with mergers designed to limit competition and enjoy excessive pricing power.

Leigh notes that a less-competitive market can add to the cost of doing business, and reduce the incentives and opportunities to invest, grow and innovate. For consumers, a less competitive market leads to higher prices, less choice, and lower growth in wages.

Big companies have resisted previous reforms – sometimes as represented by the (big) Business Council – sometimes, when Labor’s been in power, by big unions in bed with their big employers.

But now the Albanese government is making another attempt to get decent control over mergers that are expected to worsen competition.

And not before time. The challenge in Australia is to name more than a handful of industries not dominated by a few big firms.

Academic research Leigh has been associated with has shown that monopoly power worsens inequality by transferring resources from consumers to shareholders. He found evidence that market concentration – a few firms with a big share of the market – had worsened.

As well, profit margins had worsened and “monopsony hiring power” – few employers in an industry – was a problem in many industries.

After the Albanese government’s election in 2022, Treasurer Jim Chalmers and Leigh set up a Competition Taskforce within the Treasury focused on advising the government on actionable reforms to create a more dynamic and productive economy.

The taskforce’s top priority was to reform our merger laws. Consultations with industries said our piecemeal merger process was unfit for a modern economy and lagged best practice in other countries.

We were one of only three developed countries with a system of notifying proposed mergers that was merely voluntary. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) complained about inadequate notification of proposed mergers, insufficient public information about the mergers, “a reactive, adversarial approach from some businesses” and limited opportunity to present evidence of likely economic harm arising from a particular merger.

In April this year, Chalmers and Leigh announced what they said were “the most significant reforms to merger rules in almost 50 years”. They would reduce three ways of reviewing merger proposals to a single, mandatory but streamlined path to approval, run by the ACCC.

For merger proposals above a monetary threshold or market-concentration threshold, this means those which would create, strengthen or entrench substantial market power will be identified and stopped. But those consistent with our national economic interest will be fast-tracked.

Challenges to the commission’s decisions will be the responsibility of an Australian Competition Tribunal, made up of a Federal Court judge, an economist and a business leader.

This should make it easier for the majority of mergers to be approved quickly, so the commission can focus on the minority that are a worry on competition grounds.

It’s the great number of our industries dominated by just a few firms that makes us especially susceptible to the inflation surge we’re still struggling to get back under control.

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Cost-of-living crisis? Why only some of us are feeling the pinch

If you believe the opinion polls, we’re all groaning under the weight of the cost-of-living crisis. And Treasurer Jim Chalmers confirms we’ve all been “under the pump”. But it’s not that simple. Some of us are doing it a lot tougher than others. And some of us are actually ahead on the deal.

In any case, where did the living-cost crisis come from? That bit’s simple. The economy’s been on a rollercoaster for the past four and a half years. COVID and the lockdowns may seem a distant memory, but almost everything that’s happened in the economy since the end of 2019 has been the direct or indirect consequence of the pandemic.

The surge in consumer prices that began in early 2022 stemmed from a combination of temporary disruptions to supply caused by the pandemic, and excess demand for goods and services as people spent the money they’d earned but couldn’t spend during the lockdowns.

The tax cuts that began this month had been planned for six years, but Chalmers changed their intended shape radically to help people most affected by the cost of living. They mean that, by the end of this year, overall living standards should be just a little up on where they were five years ago.

Just as the media focus on bad news more than good news, so you and I focus more on what’s been happening to the cost of living than what’s been happening to our after-tax income. But it’s the difference between the two – our standard of living – that matters most.

Two economists at the Australian National University’s Centre for Social Policy Research, Associate Professor Ben Phillips and Professor Matthew Gray, have been crunching the numbers, and their results may surprise you.

They’ve examined the change in our standard of living since the end of 2019, and included a forecast up to the end of this year, to take account of the latest tax cuts and changes in the May budget.

Lumping all households together, they find that we did quite well in 2020 and 2021 as the Reserve Bank cut interest rates and governments spent billions on such things as the JobKeeper scheme and temporary doubling of JobSeeker unemployment benefits. But then living standards fell sharply in 2022 as consumer prices took off and housing costs rose. Living standards fell a little further last year, taking them to 0.6 per cent lower than they were before COVID arrived.

The authors estimate that, this year, the tax cuts and continuing pay rises will lift living standards to a princely 1.6 per cent above what they were in December 2019.

But those national averages conceal much variation. When the authors ranked all households by their disposable income, then divided them into five “quintiles”, the poorest 20 per cent are expected to end the five years with their living standard 3.5 per cent higher.

Huh? They did well partly because their pensions and benefits are indexed to inflation.

At the same time, the top 20 per cent of households are expected to be 2.7 per cent ahead. Why? Partly because they did well on their investments.

So it’s the middle 60 per cent of households that have been hit the hardest by the cost of living. The second lowest 20 per cent barely broke even, while the middle and upper-middle quintiles suffered a fall in their living standards.

But now we get to the pointy bit. Why did the middle do so much worse than the rest? Because that’s where you find most of the people with mortgages. Turns out all those households with mortgages are expected to see their living standards fall by 5.6 per cent over the five years to December 2024.

What about renters? Their living standards should rise by 2.9 per cent over the period. Huh? How could that be? It’s true that shortages of rental accommodation have caused rents to rise hugely this year and last. But much of that can be seen as catch-up for the lockdown-caused falls in rents in 2020 and 2021, and the small increases in 2022.

If you’re sitting down, I’ll tell you that the living standards of people who own their homes outright are expected to rise by … 8.5 per cent.

But here’s an even bigger shock: if you divide all the households by their main source of income, those in the “other” category – that is, not reliant on either wages or pensions – should see their standard of living rise by what the authors call “an astounding 15.8 per cent”.

Penny dropped yet? Yes, we’re talking about the group that always has its hand out for a handout to thank it for being too well-off to get the age pension: the self-described, so-called self-funded retirees.

But while you’re feeling sorry for all those poor souls (whose company I’ll be joining one day), spare a kick for the economists who, several decades ago, had the bright idea of using only interest rates to control inflation. They must have had a fairness bypass.

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OECD’s message to our inflation warriors: calm down, she’ll be right

Last week a bunch of international public servants in Paris launched a rocket that landed in Sydney’s Martin Place, near the Reserve Bank’s head office and the centre of our financial markets. It carried a message we should already know. Australia has a big problem with real wages: they’re too low. In which case, why are you guys so anxious about continuing high inflation?

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s annual Employment Outlook says Australia’s real wages in May this year are still 4.8 per cent lower than they were in December 2019, just before the pandemic.

This is one of the largest drops among OECD countries. It compares with real falls of 2 per cent in Germany and Japan, and 0.8 per cent in the United States. Real wages have risen by 2.4 per cent in Canada and 3.1 per cent in Britain.

The organisation observes that, “as real wages are [now] recovering some of the lost ground, profits are beginning to buffer some of the increase in labour costs. In many countries, there is room for profits to absorb further wage increases, especially as there are no signs of a price-wage spiral”.

Just so. But this isn’t something you’re allowed to say out loud in Martin Place. When the Australia Institute copied various overseas authorities in calculating the contribution that rising profits had made to our rising prices, it was dismissed by the Reserve Bank and the financial press.

Apparently, it’s OK for the Reserve to say it must increase interest rates because demand is growing faster than supply and adding to inflation, but it’s not OK to say that businesses have used the opportunity to raise their prices and this has increased their profits.

No, in the Reserve’s eyes, the problem with prices soaring way above its inflation target has never been greedy bosses, but always the risk of greedy workers using their industrial muscle to prevent their real wages from falling and thus causing a price-wage spiral that perpetuates high inflation.

It was a worry that anyone who knew anything about the changed power balance between employers and workers and their unions – anyone who wasn’t still living in the 1970s – could never have entertained.

For many years, the Reserve Bank benefited greatly from having a senior union official appointed to its board along with the many business people. But John Howard soon put a stop to that.

Since then, the Reserve has had to fall back on the primitive understanding of how labour markets work that you gain from a degree in neoclassical economics. Fortunately, since last year the board has included Iain Ross, former president of the Fair Work Commission.

The Reserve’s great sense of urgency in getting the inflation rate back down since it began raising interest rates in May 2022 has been driven by two worries about wages. First, when excessive monetary and budgetary stimulus caused the post-lockdown economy to boom while our borders were closed to imported labour, it worried that shortages of skilled and even unskilled labour would cause wages to leap as employers sought to bid workers away from other firms.

Although job vacancies more than doubled, reaching a peak in May 2022, annual wage growth had risen no higher than 4.2 per cent in December last year, even though consumer price inflation had peaked at 7.8 per cent a year earlier.

So, though no one’s bothered to mention it, our first period of acute labour shortages in decades hardly caused a ripple. It’s probably fair to say, however, that had the shortages not occurred, wages would have fallen even further behind prices than they did.

The Reserve’s second reason for feeling a sense of urgency in getting inflation back down to the target range is its fear that, should we leave it too long, inflation expectations may rise, causing actual inflation to move to a permanently higher level.

Indeed, the signs that our return to target will be slow have been used by the Reserve’s urgers in the financial markets to call for another rate rise or two. Apparently, every week’s delay in getting inflation down could see inflation expectations jump.

But this is mere pop psychology. Even if the nation’s workers and unions were to expect that inflation will stay high, they lack the industrial muscle to raise wage rates accordingly. If you didn’t already know that, our outsized fall in real wages should be all the proof you need.

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It's slowing the spin doctors' spin that keeps me busy

Do you remember former prime minister John Howard’s ringing declaration that “we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come”? It played a big part in helping him win the 2001 federal election. But it’s only true in part.

The job of economic commentators like me is supposed to be telling people about what’s happening in the economy and adding to readers’ understanding of how the economy works.

But the more our politicians rely on spin doctors to manipulate the media and give voters a version of the truth designed always to portray the boss in the most favourable light, the more time I have to spend making sure our readers aren’t being misled by some pollie’s silken words.

These days, I even have to make sure our readers aren’t being led astray by the economics profession. For the first time in many years, I’ve found myself explaining to critical academic economists that I’m a member of the journos’ union, not the economists’ union.

Like many professions, economists are hugely defensive. And they like to imagine my job is to help defend the profession against its many critics. Sorry, I’m one of the critics.

My job is to advise this masthead’s readers on how much of what economists say they should believe, and how much they should question.

It’s not that economists are deliberately misleading, more that they like to skirt around the parts of their belief system that ordinary people find hard to swallow.

And then there’s the increasing tendency for news outlets to pick sides between the two big parties, and adjust their reporting accordingly. My job is to live up this masthead’s motto: Independent. Always.

So, back to Howard’s heroic pronouncement. It’s certainly true that “we” – the federal government – decide the circumstances in which people may come to Australia. If you turn up without a visa, you’ll be turned away no matter how desperate your circumstances. If you come by boat, your chances of being let in are low.

But if you come by plane, with a visa that says you’ll be studying something at some dodgy private college when, in truth, you’re just after a job in a rich country, in you come. If we’ve known about this dodge, it’s only in the past few weeks that we’ve decided to stop it.

No, the problem is, if you take Howard’s defiant statement to mean that we control how many people come to this country, then that’s not true. We decide the kinds of people we’ll accept, but not how many.

There are no caps because, for many years, both parties have believed in taking as many suitable immigrants as possible. It’s just because the post-COVID surge in immigration – particularly overseas students – has coincided with the coming federal election that the pollies are suddenly talking about limiting student visas.

But remember, the politicians have form. Knowing many voters have reservations about immigration, they talk tough on immigration during election campaigns, but go soft once our attention has moved on, and it’s all got too hard.

It’s a similar thing with Anthony Albanese’s Future Made in Australia plan. Polling shows it’s been hugely popular with voters. But that’s because they’ve been misled by a clever slogan. It was designed to imply a return to the days when we tried to make for ourselves all the manufactured goods we needed.

But, as I’ve written, deep in last month’s budget papers was the news that we’d be doing a bit of that, but not much. It’s just a great slogan.

On another matter, have you noticed Treasurer Jim Chalmers’ dissembling on how he feels our pain from the cost-of-living crisis, which is why he’s trying so hard to get inflation down?

What he doesn’t want us thinking about is that, at this stage, most of the pain people are feeling is coming not from higher prices, but from the Reserve Bank’s 4.25 percentage-point increase in interest rates.

Get it? The pain’s coming from the cure, not the disease. The rise in interest rates has been brought about by the independent central bank, not the elected government, of course. But when Chalmers boasts about achieving two successive years of budget surplus, he’s hoping you won’t realise that those surpluses are adding to the pain households are suffering, particularly from the increase in bracket creep.

And, while I’m at it, many people object to businesses raising their prices simply because they can, not because their costs have increased. This they refer to disapprovingly as “gouging”.

But few economists would use that word. Why not? Because they believe it’s right and proper for businesses to charge as much as they can get away with.

Why? Because they think it’s part of the way that market forces automatically correct a situation where the demand for some item exceeds its supply. In textbooks, it’s called “rationing by price”.

Rather than the seller allowing themselves to run out of an item, they sell what’s left to the highest bidders. What could be better than that?

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Treasury tells all: how the housing market is so stuffed up

Would you believe that our ever-rising house prices are a sign there’s something badly wrong with our housing market? Would you believe our housing arrangements are worse than in the other rich countries?

Well, I would when that’s what Treasury is admitting in the annual sermon it tacks onto the budget papers. This year it’s about meeting our housing “challenge”.

In a well-functioning economy, its industries can respond to the increase in demand for their good or service by increasing their supply without much delay. Of course, it takes a lot longer to build a new house or apartment than it does to churn out more ice-creams or haircuts.

But, even so, our housing industry has been too slow to respond to the increased demand for housing. This comes from our rising population which, thanks to continuing high levels of immigration, has grown faster than most of the other rich countries.

Figures from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, a group of mainly advanced economies, show that our number of dwellings per 1000 people increased only from 403 to 420 between 2011 and 2022. This compared poorly with most other countries.

In 2011, our level of housing supply was just 92 per cent of the OECD average. And by 2022 it had fallen to 90 per cent. This was behind countries such as Canada, the United States and England.

Our completions of new private dwellings reached a peak of more than 200,000 a year in 2018-19 but have since fallen to about 160,000 a year. This has left us with an acute shortage of properties available to buy or rent.

Nationwide, the number of homes being offered for sale has fallen since 2015, while the number offered for rent has been falling since early 2020.

Speaking of renting, Treasury says the rental market is considered to be in balance – meaning renters have little trouble finding a place and landlords have little trouble finding a tenant – when the vacancy rate is about 3 per cent. In cities such as Sydney and Melbourne it’s now down to about 0.5 per cent. Ouch.

Not surprisingly, when demand grows faster than supply can keep up with, prices rise. The rise in the cost of newly built homes, and the cost of renting, have contributed significantly to the general cost-of-living crisis.

So, why has our housing industry become so slow to respond to increased demand? Treasury says the causes are “multifaceted, complex and affect all stages of the housing construction process, including all levels of government and industry”.

One way to improve the market’s response to greater demand is to accelerate the construction process. But Treasury says that completion times for apartments, townhouses and detached houses actually worsened by 39 per cent, 34 per cent and 42 per cent respectively over the 10 years to June 2023.

Calculations (or, if you want to sound more scientific, “modelling”) by a federal government agency says that, over the next six years, the nation’s existing unmet demand will never be satisfied unless completion times are speeded up. In six years’ time, we’ll still have a backlog of about 39,000 dwellings.

Treasury says the expectation that churning out homes faster will help to lower house prices is supported by empirical research. One study found that those OECD countries that built more housing over the 15 years to 2015 experienced lower real growth in house prices.

Another study showed that adding an extra 50,000 homes a year for a decade could reduce house prices by up to 20 per cent.

So, what can be done to increase the housing industry’s annual output? Treasury says planning and zoning restrictions can limit the speed at which land is made available.

Delays in approving development applications by local councils can be excessive. I think councils and government departments are monopolists and, like all monopolists, they take advantage of the lack of competition.

Private sector monopolists whack up their prices and don’t worry about the quality of the service they provide. Public monopolists make you jump through hoops that aren’t strictly necessary, and they fix your problem in their own good time.

I wonder whether, over all these years, those outfits have ever had much pressure on them to lift their game. If that changed, I’m sure we could get more homes built per year.

Treasury says average times for the approval of development applications vary by state, with Victoria and NSW experiencing the longest waiting times early this month of 144 and 114 days, respectively.

It shouldn’t surprise you that Treasury wants housing to be delivered in well-located areas where the demand is greatest.

Dense development in the “missing middle” of major cities, where households can reside closer to jobs in areas with higher quality amenities and infrastructure, has been limited by planning and zoning restrictions and slow release of infill land, Treasury says.

Global supply constraints and price shocks on imported building materials associated with the pandemic have added to the cost of construction, driving up the price of newly built homes. Although prices aren’t rising as fast as they were, they haven’t fallen back.

Shortages of building labour have also increased the prices of newly built homes and slowed the pace of construction. The growth in non-dwelling construction activity has drawn labour away from home building. The productivity of labour in construction has not improved since the early 2000s.

The industry blames these shortages on the drop-off in rates of skilled migration during the pandemic. But I wonder if the deeper problem is that the former ready availability of imported labour tempted the industry to save money by failing to train as many apprentices as they should have.

So, what’s the Albanese government doing about this mess? It’s finally grasped the nettle and is spending big – $32 billion, including $6 billion in this month’s budget – to “address historical underinvest in the housing system” and build 1.2 million new, well-located homes. We’ll see how they go.

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