Budget warning: more rent-seeking won't create jobs

While we wait to see next week’s budget, think about this: economists must shoulder much of the blame for past "reforms" that ended up doing more harm than good. But more of the blame should go to the politicians who allowed lobbying by generous industries to subvert reform and turn it into rent-seeking, or worse.

Lefty academics who bang on about the evils of what they love calling "neoliberalism" seem to see it as some kind of conspiracy between the economics profession and big business.

There’s some truth to this – after all, many economic practitioners work for or produce "independent" consultant reports for big business. But the old rule from politics applies: what may look like a conspiracy is more likely to be just a stuff-up.

The term neoliberalism – a pompous, hipster word only a "problematic" academic could love – conceals more truth than it reveals. The words we used in Australia when this way of thinking became dominant in the 1980s were "economic rationalism" in pursuit of "micro-economic reform" – the very thing Productivity Commission boss Michael Brennan advocated a return to in a speech last week.

The more revealing label, however, is the one preferred by two leading British economics professors, Paul Collier and John Kay, in their new and enlightening book, Greed is Dead: "market fundamentalism".

The economic rationalist thinking that drove extensive economic policy change in the ‘80s and ‘90s took the profession’s ubiquitous neo-classical, demand-and-supply model of how markets work and assumed it was all you needed to know about how the economy worked.

It thus overemphasised the role of competition between "self-interested" (selfish, greedy) individuals, but underestimated the role of co-operation and community spirit and the importance of touchy-feely things such as job security, loyalty and our trust in economic and political institutions in making the economy work well.

The simple model’s assumption that all individuals and firms unfailingly act with full foresight of their best interests implies that government intervention is unnecessary and may well make things worse.

So the greatest crime of the rationalists (including, until far too late, yours truly) was naivety. They saw reforms that worked well in theory and assumed they’d work just as well in practice. In many cases they did work well enough, but in too many others they failed badly.

Unintended consequences abounded, the greatest of which was what I call "the sanctification of selfishness". When the econocrats were planning the removal of import protection they confidently predicted a benefit would be to discourage "rent-seeking" – businesses incessantly lobbying the government for favours when they should be getting on with running their businesses more efficiently.

In reality, rent-seeking has become rife. Since the mid-80s, the Canberra-based lobbying industry must surely have been one of our fastest growing and most lucrative. The economists’ greatest naivety has been their assumption that successive governments would faithfully implement their reform plans while resisting the temptation to do favours for generous mates.

Which brings us to next week’s budget. Recent days have seen big business campaigning for tax breaks, a further shift in the industrial relations power balance in favour of employers, and the removal of "burdensome regulations", all to create jobs.

Trouble is, years of bitter experience have taught us to recognise rent-seeking when we see it. Because economic rationalists have left people with the notion that economic progress is driven solely by self-interest, the rich and powerful now see themselves as justified in demanding that the economy be re-organised in ways that facilitate their efforts to get richer and more powerful.

Among the various micro-economic reforms advocated last week by the Productivity Commission’s Brennan as ways of speeding up the recovery were: removing rigidities in the labour market, streamlining the approvals process for new businesses and improving the “culture” of regulators.

I have no doubt there are plenty of anachronistic, pettifogging, cumbersome provisions of industrial relations law that both sides could readily agree to remove. But I doubt that’s what the employers are seeking. They want their quid without any quo.

Equally, I don’t doubt that much could be done to minimise the time-wasting involved in the regulation of business, without compromising other public policy goals. But too often removing "green tape" is code for sacrificing long-term protection of our environmental assets in favour of letting a few developers temporarily create a few hundred jobs while they build some highly automated mining project.

And while the culture of pushing people around at Centrelink or the local council should definitely be corrected, the last time the pollies went down this road they left the banking and corporate regulators with the clear impression that what they wanted was a buddy-buddy culture. The banks concluded that, for them, obeying the law was optional, and we all remember what happened next.

Read more >>

Unions conspire with bankers to make you pay more super

When is big business most successful at "rent-seeking" – winning special favours – from government? Often, when it’s got its unions on board. That way, both the Coalition and Labor are inclined to give it the privileges it seeks.

Despite the decline in the union movement’s power and influence in recent decades – and all the nasty things the bosses continue saying about unions – it’s very much a product of the capitalist system.

Over the decades, its greatest success has come in industries with some form of pricing power that’s allowing businesses to make outsized profits. The union simply applies pressure for the workers to be given their share of the lolly.

What kept Australia’s manufacturing industry heavily protected against competition from imports for most of the 20th century, before the Hawke-Keating government pulled the plug in the 1980s, was the manufacturing unions’ strong support for the manufacturers’ success in getting the Coalition committed to protection.

In the end, however, the manufacturing unions got screwed. While being protected in the name of preserving jobs, the manufacturers began automating and shedding many jobs. Turns out protection is better at protecting profits than jobs.

In last year’s election campaign, some part of Labor’s ambivalence on the question of new coal mines in North Queensland is explained by the support the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union, one of the few remaining powerful unions, has thrown behind the foreign mine owners.

At present, however, there’s no more significant instance of the unions being in bed with the bosses than their joint campaign to have the government increase compulsory employee superannuation contributions.

When it comes to government-granted favours to business, there aren’t many bigger than the one that compels almost all the nation’s workers to hand over 9.5 per cent of their wage, every year of their working lives, to financial institutions which will charge them a small fortune each year to "manage" their money, until the government thinks they’re old enough to be allowed to get their money back.

I’ve supported compulsory super since it began because, when it comes to saving for retirement, most of us suffer from myopia. But it does leave the government with huge obligations to ensure the money’s safely invested, ensure super tax incentives aren’t biased in favour of the highly paid (such as yours truly) and ensure the money managers don’t abuse the monopoly they’ve been granted by overcharging the punters.

And, since most of us also save for retirement in ways other than super (such as by buying a house and paying it off), governments have an obligation to ensure that workers aren’t compelled to save more than needed to live in reasonable comfort in retirement.

Compulsory super is such an easy money-maker for the for-profit financial institutions (mainly bank-owned) that it’s not surprising they’ve gone for years trying to con governments into increasing the percentage of their wages that workers are compelled to hand over. They’ve done this by exploiting people’s instinctive fear that they aren’t saving enough, using greatly exaggerated estimates of how much they’ll need to be comfortable.

What’s harder to understand is why the non-profit "industry" super funds – with union officials making up half their trustees and the employer reps not taking much interest – go along with the for-profit industry lobby groups’ self-interested empire-building.

The main reason compulsory super isn’t a particularly good deal for most union members is that when forced to pay super contributions, employers reduce their workers’ pay rises to fit. This has been understood from the outset, but last week’s report from the Grattan Institute convincingly demonstrates its truth.

The second reason is that, by design and above certain limits, super savings reduce workers’ eligibility for the age pension. Treasury and independent analysts have repeatedly discredited the industry’s claims that the present contribution rate is insufficient to provide workers with a reasonably comfortable retirement.

The present legislated plan to raise the contribution rate to 12 per cent represents the industry funds’ gift to the army of ticket-clippers making their living off the super industry. It’s origins lie in the Rudd government yielding to industry fund pressure because it believed the huge cost to the budget would be more than covered by its wonderful new mining tax.

But, as an earlier Grattan report has shown, raising the contribution rate as planned would force many workers to accept a lower-than-otherwise standard of living during their working lives so their living standard in retirement could be higher than they ever were used to when working.

This is the union movement protecting its members’ interests? Sounds to me more like union officials expanding the union institution at the expense of their members – and delivering for the banks’ "retail" super funds while they’re at it.

Read more >>

Government losing its resistance to rent-seeking businesses

I'm starting to suspect the federal government – of whatever colour – has lost its ability to control its own spending.

Even if this is, as yet, only partly true, governments are likely to have unending trouble returning the recurrent budget to balance and keeping it there, let alone getting it into surplus so as to pay down debt.

Those of us who worry about such things have given too little thought to the causes of the Abbott-Turnbull government's abject failure to achieve its oft-stated goal of repairing the budget solely by cutting government spending.

It's common to blame this on political failure and obstacles. There's truth in most of those excuses, but they miss the point. Spending restraint will never be easy politically, governments rarely have the number in the Senate and their opponents will always be opportunistic.

That's why governments need to be a lot clearer about what they're seeking to achieve on the spending side, and a lot more strategic in how they try to bring it about.

On ultimate objectives, the goal of literally smaller government – smaller than it is today – is a pipedream. Government spending is almost certain to rise over time – don't you read Treasury's intergenerational reports? – meaning taxes will have to rise over time.

But there are obvious limits to voters' appetite for higher taxes, which is why governments need to be able to control the rate at which their spending is growing, and do it not by cost-shifting to other governments or service recipients – as was the approach in the failed 2014 budget – but by ensuring ever-improving value for money through greater efficiency and effectiveness.

Unless governments lose their obsession with welfare spending (most of which goes to the aged) and come to terms with the other two really big items of government spending, health and education – especially when you consolidate federal and state budgets – they won't get far with controlling the rate of growth in their spending.

What too few people realise is how much of government spending goes not directly into the pockets of voting punters, but indirectly via businesses big and small: medical specialists, chemists, drug companies, private health funds, private schools, universities fixated by their ranking on global league tables, businesses chasing every subsidy they can get, not to mention international arms suppliers.

The budget, in other words, is positively crawling with vested interests lobbying to protect and increase their cut of taxpayers' money.

A government that can't control all this potential business rent-seeking – isn't perpetually demanding better value for taxpayers; perpetually testing for effectiveness – is unlikely to have much success in limiting the growth in its spending.

Which brings me to my fear that government has already lost that ability.

A wrong turn taken early in the term of the Howard government – when the Finance department moved most responsibility for spending control to individual departments and got rid of most of its own experts on particular spending areas – plus many years of "efficiency dividends" (these days a euphemism for annual redundancy rounds) have hollowed out the public service.

The spending departments have lost much of their ability to advise on policy, while the "co-ordinating departments" – Treasury, Finance and Prime Minister's – have lost much of their understanding of the specifics of major spending programs.

This matters not just because the departments have become increasingly dependent on outside consultants to tell them how to do their job – and to be the for-profit repositories of what was formerly government expertise – which could easily be more expensive than paying your own people.

The big four chartered accounting firms were paid $1 billion in consulting fees over the past three years, thus introducing a whole new stratum of potential rent-seeking.

More importantly, the longstanding practice of having specialised departments – one each for the farmers, miners, manufacturers, greenies etc – makes them hugely susceptible to being "captured" by the industry they're supposed to be regulating in the public interest.

The departments soon realise their job is to keep the miners or whoever happy and not making trouble for the government.

The Health department, for instance, would see its primary task as dividing the taxpayers' lolly between the doctors, the chemists, the drug companies and the health funds in a way that keeps political friction to a minimum.

How much incentive do you reckon this gives the spending departments to limit their spending, root out rent-seeking and lift effectiveness?

That's why, by denuding the co-ordinating departments of people who know where the bodies are buried in department X, government has lost a key competency: the ability to control the growth in its own spending.

Read more >>

Radical policy change may be needed to fix wages

It's too early to be sure, but not too early to suspect that, if we and the other developed economies keep travelling the way we are, conventional wisdom about what constitutes good economic policy may soon need to be turned on its head.

We're living through very strange times. Each developed economy has its own story, but there are strong similarities. One is exceptionally low inflation, which doesn't seem temporary.

Another is surprisingly weak rates of measured productivity improvement, although our rate of improvement in the productivity of labour isn't too bad.

My guess is a fair bit of this is mis-measurement arising from our quite radical shift to a digital economy.

But the other explanation may be a decline in price competition in many industries, thanks to several decades of both natural and government-facilitated rent-seeking by big businesses, in ever-more concentrated industries.

Next, wages. It's too soon to conclude that wage growth – which in Oz has been slowing since mid-2012 and been pathetically weak for three years – is down for the count.

We don't yet know how much of the weakness is merely cyclical and how much is due to deeper, longer-lasting, structural causes.

Even so, it's hard not to suspect that a fair bit of the wage weakness is structural. My guess is that while we've been busy decentralising wage-fixing and removing all provisions thought to favour unions, globalisation and technological change have conspired to rob the nation's employees of any collective bargaining power.

This may sound like a dream come true for business and its high-paid executives but, if it's true, it's deeply destabilising overkill.

Wages are a key variable in the economy. Allow them to be either too high or too low and the economy gets out of kilter.

Allow the profits share of national income to keep continually expanding at the expense of the wages share and expect to pay a price economically, socially and politically.

And that's before you remember that wages are the chief source of governments' tax revenue. Not only personal income tax, but all the indirect taxes – notably, the goods and services tax – that households pay when they spend their labour incomes.

Low nominal wage growth isn't necessarily a worry if, at the same time, the rise in consumer prices is low.

What matters to working households and the rest of the economy (but not governments) is what's happening to real wages.

In a healthily functioning economy, real wages should rise pretty much in line with the improvement in the productivity of labour.

That way, both labour and capital get their fair share of the fruits of economic progress.

Trouble is, in the US this relationship broke down maybe 30 years ago, explaining why the top few per cent of households have captured most of the growth in the nation's real income over that time.

This doesn't just widen the gap between rich and poor. By directing so much income growth away from the high spenders at the bottom and middle to the high savers at the top, it slows growth in consumption and thus production.

It also adds to the disillusionment of ordinary voters, making them more likely to lash out and vote for the cunning wacko celebrity-de-jour candidate, such as Clive Palmer, Pauline Hanson or Donald somebody​.

Get this: there are tentative signs the relationship between real wage growth and labour productivity may be breaking down in Oz.

The relevant indicator, the index of real labour costs per unit, should hover around 100. It fell by 3.3 per cent during 2016, reaching 98.1, equal lowest since the series began in 1985.

If this weakness persists, it will raise the question of whether the formerly healthy relationship was a product of market forces, or the industrial relations system's achievement of a fine balance between employer and union bargaining power.

If it does persist, how could we return to a healthy relationship? By reversing the dominant wisdom of many decades, that governments must never do anything that adds to the regulatory burden on employers. By acting (very carefully) to strengthen the hand of union collective bargainers.

Final point: governments of all colours secretly rely on bracket creep to help tax collections keep up with the inexorable growth in government spending.

But bracket creep depends on both reasonable inflation and real wage growth to work its barely noticed fiscal magic.

What happens if inflation stays low and real wages stop growing? You have to junk your rhetoric about smaller government and keep doing what Malcolm Turnbull did in this budget: justify explicit tax increases.

Either that, or get wages growing properly.

Read more >>

The Game of Mates we never quite notice

Not long after he arrived at Sydney Cove as a convict on the First Fleet, James Ruse was granted Australia's first parcel of private land – 30 acres in the heart of Parramatta – by governor Arthur Phillip.

Establishing private property rights in land is one of the core powers of government to this day. Britain had imposed limits on how much land Phillip could give away, but he had discretion over who he gave it to.

He seems to have taken a shine to Ruse, or maybe Ruse knew how to keep in his good books.

Three years later, Ruse sold his original grant for £40. A year later he was given 140 acres. Then another 16 acres, three years later.

The following year he sold these lands for £300. Twenty-one years later, aged 60, he obtained another grant of 100 acres at Riverstone. Altogether, he was given land value equivalent to about 20 years' wages for an English worker. In today's terms, about $1.5 million.

All this is recounted in the book, Game of Mates: New Masters of Australia, by Paul Frijters and Cameron Murray, to be launched on Friday.

Frijters, one of the most promising academic economists in the country, was a professor at the University of Queensland, but some of his research mightily offended the Brisbane establishment, so now he's off to a better job at the London School of Economics.

The book is his parting gift to Australia. He argues that a small class of well-connected operators hanging around the levers of government power are lining their own pockets at the expense of the rest of us.

Since Ruse was the first of them, he names each of these villains James. Frijters wants us to meet his archetypal modern James.

"He is a charming Queenslander who went to the right school, was president of the student union and has both politicians and top civil servants in his contact list. He is a professional in the Game of Mates.

"James is a clever man. When the 1980s housing boom began driving up the prices of houses throughout Queensland, he pinpointed a way to leverage the price gains for himself."

James' genius was to recognise that politicians and bureaucrats were truly in control of the gains from the influx of money for housing.

"It took political decisions to decide where new houses could be built. It took bureaucratic decisions to decide who would get permission to build bigger houses and larger apartment buildings.

"James set to work, using some of the money from his family's wealth to get started. He bought large plots of land just where one would not think the cities would expand and he set to work on the politicians and bureaucrats he knew.

"He spent time with them, shared parties and business dealings with them. He made some of them partners in his firm and, in turn, James' friends were appointed on boards deciding on planning decisions.

"Befriended politicians ran with slogans pronouncing that James' wishes were opportunities for their region, rather than costs to it.

"The politicians were later rewarded with consulting jobs to James and his friends' companies."

Get it? A Game of Mates doing what mates do, look after each other. I do you a favour and maybe one day you'll do me one.

Frijters argues this game is played in many more areas than land zoning. It can be played wherever government departments are supposedly regulating the activities of powerful industries in the interests of the public.

How many times have we seen politicians and top bureaucrats retire, but then pop up a few months later on the board or as a consultant to one of the companies they used to regulate?

How many times have we seen lobbyists brought in to head departments that regulate particular industries?

Frijters says the game has four main elements. First, flaws in our laws and regulations that create an economic honeypot to be snatched.

Second, the need for James and his mates to work as a group to capitalise on these flaws by establishing their networks of favour-exchanges.

Third, they need a way to signal loyalty to the group, a way for new members to join, and a way to rid themselves of traitors.

Fourth, they need to shield their true actions from public scrutiny with plausible myths suggesting James' dodgy dealings are good for Australia.

Frijters stresses that people playing this game aren't necessarily acting illegally, and in that sense may not be corrupt.

"The rules surrounding conflicts of interest, cooling-off periods for politicians [before they begin] working in industry, and exercising political discretion, are weak in Australia," he says.

What can we do to stop the game? "Our basic advice is to charge James for the privileges he trades in his Game of Mates or to establish a public competitor to supply the product he sells ourselves.

"We should charge him for the value increase on his houses. Charge his bank for the profits made by collusion, or introduce real competition by a true state bank. Charge his mines for the value pumped out of our ground. Charge him proper taxes. Set up a state superannuation fund . . . to compete with private ones."

Just as well you're leaving the country, Paul.

Read more >>

Why Trump won't be as big and bad as many fear

Sorry, but I find the ascent of Donald Trump more fascinating than frightening. If it's all going to be so terrible, how exactly is he going to make it happen?

If you take literally all the things he's said he'll do, it will be a disaster. But anyone who believes all the things politicians say in the heat of election campaigns isn't too bright.

It wouldn't surprise me if many of the people whose votes got him elected don't know half of what he promised, don't much care what he promised and certainly don't expect him to deliver.

They voted for him because, in their anger with the business and political establishment, they wanted to give the system a kick up the bum. The less he sounded like a proper politician, the more they thought him the man for that job.

Because Trump isn't part of the standard two-party system and didn't win the election the orthodox way, it's more relevant than usual to ask what motivated him to run for president.

It wouldn't surprise me if he was more interested in proving he knew the right buttons to press to be president, or was popular enough to be president - that he could ensure he was the last contestant voted off the island - than he was in actually doing a list of things to "make America great again".

How keen will he be to take on four years of 18-hour days making unending judgment calls?

When you think of all the struggle needed to "drain the swamp", he strikes me as more Phony Tough than Crazy Brave.

Much of the commentary we've seen so far is very "great man theory of history". Trump is such a wild man, he'll single-handedly destroy the American alliance, end America's world supremacy, start a global trade war that reverses globalisation and resumes the Great Depression, and maybe provoke a shooting war with China.

Was that in his first term, or would it take two?

Sorry, I lean more to the view that history is a product of pre-existing trajectory, random developments and the interaction of powerful political and social institutions.

They say that in the race of life, you should always back Self-interest because at least you know it's trying. I'd also put a couple of bob on Inertia.

In the coming history of the Trump administration, I see big roles for self-interest and inertia, aka the status quo.

Start with the Republicans. The hated usurper Trump, rather than dumping them in it, has had a famous victory in their name, ensured Republican majorities in both houses of Congress, and acquired control over countless perks and preferments.

If you were in the Republican caravan, what would you be doing? Sucking up.

There's an army of worthies - academics, think-tankers, bureaucrats, retired generals, former lobbyists, business people and Wall Street bankers - who spend their careers moving in and out of taxpayer-funded jobs in Republican administrations.

Trump will be knocked over in the rush to be his special friend. The thousands seeking a gig will have two dominant motivations: a share of the spoils of office and a say in the shaping of policy.

There's probably only one Republican in the country who agrees with every item on Trump's supposed to-do list, and that's the man himself.

If so, every other Republican will be hoping to persuade Trump to drop this, tone down that, add this and put that one on the backburner.

Do you really think he's going to spend his 18-hour days ensuring every bright sales idea written on the back of an envelope during the campaign remains inviolate?

What about all the real, professional econocrats, diplomats and generals? "Alienate our closest allies? Start a trade war? Good idea, Mr President."

Remember, too, that presidents often have trouble getting their policies passed by Congress, even when it's of the same political colour.

There's far less party discipline in the American political system, with individual congress people requiring a small bribe (hopefully, only something for their constituency) before they toe the party line.

They're also anxious to keep sweet with the main interest groups that contributed to their campaign costs.

Which brings us to Washington's other big industry, the lobbyists. They're going to meekly bow before Trump's sacred list of bright ideas, are they?

No, they're going to go on doing what they're so handsomely paid to do: mould the actions of president and Congress to fit the perceived interests of their generous customers.

Who are these big-spending interest groups? Well, the ones with the most money to splash around are the ones representing the most successful and powerful industries. The gun industry, for instance.

But, right at the head of the list, Wall Street - the people whose greed caused the global financial crisis, who got bailed out by the taxpayer, avoided going to jail and left millions of ordinary people to pick up the pieces of their lives.

Many of those ordinary people are those who voted for the larrikin Trump, hoping he'd give Wall Street an almighty kick up the bracket - he being a regular plain-talkin' guy, just like them.

Get it? The business and political establishment is still running the place, still ensuring their interests are put ahead of those of the lesser mortals silly enough to vote for Trump.

Now Trump has no choice but to turn to them, seeking their help in running the joint and implementing his brave plan to put them and their paymasters back in their box.

They'll be falling over themselves to help - and mould the egotistical Trump to their masters' will.

It's a recipe for inertia and preservation of America's system much the way it's always been.

Trump's amazing defeat of the political establishment isn't so much the revolt of the put-upon punters, as just another political con job.

Read more >>

Why the very rich have got richer

Everyone knows the gap between rich and poor has been widening in most developed countries, but why is it happening? Have the rich been smarter and harder working, or have they just been craftier than the rest of us?

Between the end of World War II and sometime in the 1970s or '80s, the gap got progressively narrower, reducing inequality. Since then, however, the trend has reversed and the rich have got richer faster than the poor have got less poor.

That's particularly true for the English-speaking rich countries, though it hasn't happened as much in Oz as it has in Britain and, especially, the United States.

Here, real incomes have increased at the bottom, the middle and the top, though they've risen a lot faster at the top. And the respective shares haven't changed much in very recent years.

It remains true, however, that Australia's been part of the international trend to exceptionally strong growth in incomes right at the top of the distribution, say, the top 1 per cent.

In Australia's case, Professor Paul Frijters, of the University of Queensland, and Dr Gigi Foster, of the University of NSW, sought to explain this growth in top incomes in a paper published in the Australian Economic Review.

At the level of theorising, they say there are two rival potential explanations: that incomes have become more unequal as a byproduct of market forces, or as a result of political decisions.

The first explanation focuses on a shift in the "marginal productivity" of skills. Changes in technology – the obvious candidate being the information and communication revolution, aka computerisation and digitisation – have increased the value of certain highly skilled jobs relative to other, less skilled, more routine jobs.

This economists refer to as "skill-biased technological change". Some jobs are replaced by machines, others are in greater demand because of the need for people to control and maintain the new machines and to manage a more complex organisation.

In such a world, you'd expect the wealthiest people in the community to be highly technically trained and great organisers – people like Bill Gates and Warren Buffett.

A related phenomenon is what the authors call "increasing returns to superstars", but is otherwise known as the rise of "winner-takes-all" markets.

Legal and sporting contests, for example, reward people not so much because they're highly skilled but because they're more highly skilled than others.

Such rewards increase with the size of the market in which the contest occurs.

"Moving from a world where every town runs its own competition to one where a single high-stakes competition is held for a whole country, or the whole world, involves the replacement of local winners with uber-winners who enjoy far higher returns but of whom there are far fewer per type of contest, resulting in a more unequal overall income distribution," Frijters and Foster say.

"This kind of effect explains the enormous salaries earned by today's soccer stars, top artists, top financial advisers, inventors who obtain patents, and so on."

It's advances in communication technology that do most to explain the increased scale of many markets. Bigger scale means a bigger gap between people at the top of the world market and winners in the local market.

The returns to innovation are also much greater in a global market than in a local one, because you're pushing out for the whole world what economists call the "production possibility frontier" – increasing the menu of different goods and services we're able to produce.

The alternative explanation for growing inequality – especially at the very top – is the effect of political favours.

"Our democratic political process both sets the rules of economic interaction amongst market agents [participants] and allocates political favours, including taxes and subsidies. In this view, each institution within a country's bureaucracy has some discretionary power of its own," the authors say.

The political balance of power may change and lead to changed taxes and transfer (welfare) payments in ways that favour the rich and hurt the poor. This may happen by accident or by political design.
It may happen because interest groups become more effective at lobbying governments or because the rich become better at exploiting loopholes in regulations or taxes.

So much for theoretical possibilities. What hard evidence can we find to help us choose between those possibilities?

A study by Sir Anthony Atkinson, a British world expert on inequality, and Andrew Leigh, former economics professor and now federal Labor politician, found that reductions in tax rates explain between a third and half of the rise in the income share of the richest 1 per cent in five English-speaking countries.

But Frijters and Foster took the unusual approach of seeing what clues they could deduce from studying the BRW magazine's list of the richest 200 Australians in 2009. They found that the industry category producing the largest number of super-rich Aussies – 61 – was buying and selling property.

Natural resources was second with 23, then "organising financial investments" with 19. "These 103 cases account for the vast bulk of the $119 billion owned by the top 200 in 2009."

Only eight families in the top 200 held large amounts of inherited wealth and all eight were in those three industry categories. So most of the money of our super-rich was made relatively recently.

As best the authors could determine, only five people on the list invented things. Another five were top entertainers. So only 5 per cent of our super-rich could be classed as superstars or top innovators.

About half spent their efforts on activities where local political decisions determine the winners: about who gets to build which property where, who gets access to favourable mining concessions, and so on.

On the basis of this evidence – which is hardly definitive – the authors conclude that "the political favours story seems more likely than the marginal productivity story".

Read more >>

Big business-biased 'reform' won't fly

I'm confident this year will see the economy performing better than many people expect – those who underrate the importance of domestic influences – but I'm far from confident it will be a year of great progress on economic reform.

There are plenty of things that need reforming, but anyone who thinks the top two are the tax system and industrial relations is confusing rent-seeking with reform.

Rent-seeking involves interest groups pressuring governments to change laws and regulations in ways that advantage them at the expense of others. Look at our tax "debate" and that's just what you see.

Big business and high income-earners want to pay less tax – a cut in the rate of company tax and in the top personal tax rate – and if that means other people paying higher tax, say through a higher goods and services tax, so be it.

Naturally, their self-interest is cloaked in claims about how good this would be for the economy. Benefits going directly to the well-off, we're assured, will trickle down to the punters.

But rarely do the advocates of such reforms spell out the mechanisms by which lower rates of tax are supposedly transformed into greater effort to "work, save and invest", much less produce empirical evidence.

It's remarkable how many highly trained economists go along with this self-serving pseudo-science.

There are two giveaway signs that the present push on taxes isn't genuine reform. First, the one area where there's solid evidence that high (effective) marginal tax rates are discouraging work effort is in returning mothers' transition from part-time to full-time work, but no one's proposing to do anything about this.

Second, if people are so anxious to respond to globalisation's threat to our tax base by shifting it away from taxing mobile resources, how come they're so set on increasing the GST rather than taxing the ultimate immobile resource, land?

Of course, we've yet to see how far Malcolm Turnbull will go in seeking to give his party's business backers the "reform" they seek. If he doesn't go far, they'll brand him as lacking courage. It will be more accurate to say he lacks foolhardiness. Rejigging the tax system to favour the better-off will always be hard to sell to the rest of the electorate.

As for industrial relations reform, there's never been a time when it's less needed. Certainly not the reform that gives employers more power to limit the wage rises of their workers. This stuff is straight wishful thinking by bosses.

One thing we'll notice this year is the potential for conflict between tax reform and budget repair. It was good last week to see the secretary to the Treasury, John Fraser, discharging Treasury's sacred duty to put fiscal rectitude above all else, by reminding us of the importance of returning the budget to surplus.

Predictably, the political journalists' conclusion that Fraser was warning of the imminent loss of our AAA credit rating missed the point. Rather, he was openly correcting his masters' repeated contention that a return to "growth and jobs" (mysteriously brought about by business-biased tax reform) would fix the budget problem.

Not when the deficit you're running is more structural (caused by explicit spending and taxing decisions) than cyclical (caused by temporary weakness in the economy), he told them. So there's no substitute for hard decisions to cut spending and raise taxes.

Can the Turnbull government reform taxes and repair the budget in the same year? We'll see, but I doubt it.

In any case, it won't get far as long as it sticks to its political ideology that higher taxes are the greatest economic evil, so the only acceptable way to return the budget to surplus is to slash government spending.

Trouble with this mentality is that while it rests easily in the minds of conservative governments – and Treasury secretaries – in practice it's almost impossible to implement.

That's because it shifts the burden of repair towards welfare recipients and ordinary wage-earners, and away from high income-earners using concessions and loopholes to pay less tax than they should.

Problem: the votes of the chosen victims far outweigh the votes of the high-income beneficiaries. Surely Turnbull, Scott Morrison and Fraser learnt that from the utter disaster of the government's first budget.

He didn't say it, but Fraser's speech implied that recent increases in spending on the disabled, on disadvantaged school kids and on higher wages for welfare and childcare workers were a waste of money and needed to be chopped back.

If we never get back to budget surplus, such ideological bias and pig-headedness will be a big part of the reason.

Read more >>

To be great, Turnbull must govern for the other side

A great attraction of my job is that I'm paid to offer gratuitous advice to everyone from the prime minister down. So step up, Malcolm, it's your turn.

Everyone has high hopes that Malcolm Turnbull will be the successful, long-lasting prime minister so many of us have been seeking. Business people are hoping he'll deliver the economic reform we need to rejuvenate and energise the economy.

Though his performance won't fail to disappoint those hoping for a perfect politician, it's reasonable to hope for a big improvement on his immediate predecessors, Liberal and Labor.

Turnbull is so intelligent, so articulate, so self-assured it's become possible to believe he can do something that, until now, seemed impossible: reverse the continuing decline in standards of political behaviour.

It's doable if he uses his present commanding lead in the polls to keep the political "conversation" positive, adopts some necessary if controversial policies and devotes all his effort to explaining and defending those policies, rather than incessantly telling us how terrible his political opponents are.

He starts with much goodwill and needs now to turn it into abiding respect by the way he conducts himself as the nation's leader, not a barroom brawler. A leader who brings us together in a common cause, not one seeking to divide and conquer.

It's already becoming apparent that when a new and popular leader chooses the high road, his opponents feel a need to match him, putting up a contest of ideas and policies, not negativity and electoral bribes.

As the election approaches, Turnbull should protect his credibility by keeping promises to a minimum, being sure those he does make are deliverable or setting out up-front the circumstances that would oblige him to abandon them.

Turnbull is no political apparatchik. He came to politics late after successful careers as a journalist and a barrister, having made his fortune as a merchant banker.

This is a good sign. The guy could have retired to count his millions – or make a few more – but entered and stayed in politics to have a crack at being PM.

Why? It's more likely to be because he hopes to be seen as one of our great leaders than because he wants to keep the seat warm for as long as possible.

This suggests he'll be more willing to run a few calculated risks in the interests of notching up some memorable achievements.

It's true Turnbull has already had one short-lived and undistinguished stint as leader of the Coalition. But that's just as true of the Liberals' most long-lasting and celebrated leaders, John Howard and Bob Menzies.

As with those two, Turnbull's first, abortive attempt will prove an asset provided he's used his time in the wilderness to correct the personal weaknesses that caused his initial failure.

If a high IQ is Turnbull's greatest strength, his greatest weakness is a low EQ – a shortage of emotional intelligence. He can be charming when he wants to be, but mostly he prefers you to stand back and admire while he demonstrates his towering intellect. Hardly endearing.

All successful politicians understand that, though they hold more power than most, in any democracy power is widely diffused, so you must always be trying to add other people's power to your own to ensure you've got enough to prevail.

To this end you need to consult widely, include others in the decision-making, listen patiently while people give you free advice, and school yourself to suffer fools gladly.

But if Turnbull really wants to make a difference, his notion of reform needs to be a lot more creative than simply bringing to reality all the rent-seeking "reforms" long advocated by big-business people and their economist handmaidens, who've never had an innovative, intellectually agile policy idea since they encountered the neo-classical model in first year uni.

Turnbull's unlikely to get far if he allows himself to seen as a rich man delivering for his well-off mates at the expense of the rest of us. Every new PM promises to "govern for all Australians"; more than most, Turnbull must demonstrate he really means it.

Paul Keating and Bob Hawke made their names as micro reformers by implementing changes that gave their own supporters more heartburn than the other side's; by doing things the Libs should have done but weren't game to.

Similarly, Turnbull needs to show up his opponents, proposing reforms they could only dream of – but can't now oppose without losing all credibility.

The key is to look for reforms that improve equity at the same time as they enhance efficiency. There are plenty if you look.

Read more >>

Economists shouldn’t be apologists for business

As the nation's economists gird their loins for a year of furious debate over economic management and reform, there's a soul-searching question they need to face.

This year's policy agenda will be dominated by economic issues. First is what's to be done about what wasn't done last year: the failure to get the budget on a credible course towards eliminating the structural deficit.

What can be done to reduce wastefulness in health spending that makes more sense than GP co-payments? Is it really a smart idea to partially deregulate government-owned and highly bureaucratic universities with their high degree of pricing power?

Apart from the government's response to last year's review of the financial system, there's the various inquiries being conducted this year: the review of the tax system, review of federal-state responsibilities and review of industrial relations.

In these things the government's big-business backers have very strong views about which reforms it should take for ratification at next year's federal election.

But while the economists are willing the politicians to "show leadership" there's a tough question they should be asking themselves: is conventional economics in reality just a rationalisation of the interests of business? Are economists spin doctors seeking to advance the greed of the rich and powerful?

That's certainly not what economics is supposed to be about. Its stated ethic is that the interests of consumers should always trump those of producers. Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations carries a powerful condemnation of business people's propensity to engage in rent-seeking.

But that's just the theory. In practice these days, it's hard to find many economists pushing such a line in the public debate. One honourable exception is Professor Ross Garnaut, who has pointed to the way the push for economic reform has degenerated into rival interest groups striving for nothing more than sectional advantage.

Why are so few of his colleagues joining him in this cause? Why do so many economists stay silent while business interests distort the principles of economics to disguise their self-seeking? And, indeed, many economic consultants make their living by crafting such distortions - often through modelling - for whoever can afford their services.

One reason for the economists' silence is that most are employed by bosses who don't want them criticising business. The business economists may speak endlessly on whether or not the Reserve Bank will cut interest rates, but on little of lasting importance. Econocrats aren't supposed to express personal opinions and, in any case, their masters - of either colour - wouldn't want them offending business.

Even the academic economists enjoy less freedom to critique business behaviour in an era where the backdoor privatisation of universities has made them more dependent on business donors and where individuals are too busy publishing or perishing in journals with zero interest in Australian issues.

But the full explanation goes far deeper. Biases hidden in the neo-classical model of how markets work have caused "the economists' way of thinking" to be deeply suspicious of government intervention in markets and unthinkingly supportive of business behaviour.

One bias is the assumption that economic agents always behave rationally in pursuit of their self-interest. So individuals always know better than governments and any strange behaviour by businesses can be explained only by their rational response to distortions caused by interfering politicians.

Another bias arises from the model's unit of analysis: the individual firm or consumer. This leaves no room in the model for any kind of benefit from collective action. Rather, the market's "invisible hand" transforms agents' rational self-interest into the public good.

So economists keep mum while governments assume the budget can be returned to surplus only by reducing government spending, not by increasing taxation, and that all government spending is dubious, but distorting "tax expenditures" (which, purely by chance, heavily favour business and high income-earners) aren't a problem.

Even so, many economists are inclined to agree with business lobbies that the one exception to the fatwa against higher taxes could be an increase in the goods and services tax - provided the extra revenue is used to reduce the tax on companies or high income-earners.

As for industrial relations, conventional economic theory's primitive analysis of the labour market - which largely assumes away differences in the quality of labour, as well as assuming units of labour are no different from units of any commodity - leaves many economists happy to accept that the more bargaining power employers enjoy the better off all of us will be.

Many of these ingrained prejudices are being challenged by empirical research, but "evidence-based policy" that doesn't fit with business's perceived interests is being studiously ignored by most economists.

Read more >>

Abbott's choice: competition v cronies

It's still too soon to tell whether Tony Abbott's government is pro-market or pro-business, but so far the evidence for the latter stacks higher than that for the former.

The difference turns on whether the pollies want markets where effective competition ensures benefits to consumers are maximised and excessive profits minimised, or markets where government intervenes to limit competition - often under the cover of claiming to be protecting jobs - and makes life easier for favoured businesses.

Will we see more rent-seeking or less under Abbott, more of what The Economist calls "crony capitalism"?

Will firms or industries with rival interests do better from government regulation if they're more generous donors to party coffers?

Abbott and his ministers' intemperate attacks on the Australian National University for its decision to "divest" itself of a few million mining company shares for environmental or ethical reasons are a worrying sign.

Investors shouldn't enjoy freedom to choose where they invest, regardless of their reasons? ANU is different from the rest of us even though its investment funds come largely from private donations and bequests? This from a government keen to complete the de facto privatisation of universities?

What is ANU's offence? Bringing ethical considerations into investment? Or sounding like it believes climate change is real and we should be doing something real about it?

Abbott attacked ANU's decision as "stupid" and believes "coal is good for humanity, coal is good for prosperity, coal is an essential part of our economic future".

If ever there was an industry whose early decline could be confidently predicted - as it is being by hard-headed investors and bankers the world over - it's steaming coal.

Yet Abbott seems keen to change the rules of the formerly supposed bipartisan renewable energy target in ways that, by breaking long-standing commitments to the renewables industry, would cost it billions and blight the future of its employees, all to provide the government's coal and electricity industry mates with temporary relief from the inevitable.

The biggest problem with governments "picking winners" is that they quickly regress to picking losers, helping industries against which technology and other forces have shifted to resist the market's pressure for change that would - almost invariably - make consumers and the economy better off.

The proposals of the recent draft report of Professor Ian Harper's competition policy review could do much to strengthen the market's ability to deliver benefits to consumers and roll back decades of accumulated rent-seeking and crony capitalism.

The enthusiasm with which the Abbott government takes up those proposals will tell us much about its choice between being pro market forces or pro certain generous business donors to party funds.

A particular area where sound competitive principles have been secondary to special pleading from various interests is the regulation of intellectual property, such as patents, copyright, trademarks and plant breeder rights. Harper says our intellectual property regime is a priority for review.

IP isn't God-given, it's a government intervention in the market to limit competition with owners of the patents and so forth for a limited period. It's a response to market failure where the "public goods" characteristics of IP would otherwise generate too little monetary incentive for people to come up with the new knowledge and ideas that benefit us all.

In other words, it's a delicate trade-off between government-granted monopolies to encourage innovation, and competition to keep prices and excess profits down.

This makes it ripe for rent-seeking: pressuring politicians to extend the monopoly periods retrospectively (despite the lack of public benefit), to allow loopholes that permit phoney "ever-greening" of drug patents that would otherwise expire, to limit poor countries' access to life-saving drugs at realistic prices and to ignore blatant gaming of IP laws by two-bit operators that have never created anything.

Most of these excesses are at their worst in the United States with its easily bought legislature. The information revolution has made IP one of America's chief export earners. And the free-trade preaching Yanks have made advancing the interest of their IP exporters their chief priority in trade negotiations such as the present Trans Pacific Partnership deal.

As always, we have a tendency to give the Yanks whatever they want. Trouble is, as Harper points out, Australia is and always will be (and should be, given our comparative advantage in world trade) a net importer of intellectual property.

Abbott has a further temptation to be less than vigilant in pursuing Team Australia's best interests: his chief media cheerleader, News Corp, happens to be the twin brother of a primary beneficiary of the Yanks' efforts to advance the interests of their IP exporters, 21st Century Fox.

Read more >>

Why no one is backing the budget

A big reason Joe Hockey isn't getting much support from independent observers like me in his battle to get the budget through the Senate is that so few of his contentious measures are worth fighting for.

If he were facing opposition from vested interests struggling to protect their privilege, or even just unthinking populism from the punters, it would be a different matter.

For a bit I thought I'd be in the trenches with him defending a plan to impose a temporary deficit levy on individuals with incomes above $80,000 a year but, as we now know, his boss insisted on lifting the threshold to a far-less-contentious $180,000 a year.

What would have made the lower threshold defensible is the inconvenient truth that so much of our present distance from budget surplus is explained by the folly of eight tax cuts in a row, the savings from which were skewed in favour of higher income-earners. This would have clawed back a bit of it.

It's remarkable anyone could put together a budget at once so unpopular and so lacking in Paul Keating's "quality cuts". Who did Hockey imagine would join him at the barricades apart from the mindlessly partisan commentators? (Even they haven't been particularly vociferous - although the government hasn't raised much of a banner to rally behind.)

In my initial assessment I said "I give Joe Hockey's first budgetary exam a distinction on management of the macro economy, a credit on micro-economic reform and a fail on fairness".

Nothing wrong with the F, and the D on macro management has stood up well. The decision to announce a lot of measures that didn't take much effect until the last year of the forward estimates, 2017-18, was a clever combination of macro-economic good sense - nothing to gain by hitting demand while it was expected to be weak - and political necessity.

By delaying the start of so many measures until after the next election Hockey was able to claim the budget didn't really break all the election promises Tony Abbott made when pushing his contention that a "budget emergency" could be fixed without pain.

It's not part of my religion to insist politicians keep irresponsible promises they should never have made. But that's not to say such blatant promise-breaking carries no political price. After all the fuss Abbott made about "Ju-liar" Gillard and his pretence about restoring trust in politicians, my guess is the price his government is paying is high. The pity is he could have won comfortably without such dishonesty.

On closer inspection, my C for micro reform was badly astray. Should have been an M for missed opportunity. There was a lot of cost shifting, but precious little that could be claimed to increase the efficiency with which the government delivers its many high-cost services or to reduce rent-seeking by private industries.

The greatest disappointment was that, after making a good start in eliminating handouts to the car makers and refusing to bail out fruit canners, Hockey dropped the ball on business welfare, thus leaving all his talk of ending "the age of entitlement" looking like nothing more than a shameful attack on the poor and disadvantaged.

One honourable exception was the decision to remove the always-indefensible subsidy to locally produced ethanol. Another was the plan to resume indexing the fuel excise.

Removing the carbon price involved allowing fossil-fuel industries to continue imposing external costs on the rest of the community and the intention to abolish the mining tax involves allowing much receipt of economic rent by foreigners to go grossly under-taxed. That's efficient?

Add to that the failure to remove the fuel excise credit, which constitutes a favour to miners and farmers but no one else, and you have to ask what hold the big three mining companies have over this government.

Similarly, take the cutting back on the age pension while doing nothing whatsoever to curb the excesses of the concessional tax treatment of superannuation, combine it with watering down the Future of Financial Advice Act despite the presence of gross information asymmetry, and you have to ask what hold the big four banks have over this government.

On its face, you could have expected the "deregulation" of university fees to bring significant gains in efficiency - but only if your understanding of economics had progressed no further than 101. To take a relatively small number of government-owned and still highly regulated agencies with a monopoly over credential-granting, allow them to set their own fees and then imagine an adequately competitive "market" would emerge isn't economics, it's magical thinking.

Read more >>

Ulterior motives abound in privatisation push

The trouble with the latest round of state government privatisations is that those who oppose them do so for the wrong reasons, but their promoters are also pushing them through for the wrong reasons.

Joe Hockey's 15 per cent incentive payment to encourage "asset recycling" - selling existing government-owned businesses to fund the building of new infrastructure - has fallen on receptive pockets in the NSW and Queensland governments, which are worried about their credit ratings and, unlike the Victorian government, still have valuable electricity transmission and distribution businesses to flog off.

The previous, Labor government in NSW tore itself apart over electricity privatisation, with the cabinet supporting it but the powerful public sector unions bitterly opposing it. It wasn't much better with the previous, Labor government in Queensland.

Now Labor is free of the responsibilities of office, it will be completely united in its opposition and its unceasing claims that privatisation will lead to big rises in electricity prices.

Since voters in all states strongly oppose privatisation, Labor will hope to do well with this argument at the NSW election in March. But polling also shows voters are much less opposed when the sale of businesses is linked to the building of specific new projects.

Labor's counter-argument is deceptively simple: government-owned businesses act in the best interests of their customers, whereas privately owned businesses seek to maximise their profits by raising their prices.

The truth is far more complicated than that. Whether publicly or privately owned, the monopoly business that doesn't seek to overcharge its customers has yet to be discovered by archaeologists. Monopolies that don't seek to maximise profits usually succumb to overstaffing and overpaying workers and managers. Why wouldn't they?

The public sector unions understand this full well, which is their real reason for opposing privatisation so vehemently.

They know that whether or not the private owner succeeds in raising prices, it will seek to improve its profitability by moving in on union perks and rorts. They know even Coalition-government owners give them an easier ride than a private owner would.

So voters would be mugs to believe Labor and its union mates have consumers' best interests at heart.

Unfortunately, that doesn't mean Coalition privatisers can be trusted to do their best by customers. The temptation facing all privatising governments is to seek to maximise the price they get for the asset they're selling.

If you can't see why that would be a problem, you're helping demonstrate why privatisations so often fail to deliver their promised benefits.

The main thing that protects customers from being overcharged is effective competition between the privatised entity and other businesses.

So the main way governments seek to inflate the price they get for a privatised business is to protect it from competition, or otherwise ensure its ability to overcharge. They tie the hands of the price regulator in some way, or explicitly guarantee freedom from certain future sources of competition, or sell the business to some player who already owns businesses in the industry and so can use the acquisition to increase the player's pricing power.

The simple truth that escapes so many privatisation supporters on the non-Labor side is that privatisation is only worthwhile if it leads to greater competition in the market. If it doesn't, it will be of little benefit to anyone bar the new private owners.

When the Keating government privatised Sydney airport, it guaranteed the purchaser first refusal on control of any second Sydney airport, thus virtually ensuring that even with two airports there'd be no competition between them.

When the Kennett government privatised Victoria's electricity industry in the 1990s it took care to ensure a wide range of buyers.

But it seems the Baird government in NSW has no such scruples. It planned to sell Macquarie Generation, the state's largest power producer, to AGL, one of the state's three largest power retailers.

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission tried to block the deal, judging it would have resulted in a substantial lessening of competition in the electricity market. But last week the commission was overruled by the Competition Tribunal, so the deal is likely to go ahead.

Only a couple of days earlier, however, the chairman of the commission, Rod Sims, reiterated his view that "electricity companies have a strong commercial incentive to have all players vertically integrated ... If electricity retailers can tie up most of the generation then they can create a stable oligopoly with high entry barriers and so higher prices and better returns."

I'd be wary of believing any politician who tried telling you electricity privatisation won't lead to higher prices.

Read more >>

Your guide to business entitlement

With the Abbott government's close relations with big business, we're still to see whether its reign will be one of greater or less rent-seeking by particular industries. So far we have evidence going both ways.

We've seen knockbacks for the car makers, fruit canners and Qantas, but wins for farmers opposing the foreign takeover of GrainCorp and seeking more drought assistance, as well as a stay on the big banks' attempt to water down consumer protection on financial advice.

The next test will be the budget. Will the end of the Age of Entitlement apply just to welfare recipients (especially the politically weak, e.g. the unemployed and sole parents, rather than politically powerful age pensioners) or will it extend to "business welfare"?

With Joe Hockey searching for all the budget savings he can find, there's a lot of business welfare or, euphemistically, "industry assistance" to look at. The Productivity Commission measures it every year in its Trade and Assistance Review.

Government assistance to industry is provided in four main ways: through tariffs (restrictions on imports), government spending, tax concessions and regulatory restrictions on competition. Although much rent-seeking takes the form of persuading governments to regulate markets in ways that advantage your industry, the benefit you gain is hard to measure, so it's not included in the commission's figuring.

Assistance through tariffs is far less than in the bad old days before micro-economic reform, but there's still some left. However, its cost is borne directly by consumers in the form of higher prices. So it's not relevant to Hockey's search for budget savings. Even so, I'll give you a quick tour.

The commission estimates that, in 2011-12, tariffs allowed manufacturing industries (plus the odd rural industry) to sell their goods for $7.9 billion a year more than they otherwise would have.

In the process, however, this forced up the cost of goods used by manufacturers and other industries as inputs to their production of goods and services by $6.8 billion a year. About 30 per cent of this cost to inputs was borne by the manufacturers themselves, leaving about 70 per cent borne by other industries, largely the service industries.

(This, by the way, shows why import protection doesn't help employment as non-economists imagine it does. It may prop up manufacturing jobs, but it's at the expense of jobs everywhere else in the economy.)

So now we get to budgetary assistance to industry. On the spending side of the budget it can take the form of direct subsidies, grants, bounties, loans at concessional interest rates, loan guarantees, insurance arrangements or even equity (capital) injections.

On the revenue side of the budget it can take the form of concessional tax deductions, rebates or exemptions, preferential tax rates or the deferral of taxation. In 2011-12, the total value of budgetary assistance was $9.4 billion, with just over half that coming from spending and the rest from tax concessions.

Often people will virtuously assure you their outfit doesn't receive a cent of subsidy from the government, but omit to mention the special tax breaks they're entitled to. Think-tanks that rail against government intervention and the Nanny State, hate admitting they're sucking at the teat because the donations they receive are tax deductible (causing them to be higher than otherwise, but at a cost to other taxpayers).

This is why economists call tax concessions "tax expenditures" - to recognise that, from the perspective of the budget balance and of other taxpayers, it doesn't matter much whether the assistance comes via a cheque from the government or via the right to pay less tax than you otherwise would.

Of the total budgetary assistance in 2011-12 of $9.4 billion, 15 per cent went to agriculture, 7 per cent to mining, 19 per cent to manufacturing and 45 per cent to the services sector (leaving 14 per cent that can't be allocated to particular industries).

To put that in context, remember that agriculture's share of gross domestic product (value-added) is about 3 per cent, mining's is 10 per cent and manufacturing's is 8 per cent, leaving services contributing about 79 per cent.

Within manufacturing, the recipients of the most business welfare are motor vehicles and parts, $620 million, metal and metal fabrication, $270 million, petroleum and chemicals, $220 million, and food and beverage processors, $110 million.

Within services, the big ones are finance and insurance, $910 million, property and professional services, $610 million, and arts and recreation, $350 million.

But if you combine tariff and budgetary assistance, then compare it with the industry's value-added (share of GDP), you get a different perspective on which industries' snouts are deepest in the trough. The "effective rate of combined assistance" is 9.4 per cent for motor vehicles and parts, 7.3 per cent for textiles, clothing and footwear, and 4.7 per cent for metal and metal fabrication.

Get this: outside manufacturing, the most heavily assisted goods industry relative to the size of its contribution to the economy is forestry and logging on 7.2 per cent. We pay a huge price to destroy our native forests.

Within services, the most heavily assisted industry is the one where incomes are so much higher than anywhere else: financial services. Virtually all the assistance picked up in the commission's calculations comes via special tax breaks, such as the tax concession for offshore banking units and the reduced withholding tax on foreigners receiving distributions from managed investment trusts.

But that ain't the half of it. These calculations don't pick up two big free kicks: the benefit to the industry because the government forces almost all workers to hand over 9.25 per cent of their pay to be "managed" by it, and the benefit it gains from having one of its main products, superannuation, so heavily subsidised by other taxpayers.

Cut these fat cats? Naah, screwing people on the dole would be much easier.

Read more >>

Abbott's red tape play-acting hides rent-seeking

The world of politicians gets deeper and deeper into spin, and so far no production of the Abbott government rates higher on the spin cycle than last week's Repeal Day.

Hands up if you believe in red tape? No, I thought not. So how about we package up a huge pile of window dressing with some worthwhile but minor measures, slip in a few favours for our big business supporters and generous donors, and call it the most vigorous attack on red tape ever? This will give a veneer of credibility to our claim it will do wonders for the economy.

In the process, of course, we'll have changed the meaning of "red tape". It's meant to mean bureaucratic requirements that waste people's time without delivering any public benefit. In the hands of the spin doctors, however, it's being used to encompass everything from removing dead statutes to the supposed deregulation of industries.

Repealing redundant laws and regulations dating back as far as 1900 is mere window dressing. By definition they don't waste anyone's time - if they did they'd have been repealed long ago. Their primary purpose is to allow Tony Abbott to quote huge numbers: today I announce the abolition of more than 1000 acts of Parliament and the repeal of more than 9500 regulations. A trick you can pull only once.

Somewhere in there is some genuine, time-wasting red tape we're better off without, but it doesn't add up to much - hence the need for so much padding. Governments of both colours are always promising to roll back red tape, mainly because it gives people such an emotional charge.

But while it's true there are examples of mindless, unreasonable bureaucratic rules and requirements that could be eliminated or greatly simplified at no loss to anyone, much alleged red tape is in the mind of the beholder: it's red tape if you don't like it and good governance if you do.

There are plenty of small business people who'd try telling you supplying information to the Bureau of Statistics was "pointless red tape", maybe even filling out tax returns. In an era when big business is going overboard on "metrics", it's whingeing about the "reporting burden" the government imposes so it - and the rest of us - can know what's going on in the economy.

When business isn't complaining about "compliance costs" it's demanding greater transparency and accountability from governments. Guess what? They're opposite sides of the same coin. The world is and always will be full of compliance costs. The sensible questions are whether they're higher than they need to be and whether the benefits of compliance outweigh the costs.

The notion that all so-called red tape comes from power-crazed bureaucrats is a delusion. Most excessive regulation comes from politicians. Sometimes they act at the behest of lobbyists for particular industries, sometimes they're merely trying to create the appearance of action (an old favourite is laws to make illegal something that's already against the law) and sometimes they pass an act to impress the punters while carefully leaving loopholes and escape hatches for the industry pros.

But the most objectionable feature of the whole red tape Repeal Day charade is the way it has been used as cover for rent-seeking by the Coalition's industry backers. It's an open secret the protections for investors provided by the Future of Financial Advice legislation are being watered down at the behest of the big banks, which want to be freer to incentivise unqualified sales people to sell inappropriate investment products to mug punters.

Then there's the strange case of the Charity Commission,which was set up only recently to reduce inefficient regulation and red tape. It's to be abolished despite the objections of most charities, presumably because the Catholic Church doesn't like it.

It's being claimed all these dubious doings will "drive productivity, innovation and employment opportunities", not to mention "creating the right environment for businesses of all sizes to thrive and prosper and to drive investment and jobs growth".

Yeah sure. The claimed savings of $700 million a year (don't ask how that figure was arrived at) are equivalent to 0.04 per cent of GDP, and yet they'll work wonders. Must be an incredible multiplier effect.

We're told we'll be getting at least two Repeal Days a year, with the goal of achieving savings worth $1 billion a year. Really, a minimum of six Repeal Days in Abbott's first term? What's the bet that promise will be quietly buried?

But for as long as this pseudo reform lasts it seems it's intended as a substitute for genuine deregulation.

Read more >>

Ending the mining tax will hurt jobs

Don't be misled by last week's better-than-expected figures for employment in February. If you peer through the statistical haze you see the problem is the reverse: employment is weaker than you'd expect. Follow that through and it takes you to - of all things - the mining tax.


The job figures were better than expected for two quite silly reasons. First, because economists are hopeless at predicting month-to-month changes in employment and unemployment. Their guesses are wrong most months.

Second, because it suits the vested interests of the financial markets and the media to ignore the Bureau of Statistics' advice and focus on the volatile seasonally adjusted estimates rather than the more reliable trend estimates.The markets like volatility because it makes for better betting; the media like it because it makes for sexier stories.

If we put understanding ahead of thrills and spills and use the trend estimates, they show total employment grew by a paltry 58,000 over the year to February, an increase of just 0.5 per cent. Worse, within that, full-time employment actually fell by 24,000.

This doesn't fit with the news we got the previous week that real gross domestic product grew by a not-so-bad 2.8 per cent over the year to December. (Comparing employment to February with economic growth to December isn't a problem because employment responds with a lag.)

Economic growth of 2.8 per cent is only a bit shy of our medium-term trend growth rate of 3 per cent, which Treasury estimates is consistent with annual employment growth of 1.5 per cent, or 170,000 extra jobs.
So the real question we should be asking is why employment has been weaker than you'd expect.

The answer isn't hard to find: it's because "net exports" (exports minus imports) account for 2.4 percentage points of the overall growth of 2.8 per cent. And most of that is explained by the resources boom's shift from its investment phase to its production and export phase.

On one hand, construction workers are losing jobs as the building of new mines and natural gas facilities winds up while, on the other, few extra jobs are required to permit a huge increase in mining production. All this is fine for growth in production (real GDP), but bad for growth in employment.

Fact is, mining's so hugely capital-intensive that though it now accounts for an amazing 10 per cent of GDP, it still accounts for a mere 2.4 per cent of total employment.

Now, I've never had any sympathy for those who argue an expansion in mining isn't worth having because it generates so few extra jobs. This reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of how economies work (via the "circular flow of income").

The size of an industry's economic contribution is determined not by the number of jobs it creates directly, but by the amount of income it generates. And even with falling coal and iron ore prices, our miners are still highly profitable because their efficiency, plus the quality and accessibility of our mineral deposits, mean their marginal cost of production is far lower than that faced by miners in most other countries.

In other words, our miners earn huge economic rents.

What the mining bashers miss is that when all the income generated by an industry is spent, it generates jobs throughout the economy. This includes the income the industry pays in tax, which generates jobs when it's spent by governments.

In the case of mining, however, there's a weakness in this argument. For the income earned by an industry to generate jobs in Australia, it has to be spent in Australia. And our mining industry is about 80 per cent foreign-owned.

Got the message yet? For our economy and our workers to benefit adequately from the exploitation of our natural endowment by mainly foreign companies, our government has to ensure it gets a fair whack of the economic rents those foreigners generate.

This, of course, is the justification for the minerals resource rent tax. And the fact that, so far, the tax has raised tiny amounts of revenue doesn't mean mining is no longer highly profitable, nor that the tax isn't worth bothering with.

Because Labor so foolishly allowed the big three foreign miners to redesign the tax, they chose to get all their deductions up-front. Once those deductions are used up, the tax will become a big earner. Long before then, however, Tony Abbott will have rewarded the Liberal Party's foreign donors by abolishing the tax.

This will be an act of major fiscal vandalism, of little or no benefit to the economy and at great cost to job creation.

Read more >>

Compulsory super without protections is a rip off

A few weeks ago, when I offered my list of our top 10 economic reforms of the past 40 years, I was surprised by the number of people arguing I should have included compulsory employee superannuation in the list. Really? I can't agree.

It is, after all, merely a way of compelling people to save for their retirement. That's probably no bad thing in principle, countering our all too human tendency to worry excessively about the here and now and too little about adequate provision for our old age.

But compulsory saving hardly counts as a major reform. I suspect some of my correspondents see it as a boon for workers because it extracts a benefit from employers over and above the wages they're paid.

If so, they've been misled by appearances. Economists are in no doubt it all comes out in the wash: that when the government obliges employers to contribute to workers' retirement savings, the employers eventually make up for it by granting smaller wage rises than they otherwise would have.

It's true that compulsory super contributions - and the subsequent earnings on them - attract tax concessions, being taxed at a flat rate of just 15 cents in the dollar. But while upper income-earners do disgracefully well out of these concessions, people on incomes around the average gain little advantage, and those earning less than $37,000 a year gain nothing. Hardly sounds fair to me.

My other reservation about compulsory super is the way it compels employees to become the victims of the most shamelessly grasping, overpaid industry of them all: financial services. These are the people who made top executives and medical specialists feel they were underpaid.

Compulsory super delivers a huge captive market for the providers of investment services to make an easy living from and for the less scrupulous among them to prey upon. The pot of money the government compels us to give these people to manage on our behalf has now reached $1.6 trillion.

Most of us have little idea how much these people appropriate from our life savings each year to reward themselves for the services we're compelled to let them provide to us - and little desire to find out.

We should be less complacent. For many workers it's more than we pay for electricity each year. Think of it: we put so much energy and passion into carrying on about the rising price of power - and Tony Abbott used our resentment to get himself elected - while the men in flash suits dip into our savings without most of us knowing or caring.

To be fair, industry super funds dip into our savings far more sparingly than the profit-driven "retail" funds backed by the big banks, insurance companies and firms of actuaries. Since most workers do have a choice, you'd need a very good reason not to have your money with an industry fund.

But even this worries me. It means the union movement - the people whose job is to protect workers by being full bottle on the tricks the finance industry gets up to - has divided loyalties. Those who should be holding the industry to account are also part of it.

For years the industry campaigned for an increase in the super levy of 9 per cent of salary, arguing it was insufficient to provide people with an adequate income in retirement. This is a dubious argument, rejected by the Henry taxation review.

But look at it another way: here is a hugely profitable industry arguing the government should increase the proportion of all employees' wages diverted to the industry for it to take annual bites out of before giving us access to our money at age 60 or later.

This is classic rent-seeking. The Howard government was never tempted to yield, but as part of the Labor government's mining-tax reform package, it agreed to boost compulsory super contributions to 12 per cent by 2019. Why? I don't doubt Labor was got at by the union end of the financial services industry.

Contributions increased to 9.25 per cent last July, but the Abbott government came to power promising to defer the phase-up for two years. I'd lay a small bet this deferral will become permanent - though probably not before contributions rise to 9.5 per cent on July 1.

I wouldn't be sorry to see the phase-up abandoned. The Henry report recommended against it, arguing that action to reduce the industry's fees could produce a similar increase in ultimate super payouts. And it's doubtful that low income earners are better off being compelled to save rather than spend their meagre earnings.

The government's policy of compelling workers to hand so much of their wages over to the finance industry surely leaves the government with a greater-than-normal obligation to ensure the industry doesn't exploit this monopoly by misadvising and overcharging its often uninformed customers.

This - along with the millions lost by investors in Storm Financial and other dodgy outfits - prompted Labor's Future of Financial Advice reforms, which focused on prohibiting or highlighting hidden commissions and requiring advisers to put their clients' interests ahead of their own.

But now Senator Arthur Sinodinos is seeking to water down these consumer protections in the name of reducing "red tape". The financial fat cats live to rip us off another day.

Read more >>

We’ve become a nation of rent-seekers

In political economist Mancur Olson's pathbreaking book, The Rise and Decline of Nations, published in 1982, he argued that a country's economic stability ultimately leads to decline as it becomes increasingly dominated by organised interest groups, each seeking to advance their interests at the expense of others.

By contrast, countries that have a collapse of the political regime, and the interest groups that have coalesced around it, can radically improve productivity and increase national income because they start with a clean slate in the aftermath of the collapse. Examples are the rapid growth of postwar Germany and Japan, as Wikipedia reminds us.

Professor Ross Garnaut has argued that Australia is unlikely to see another era of extensive micro-economic reform because of the growth in rent-seeking behaviour since the days of the Hawke-Keating government.

What these days passes for the political debate seems to be dominated by ''distributional coalitions'', in Olson's phrase, arguing for ''reforms'' from which the chief beneficiaries would be their good selves, or desperately opposing government reforms that would impose even the most modest sacrifice on their members.

What gets me is how blatantly self-seeking our lobby groups have become. It is as if the era of economic rationalism - with its belief that the economy is driven by self-interest - has sanctified selfishness and refusal to co-operate for the common good.

Another explanation may be the growth of a lucrative rent-seeking industry. These days far more people make their living lobbying for interest groups than did so in the 1980s.

When your livelihood depends on convincing your clients their money is well spent, it's hardly surprising these ever-multiplying industry groups, corporate ''government relations managers'' and freelance lobbying firms make so much noise and are so untiring in their efforts to extract concessions from government.

The relationship between elected governments and bureaucrats, and the professional lobbyists, is unhealthy. In an ever more complex world, governments seek to consult ''stakeholders'' before implementing policy changes.

But some stakeholders - those that spend most on lobbyists - are more equal than others. And too many politicians, private-office advisers and bureaucrats retire as gamekeepers to become poachers. The fact that ex-Coalition lobbyists do better under Coalition governments, while ex-Labor people do better under Labor governments is a sign that this is not an innocent, arms-length, information-gathering exercise.

Meanwhile, the business of opposition has degenerated into automatic opposition to any and every unpopular government decision, even though this requires parties to turn their rhetoric on its head when they move from opposition to government.

Labor's attempt to exploit public anxiety over the Abbott government's inability to solve the deep-seated and long-running commercial challenges faced by hard-pressed manufacturers and airlines, while advancing not a shred of credible alternative policy, is despicable. Just as despicable as when Tony Abbott did it to Labor.

It's finally dawning on people that major and genuine reform requires a degree of bipartisanship at the political level and a spirit of give-and-take on the part of powerful interest groups. But these prerequisites are further away than ever.

Instead what we get is lowest-common-denominator politics from the pollies and rent-seeking posing as ''reform'' from the interest groups. This is particularly true of business lobby groups - the big miners, the financial services sector, the hotels and the registered clubs, for instance - because they have the most money to invest (and I do mean invest) in rent-seeking.

There does seem to be one spark of potential progress, however. Perhaps because of its organic links to big business, the Abbott government seems to have realised something Labor never did: giving in to rent-seekers doesn't make you any friends, it just makes things worse.

Yielding to my pressure for a concession never satisfies me, it just shows me you're an easy touch and prompts me to think of something else I want. Meanwhile, giving me a lolly just makes my rivals envious and prompts them to demand theirs. Bad inevitably leads to worse.

Joe Hockey and Abbott have been courageous in ignoring the begging bowl of the least competitive end of manufacturing and, it seems, Qantas. It's too early to say whether this constitutes a consistent attempt to turn back rent-seeking or just prejudice against certain industries but not others - though it would be idle to expect absolute consistency of principle from any flesh-and-blood government.

The way Arthur Sinodinos has been cutting back investor protections at the behest of the greediest industry of them all - financial services - under the guise of reducing ''red tape'' raises the possibility that rent-seeking via the budget is verboten, but not rent-seeking via regulation. We shall see.

Read more >>

Who's paying the rent are are you getting any?

What is rent? You don't make it past the elementary economics class unless you know that's a trick question. In economics there are two kinds of rent: common or garden rent and "economic rent".

Obviously, ordinary rent is what you pay for the use of a building or land. By contrast, economic rent (also called quasi rent) is the amount paid for any "factor of production" - land, labour or capital - in excess of the amount it needs to be paid to keep it in its present use (which is its "opportunity cost").

If you think you've never heard of economic rent before, you're probably wrong - unless you haven't heard of the minerals resource rent tax or of "rent-seeking".

It doesn't get talked about a lot, but economic rent is widespread in every real-world economy, making it something worth talking about. You never know, you may be getting a bit yourself (I'm getting loads).

Economic rent isn't a cost of production that contributes to the selling price of the factor - the land, the physical capital or the labour. Rather, it's earnings to the owner of the factor determined by the selling price.

Economic rent is equivalent to "producer surplus" in the market for goods and services. When it's received by a business it's also known as "above-normal profits" or "super profits" (does that term ring a bell?).

Economists define profit differently to accountants. To an accountant, profit is sales revenue minus actual costs. To an economist, costs involve actual costs plus the opportunity cost of the financial capital invested in the business - that is, the most the capital would earn in a different industry with an equivalent degree of risk. (For unincorporated businesses, the opportunity cost also includes the highest wage the proprietor could earn in a different job.)

The opportunity cost of the capital invested in the business is what economists call "normal profit". Any actual profit in excess of actual costs plus normal profit is above-normal profit and likely to be the consequence of economic rents.

What is it that allows some factors of production to earn economic rent - higher returns than those needed to keep them in the business? Scarcity or, better, exclusivity. The factor possesses some highly desirable characteristic that means there's not enough of it to go around, so people fight over it and, in the process, bid up its price.

In a textbook economy such a situation wouldn't last long because the market would have an incentive to increase the supply of the desirable factor to meet the high demand. In real-world economies, economic rents can persist because they're not easily replicated. The supply of harbourside land, for instance, is fixed.

The exclusivity of factors may be natural or contrived. Governments often create economic rents by limiting the number of licences they're willing to issue to participants in particular industries - taxi plates, for example.

Patents and copyright are designed to allow creators to enjoy economic rents for a fixed time. This implies monopoly profits are a form of economic rent, although rents can be enjoyed by multiple firms in an industry.

And don't forget many workers benefit from rents. Unions may be able to limit the supply of a particular occupation and so force wages above what they would otherwise be. In this, however, trade unions are amateurs compared with the colleges of medical specialists.

But some rents aren't contrived. If I were prepared to do my job for $60,000 a year but my boss paid me $100,000, I'd be enjoying economic rent of $40,000 a year. Why would he pay me more than my "reservation wage"? Because if he didn't, a rival employer would.

Of course, the people who do best in the rent stakes are film stars, sports stars and the like. Such people have far more talent than the rest of us, but they also have a name - are a brand - that attracts more customers than other actors or players do.

The point of all this is that, from a social (community-wide) point of view, economic rent is a waste. It's a price customers pay that does nothing to increase the production of goods and services. If we could eliminate it - say by taxing it away - it wouldn't reduce production, just the incomes of the owners of scarce resources.

This, of course, is the justification for the minerals resource rent tax. There is a lot of economic rent associated with the exploitation of mineral deposits, particularly in Australia, because world reserves of certain minerals are relatively limited and because much of our supply is high quality and easily won.

Since these resources belong to us, not the mining companies we permit to extract them, we'd be mugs not to tax much of that rent rather than letting largely foreign companies walk away with most of it.

I hope by now you understand why the Abbott government's talk of all the damage the mining tax is doing to the economy is tosh, intended to mislead the economically undereducated. (Which is not to say Labor's tax was well designed - it wasn't.)

It is rational for workers to be "rent-seekers" in the sense that they equip themselves with scarce skills and work hard at being the best in their field. Similarly, it is rational for firms to seek out niches where prices far exceed costs.

But that's not what the term "rent-seeker" - which comes from the libertarian "public choice theory" - is usually taken to mean. It refers to groups that lobby the government for tax, spending or regulatory policies that benefit the lobbyists at the expense of taxpayers or consumers, or their rivals.

As The Economist magazine puts it in its business dictionary, it means "cutting yourself a bigger slice of the cake rather than making the cake bigger".

Read more >>