Wednesday, May 29, 2024

THE BUDGET, INFLATION & UNEMPLOYMENT

UBS HSC Economics Day, May 29, 2024

I want to talk to you today about the federal budget two weeks ago and how it relates to the two key issues the managers of the economy need to keep under control: inflation and unemployment. Right now, inflation is still at the top of our worry list, but we shouldn’t forget that we’ve been doing exceptionally well on unemployment, and it’s important we do what we can to avoid fixing inflation at the expense of making unemployment our new problem.

Of course, what most voters see as our big economic problem – thereby making it the government’s biggest political problem - is the cost-of-living crisis. You may think that’s the same thing as what economists think of as the inflation problem, but it’s not that simple. When people complain about the pain they’re feeling from the cost of living, what they want is some immediate relief. By contrast, what economists want is a lasting reduction in high inflation. And this distinction matters because the economists’ standard solution to the pain caused by high inflation is to make it better by first making it worse. It’s actually the pain caused by this solution that people are complaining about most.

Economists know that the only cause of inflation their shorter-term macroeconomic levers can do anything about is inflation caused by the demand for goods and services growing faster than the economy’s ability to produce – supply - more goods and services. When demand exceeds supply, businesses use the opportunity to raise their prices. So, if you want to stop them raising their prices so freely, you have to reduce the demand for whatever it is they are selling. How do you do this? By putting the squeeze on households’ finances, thus making it harder for households to keep up their spending. How do you do this? The main way is for the RBA to raise interest rates, thus greatly increasing monthly mortgage payments. But it adds to the squeeze when bracket creep means the government takes a bigger tax bite out of workers’ pay rises. And it also helps if the government finds other ways to take more money out of the economy with its taxes relative to what it puts back into the economy by its own spending. That is, when you are reducing a budget deficit or increasing a budget surplus.

Before we get to this month’s budget, we need to understand where the economy is now by going back to see where it’s come from.

The recovery from the pandemic and the return to full employment

After the COVID virus arrived in Australia in early 2020, governments sought to slow its spread through the population until a vaccine could be developed. They closed our international borders, limited travel between our states, and locked down the economy, getting people to work from home if possible, closing schools and closing many shops and venues. The idea was for people to stay in their homes as much as possible. The result was a sudden collapse in economic activity – a sort of government-caused recession, with unemployment shooting up.

But governments knew they had to do what was necessary to hold the economy together during this temporary lockdown so that, as soon as it could be ended, the economy would quickly resume normal activity. So the economic managers unleashed huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. The RBA cut the official cash rate almost to zero, and the federal government spent loads of money on JobKeeper grants to employers and many other things. The state governments also spent a lot. From an almost balanced budget in the financial year to June 2019, the federal budget balance blew out to a deficit of $85 billion (equivalent to 4.3 pc of GDP) in the year to June 2020, then a peak deficit of $134 billion (6.4 pc of GDP) in the year to June2022.

But when the lockdowns ended, all the stimulus caused the economy to rebound. People started catching up with their spending, employment grew strongly and unemployment – and underemployment – fell like a stone. The economy boomed. With our borders still closed to immigrants, the rate of unemployment fell to 3.5 pc, it’s lowest in almost 50 years. So we had returned to full employment for the first time in five decades.

This strong growth did wonders for the budget balance. The temporary spending programs ended. When people go from being on JobSeeker to having a job, they start paying income tax – a double benefit to the budget. When people who want to are able to go from working part-time to full-time, they pay more tax. And when workers get bigger pay rises, their average rate of income tax rises, often because they’ve been pushed into a higher tax bracket. People call this “bracket creep”. But economists call it “fiscal drag”. They know it’s the budget’s inbuilt “automatic stabilisers” changing direction and acting to reduce workers’ after-tax income, thereby limiting the rate at which the economy is growing and adding to inflation pressure. (Another factor increasing tax collections was the world prices for iron ore and other commodities we export, which stayed high and cause our mining companies’ payments of company tax collections to be higher than expected.)

You can see this in the change in the budget balance. From a deficit of $134 billion (6.4 pc of GDP) in the year to June 2021, it fell to a deficit of $32 (1.4 pc) in the year June 2022. And then, in the first financial year of the Albanese government, it flipped to a budget surplus of $22billion (0.9 pc). This was all very lovely. But while it was happening, trouble was brewing: inflation was building up.

The return of high inflation

Since the early 1990s, we – and the other advanced economies – had enjoyed a low and stable rate of inflation within the RBA’s 2 to 3 pc target range. Or, in recent years, even a bit lower than the target. But with the economy booming, from early in 2022 the rate of inflation started rising rapidly. In May 2022, just before the election in which government passed from the Morrison Coalition to Albanese’s Labor, the RBA started raising interest rates to slow the growth of demand. By November 2023, it had raised the official “cash” interest rate 13 times, from 0.1 pc to 4.35 pc. Now, 4.35 pc is not high by the standards of earlier decades, but this was the biggest and quickest increase in interest rates we’ve seen, imposing great pain on households with big home loans. For separate reasons, we’ve seen an acute shortage of places to rent, allowing landlords to make big increases in the rent they charge.

So, while the RBA was raising interest rates to slow demand, consumer prices kept rising, with the inflation rate reaching a peak of nearly 8 pc – 7.8 pc to be exact - by December 2022. Last year, 2023, the RBA kept tightening monetary policy, and the inflation rate started falling, reaching 3.6 pc over the year to March, 2024.

It’s important to remember that not all of the rise in prices was caused by strong demand within Australia. A fair bit of it was caused by overseas disruptions to the supply of various goods we import. The disruption was caused by the pandemic and by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which pushed up the prices of petrol and gas. The resolution of these disruptions helped get our inflation rate down. And while all this was happening, the squeeze on households’ budgets had pretty much stopped any growth in consumer spending, thus slowing the economy’s growth. This meant a weakening in the demand for labour, causing the rate of unemployment to rise from its low of 3.5 pc to 4.1 pc by April this year. Now, that was where the economy was at when Mr Chalmers announced his budget two weeks’ ago.

The 2024 budget

The part of the Mr Chalmers’ budget that got most attention from the media was the decision to give all households a one-year, $300 rebate on their electricity bills. This had the political benefit to the government of giving voters some relief to cost-of-living pain they have been demanding the government provide. But it was designed also to produce a benefit to the economy: combined with an increase in the rent allowance paid to people on welfare payments, it is expected to reduce the consumer price index by 0.5 percentage points during the coming financial year, 2024-25. This device will come at a cost to government spending of $4.4 billion over two years. Some economists criticised the rebate, arguing that its cost to the budget would actually add to inflationary pressure. They noted that all the new measures announced in the budget would worsen the budget balance by almost $10 billion in the new financial year, and by a total of $24 billion over the coming four years. So they denounced the budget as inflationary at a time when the RBA and the government were still battling to get inflation heading down to the inflation target of 2 to 3 per cent, so that the RBA could start lowering interest rates.

But what the critics have missed is that the measure that will do by far the most to worsen the budget balance from an expected further surplus of $9 billion (equivalent to 0.3 pc of GDP) in the financial year just ending, to a deficit of $28 billion (1 pc of GDP) in the coming year, is the stage 3 tax cuts. These have been government policy since 2018, but were rejigged a few months ago to ensure that more of their benefit went to low and middle-income taxpayers. Their cost in the first year of $23 billion, accounts for more than 60 pc of the total expected turnaround in the budget balance of $37 billion.

The other big announcement in the budget was the government’s Future Made in Australia program. This is a most important change in the government’s micro-economic policy. But the expected cost to the budget of about $23 billion will be spread over 10 years, with little of it spent over the next few years. This means it is not a big issue for the short-term management of the macro economy.

The new macro “policy mix”

So where does the budget leave the authorities use of the two instruments of macro demand management – monetary policy and fiscal policy? It leaves us with the “stance” of monetary policy having got progressively more restrictive over the past two years, with the long lag in policies having their full effect on demand meaning there is more contractionary effect to come.

The huge growth in tax collections caused by the budget’s automatic stabilisers has caused the budget to have two financial years of surpluses, meaning a restrictive stance of fiscal policy has added to the contractionary pressure from monetary policy. But, although Mr Chalmers has denied it, there can be no doubt that, thanks mainly to the stage 3 tax cuts, the budget changes the “stance” of fiscal policy from restrictive to expansionary.

The government’s critics argue that this expansion will jeopardise our efforts to get inflation down to the target range. I disagree. The economy is weak, expected by Treasury to have grown by only 1.75 pc in the financial year just ending, and to grow by only 2 pc in the coming year. If anything, that’s probably on the optimistic side. At 3.6 pc over the year to March, the inflation rate has already fallen close to the 2 to 3 pc range, and it’s easy to believe it will keep falling in the coming year, as Treasury forecasts. After a lag, the tax cut will take some of the pressure off household spending. But, with luck, it will help ensure the economy’s slowdown doesn’t become a recession. Even so, Treasury’s forecast that the economy’s continuing weakness will push the rate of unemployment no higher than 4.5 pc is probably also on the optimistic side.

Outlook for the budget and the public debt

Treasury’s forecasts and projections suggest the budget is likely to remain in small but declining deficits over the decade to 2034-35. The federal government’s gross public debt is expected to be $904 billion (34 pc of GDP) at June, 2024. The gross debt is projected to peak at 35 pc of GDP in June 2027, then decline to 30 pc by June 2035. This proportionate decline would occur because the economy was growing faster than the small deficits were adding to gross debt.

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The pollies have twigged that our crazy housing game can't go on

Last week, a fairly ordinary place in our street, similar to ours, sold for $4.7 million. I suppose I should be congratulating myself on how well I’ve done in the capitalist game. And it’s only fair since I’ve “worked hard all my life”. In truth, all we’ve done is pay the exorbitant price of $180,000 for our place, then hung around for 40 years. This makes sense? Surely, this crazy game can’t keep going onward and upward forever.

It’s now been two weeks since Treasurer Jim Chalmers delivered his budget, but I’ve only just realised its main content is not the one-year $300 electricity bill rebate we’ve obsessed over, it’s the evidence the government has finally accepted our housing system is dysfunctional and must be fixed. The budget papers include a long statement spelling out what’s wrong with housing with a candour I’ve not seen before.

The hard truth is that, until now, the pollies on both sides have only pretended to care about how hard the young were finding it to afford a home of their own. Why? Because the number of voters who own a home – whether outright or still with a mortgage – greatly exceeds the number who’d merely like to become a homeowner. As John Howard used to say, he’d never heard any homeowner complain about the rising value of their property.

All the things pollies do in the name of helping first-home buyers – such as cutting stamp duty on the purchase price – don’t actually help, and probably aren’t intended to. When they claim to be helping you afford the high price, they’re really helping to keep it high. If they helped you and no one else you’d be advantaged. But when they also help the people you’re bidding against, it’s actually the seller who benefits.

It’s the same with the Bank of Mum and Dad. The more parents help their kids afford the high prices – as I have – the higher those prices will stay. Again, the sellers benefit.

When the value of the oldies’ homes just keeps going up, this constitutes a transfer of wealth from the younger to the older generation. The Bank of Mum and Dad transfers some of the wealth back to the youngsters. The losers, however, are those kids who didn’t have the sense to pick well-off parents.

But what makes me think the Albanese government has seen the light?

Well, for a start, it makes more political sense than it used to. Not only are younger people having trouble affording their first home, they’re being hit with big jumps in rent thanks to an acute shortage of rental accommodation.

The budget statement admits that the median price of dwellings in the eight capital cities has more than doubled since the mid-noughties. So have advertised rents. It now takes more than 11 years to save a 20 per cent deposit on a house.

Politicians have been favouring the old at the expense of the young for decades, but the young are getting restive. Labor has more than its share of the votes of young adults. It risks losing those votes if it doesn’t start delivering for the younger generation.

Labor sees that house prices and rents are rising because the supply of homes has failed to keep up with growth in the population. Part of the reason for this is what the statement admits has been a “long-term, chronic under-investment in social housing”.

Why all these frank admissions? Because the Albanese government has decided to do something big to ease the problem. The budget announced new measures worth $6 billion which, added to those already announced, amount to a $32 billion plan to deliver 1.2 million new, well-located homes in the five years to June 2029. This would be equivalent to a city the size of Brisbane.

As with so many of our problems, the feds have most of the money needed to fix the nation’s housing, but the actual responsibility for housing rests with the states and even local government. The plan’s attraction is that it’s been agreed with the states and includes monetary incentives for them to co-operate.

The words “well-located homes” are code for many of them involving medium and high-density housing in the capital cities’ “missing middle”. It requires the states to take on their local government NIMBYs (see monetary incentives above).

It would be wrong, however, to see this plan as the simple solution to a housing system that’s been performing poorly for decades. It will be some years before it makes much difference, and experts have questioned whether so many new homes can be built in just five years.

It’s an advance to see the new emphasis on improving the system’s ability to supply more houses, but the vexed question of fixing the distortions to demand caused by misguided tax concessions remains to be faced.

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Monday, May 27, 2024

Politicians don't control migrant numbers, and usually don't want to

Suddenly, everyone’s talking about high migration and the way it’s disrupting the economy. Why is the government letting in so many people, and why hasn’t it turned off the tap?

Short answer: because, the way we run immigration, it has little control over the tap.

But, at times like this, that’s not something either side of politics wants to admit. The truth is, they could exercise more control over immigration, but neither side has particularly wanted to.

Usually, the pressure on them to keep immigration high greatly exceeds the pressure to keep it low. The upward pressure comes from business, which finds it easier to increase profits when it has a continuously growing market.

For many years, business’s main interest was in getting more factory fodder. More people to buy the products of our highly protected manufacturing industry and give it a little of the economies of scale it lacked.

This was why it had to be protected from imports from overseas manufacturers with much bigger domestic markets. As well, our manufacturers needed a steady supply of less-skilled workers to staff their production lines.

In more recent decades, the emphasis has switched from factory fodder to preferring those immigrants with the skills we particularly need to fill shortages as they arise. This, I fear, has allowed our employers to take less interest in ensuring they were always training up enough locals to meet their industry’s future needs.

Another change has been from focusing on permanent migration to encouraging people to come here for a while on temporary visas: workers with skills coming to see what it’s like, students coming to gain further education and young people coming on working holidays, aka backpackers.

We’ve become quite dependent on this huge inflow and outflow of temporary migrants, which far exceeds people coming on permanent visas. Businesses often want their temporary skilled workers to stay on.

The sale of education to overseas students has become one of our biggest exports, one on which our universities have become heavily dependent. Our hospitality industries rely on the casual employment of overseas students and backpackers. And farmers and country towns rely on backpackers for fruit picking and other unskilled work.

On top of all that, federal governments have become reliant on high migration to make our GDP growth figures look better. They often boast about how well our growth compares with the other rich countries, without ever mentioning that most of this is explained by our faster population growth.

And right now, of course, the economy’s growth is so weak we’d be in recession if not for the recent immigration surge.

All these are the reasons successive federal governments want to maintain strong immigration, despite the public’s longstanding reservations. Former prime minister John Howard did a great line in diverting the punters’ attention to resentment of some uninvited arrivals by boat, while he ushered in visa-wielding immigrants arriving by the plane load.

It’s only when high immigration becomes an issue before elections, as now, that the pollies make noises about slowing the inflow. It’s true that, since we reopened our borders following the lockdowns, our “net overseas migration”, people arriving minus people departing, but not counting those on brief visits, leapt to 528,000 in 2022-23, more than double what it was in 2018-19. And it may exceed another 400,000 in the financial year just ending.

This surge does seem to have contributed to the present acute shortage of rental accommodation and the big jump in rents, but Opposition Leader Peter Dutton is drawing a long bow in blaming the recent surge for the unaffordability of buying a home, which has been worsening for decades.

The telltale sign that Dutton is fudging is his plan to make more homes available by cutting the government’s permanent migration program from 185,000 a year to 140,000.

The government does control the size of this program, and often moves it up or down a bit, but the size of the program makes little difference to what matters most for the economy: annual net overseas migration.

The trick is that about 65 per cent of the permanent visas go to people who are already here on temporary visas. Changing their visa status makes no difference to net overseas migration.

At times like this, the pollies would like you to think they have the power to move immigration up or down according to the economy’s needs at the time.

But they don’t. For the most part, the level of net migration is, as economists would say, “demand determined”. And, as the demographers will tell you, net migration tends to go up and down with the state of our economy.

When the economy’s booming, migrants are keen to come to Australia, and our employers are keen to have them, particularly if they have skills. What’s more, locals and former immigrants are more likely to want to stay here than go overseas.

It’s a different story when our economy’s weak. Employers are less keen to bring in people and migrants are less keen to come.

Now, our present circumstances don’t fit that long-established cyclical pattern. But that’s mainly because the economy’s been returning to normal after the end of the pandemic. This is particularly true of the people most disrupted by the pandemic, and who’ve done most to account for our recent downs and ups in net migration: overseas students.

Most students went back home during the lockdowns, but now many of them, and many newbies, are coming back in. We’ve had a lot more students than expected because, to encourage their return, the Morrison government removed the limit on how much paid work they could do. It took the Albanese government too long to wake up and end the concession.

If you find it hard to believe the government has little control over the number of immigrants it lets in, note this. To be given a temporary visa, you have to fit one of the many categories the government wants: skilled, student, backpacker and so on. But there are no limits on the number of applicants accepted in each category.

Until now. Because it’s the students who’ve contributed most to the recent surge, the government is planning to impose caps on how many it will admit. The opposition is promising something similar.

Remember this, however. The economy is weak – and it is forecast to remain so for a year or two – so it’s reasonable to expect that, even without the caps on overseas students, net migration will fall back soon enough.

But an election is coming. Voters are unhappy about high migration and the high cost of housing, and both sides want to be seen doing something about it. How much the winner actually bothers to do after the election, may be a different matter.

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Friday, May 24, 2024

INFLATION, TAX & THE COST OF LIVING

May 2024

The economy has been going through huge ups and downs since COVID arrived in early 2020. Since most of you weren’t taking a great deal of notice of the economy that long ago, let me give you a quick summary. To slow the spread of the virus while a vaccine was being developed, governments locked the economy down, getting as many people as possible to work from home, closing schools and many shops, and telling people to stay in their homes as much as possible. Australia’s borders were closed to people coming and going, though many overseas students were encouraged to return to their home countries. The Australian states closed their borders to interstate travel.

This hugely reduced economic activity, causing an immediate recession and sending unemployment shooting up. But to ensure this didn’t cause lasting damage to the economy, the Reserve Bank cut the official interest rate to almost zero and the federal government spent a fortune on JobKeeper payments and many other things. As well, the state governments spent up big.

This worked like a charm. As soon as the lockdowns ended, the economy rebounded. Once people were allowed out of their homes, they really caught up with their spending. The economy boomed, with employment growing and unemployment falling like a stone. The boom, coming before our borders had been reopened to immigrants, caused the rate of unemployment to fall to 3.5 per cent, its lowest in almost 50 years. With job vacancies far exceeding unemployment, the economy had returned to full employment for the first time in five decades. Everything seemed wonderful, until we – like the other advanced economies – noticed prices shooting up.

The return of inflation

Until then, and like all the advanced economies, Australia had enjoyed years of low inflation, with the rate of price increases staying in the RBA’s target range of 2 to 3 pc on average since the mid-1990s. In the years before the pandemic, the RBA even had trouble getting inflation up to the bottom of the target range. But from early in 2022, prices started rising rapidly and, by the end of 2022, inflation reached a peak of 7.8 per cent. Similar things were happening in the other advanced economies. What caused this sudden surge in inflation, the worse we had seen for 30 years?

Two quite separate developments. The first factor was us being hit by global supply-side price shocks arising from disruptions caused by the pandemic. When people were locked up in their homes, they couldn’t get out and buy services such as restaurant meals, go to shows and sporting matches, or travel. But they could use the internet to buy things to improve their homes, new appliances or even new cars. So, while spending on services collapsed, spending on goods took off.  This sudden surge in the purchase of goods led to shortages – including a shortage of computer chips - and higher prices. Because, these days, all the rich countries import many manufactures from places such as China, this surge in demand for goods led to shortages of ships and shipping containers. So the pandemic led to temporary supply shortages, which pushed up prices.  As well, Russia’s attack on Ukraine caused a big increase in oil and gas prices.

But the second factor, adding to these problems on the supply – or production – side of the economy, was a strong surge in the demand for goods and services. Where did this come from? From all the economic stimulus the managers of the macro economy had applied during the lockdowns to hold the economy together. The official cash rate was already down to 0.75 per cent, but the RBA cut it almost to zero, 0.1 per cent. It also used unconventional measures – “quantitative easing”, or the buying of second-hand government bonds – to lower medium-term interest rates. As well, from a virtually balanced budget in the financial year to June 2019, the government’s hugely increased spending caused annual deficits of $85 billion (4.3 pc of GDP), $134 billion (6.4 pc of GDP) and, in 2021-22, $32 billion (1.4 pc). The state governments greatly increased their spending also.

With the wisdom of hindsight, it’s clear the economic managers provided a lot more monetary and fiscal stimulus than turned out to be needed. As a result, this excess demand for goods and services outstripped our businesses’ ability to increase their production of goods and services, thus causing prices to rise. So the surge in prices in 2022 had two quite different causes. The supply-side problems were beyond our control, but would sort themselves out in time. The excessive demand, however, was caused by our own miscalculations and so required the economic managers to move the two instruments for managing the strength of demand – monetary policy and fiscal policy – from a stimulatory setting to a restrictive setting.

The policy response to high inflation

The RBA responded to the worsening inflation in May 2022, just before the federal election in which the Morrison Coalition government was replaced by the Albanese Labor government. The RBA began increasing the official cash rate and, by November 2023, had raise it 13 times, from 0.1 pc to 4.35 pc. Note that, although 4.35 pc is not high by the standards of earlier decades, this was the biggest and fastest increase in rates ever, meaning it had a particularly sharp effect on those households with big home loans. There’s no doubt the present “stance” of monetary policy is very restrictive.

The surge in tax collections

And while all this was happening to monetary policy, the budget’s “automatic stabilisers” were tightening fiscal policy. Since the change of government in May 2022, the boom in the economy and the return to full employment caused income tax collections to grow strongly. (As well, the world prices of iron ore and other export commodities have stayed much higher than Treasury was expecting, causing mining companies to pay more company tax than expected.)

When more people get jobs, they go from being on JobSeeker to paying income tax. When strong demand for labour allows those who want to to move from part-time to full-time work, they pay more income tax. And when higher inflation causes people to get bigger pay rises, this increases their average rate of income tax, often by pushing them into a higher tax bracket. What people call “bracket creep”, economists call “fiscal drag”. It’s one of the budget’s main built-in, “automatic stabilisers” which, without any explicit decision by the government, act automatically to take a bigger tax bite out of people’s pay rises, so leaving them less to spend and helping to slow demand.

The incoming Labor Treasurer Jim Chalmers’ main part in this has been to spend as little of this revenue windfall as possible, allowing almost all of it to flow through to the budget’s bottom line. So, from a deficit of $32 billion in the year to June 2022, the budget flipped to a surplus of $22 billion in the year to June 2023. That’s a turnaround of $54 billion, equivalent to 2.3 pc of GDP. The “stance” of fiscal policy switched from expansionary to contractionary, adding to the downward pressure on demand coming from monetary policy. And we know from the new budget that fiscal policy stayed contractionary in the financial year just ending, 2023-24, with another surplus of $9 billion expected.

The price mechanism and “gouging”

Before I move on to the question of the cost of living, I must tell you about a big difference between the thinking of economists and the thinking of normal people. Economists believe that the best way to allocate resources in an economy is via the use of markets. They believe that the forces of supply and demand in a particular market interact to set the price of the particular good or service. And they believe that, when something happens to disrupt the market, the “price mechanism” works to bring demand and supply back together, and re-establish “equilibrium”. If something happens that causes the demand for a product to exceed its supply, sellers are able to increase the price they are charging. This price increase sends different messages to the buyers than to the sellers. The message to buyers is: don’t use any more of this product than you have to, and see if you can find cheaper substitutes for it. The message to sellers is: producing this product has become more profitable, so make more of it. So, putting the two sides together, the “price mechanism” works to reduce demand and increase supply, thus causing the price to fall back to pretty where it was before the disruption.

I hope you know all that. The point is that when businesses respond to excess demand for their product by using the opportunity to raise their prices, economists regard this as the completely normal way markets work to restore equilibrium. It’s thus a good thing. But consumers see it very differently. They often object to businesses raising their prices even though their costs haven’t increased. They criticise it as “gouging” the customers. (My opinion? I think markets don’t always work as well as economic theory assumes they do.)

The cost of living

Whereas economists focus on inflation and ensuring prices don’t rise too rapidly, and worry about wages rises in response to the higher prices helping to keep inflation high, ordinary people worry about the rising “cost of living”. They focus on how fast prices are rising – particularly the prices they see in the supermarket - but tend not to notice that what matters most to them is whether their wage or other income is keeping up with prices. And many may not notice that they suffer when their wage rises cause their average rate of income tax to rise, leaving them less money to spend.

Voters have had a lot to complain about in the past two years or so. Consumer prices have rising at a much faster rate than usual. As well, until recent months their wages haven’t kept up with the rise in prices. And the government has been taking a bigger tax bite out of their wages.

But what makes it worse is that the standard way central banks and governments stop the cost of living rising so fast is to make it worse to make it better. When prices are rising because households’ demand for goods and services is rising faster than the economy’s ability to supply them, the standard response by the economic managers is to squeeze households’ budgets so they can’t spend as much. When this causes demand for their products to slow, businesses aren’t able to raise their prices as much. The main way the RBA squeezes households is by raising the interest rates they pay, particularly on their mortgages. And this time, for different reasons, rents have been rising rapidly.

All this presents a problem for our politicians. The voters are crying out for them to do something to fix the cost-of-living crisis. But the only way the authorities can achieve a lasting improvement in the rate at which prices are rising is to keep the pain on for a while yet. This is why Mr Chalmers is doing fairly minor things like giving every household a $300 electricity rebate. What will do much more to ease some of the pain is the rejig of the long-planned stage 3 tax cuts. Those tax cuts are the main reason the budget is now expected to swing from a surplus of $9 billion in the year just ending, to a deficit of $28 billion in the new financial year. The budget’s forecasts say this move to expansionary fiscal policy will not stop inflation returning to the target range in the coming year and will ensure we avoid recession and achieve a “soft landing”, with the unemployment rate rising no higher than 4.5 pc. Let’s hope this is what happens.

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Treasury tells all: how the housing market is so stuffed up

Would you believe that our ever-rising house prices are a sign there’s something badly wrong with our housing market? Would you believe our housing arrangements are worse than in the other rich countries?

Well, I would when that’s what Treasury is admitting in the annual sermon it tacks onto the budget papers. This year it’s about meeting our housing “challenge”.

In a well-functioning economy, its industries can respond to the increase in demand for their good or service by increasing their supply without much delay. Of course, it takes a lot longer to build a new house or apartment than it does to churn out more ice-creams or haircuts.

But, even so, our housing industry has been too slow to respond to the increased demand for housing. This comes from our rising population which, thanks to continuing high levels of immigration, has grown faster than most of the other rich countries.

Figures from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, a group of mainly advanced economies, show that our number of dwellings per 1000 people increased only from 403 to 420 between 2011 and 2022. This compared poorly with most other countries.

In 2011, our level of housing supply was just 92 per cent of the OECD average. And by 2022 it had fallen to 90 per cent. This was behind countries such as Canada, the United States and England.

Our completions of new private dwellings reached a peak of more than 200,000 a year in 2018-19 but have since fallen to about 160,000 a year. This has left us with an acute shortage of properties available to buy or rent.

Nationwide, the number of homes being offered for sale has fallen since 2015, while the number offered for rent has been falling since early 2020.

Speaking of renting, Treasury says the rental market is considered to be in balance – meaning renters have little trouble finding a place and landlords have little trouble finding a tenant – when the vacancy rate is about 3 per cent. In cities such as Sydney and Melbourne it’s now down to about 0.5 per cent. Ouch.

Not surprisingly, when demand grows faster than supply can keep up with, prices rise. The rise in the cost of newly built homes, and the cost of renting, have contributed significantly to the general cost-of-living crisis.

So, why has our housing industry become so slow to respond to increased demand? Treasury says the causes are “multifaceted, complex and affect all stages of the housing construction process, including all levels of government and industry”.

One way to improve the market’s response to greater demand is to accelerate the construction process. But Treasury says that completion times for apartments, townhouses and detached houses actually worsened by 39 per cent, 34 per cent and 42 per cent respectively over the 10 years to June 2023.

Calculations (or, if you want to sound more scientific, “modelling”) by a federal government agency says that, over the next six years, the nation’s existing unmet demand will never be satisfied unless completion times are speeded up. In six years’ time, we’ll still have a backlog of about 39,000 dwellings.

Treasury says the expectation that churning out homes faster will help to lower house prices is supported by empirical research. One study found that those OECD countries that built more housing over the 15 years to 2015 experienced lower real growth in house prices.

Another study showed that adding an extra 50,000 homes a year for a decade could reduce house prices by up to 20 per cent.

So, what can be done to increase the housing industry’s annual output? Treasury says planning and zoning restrictions can limit the speed at which land is made available.

Delays in approving development applications by local councils can be excessive. I think councils and government departments are monopolists and, like all monopolists, they take advantage of the lack of competition.

Private sector monopolists whack up their prices and don’t worry about the quality of the service they provide. Public monopolists make you jump through hoops that aren’t strictly necessary, and they fix your problem in their own good time.

I wonder whether, over all these years, those outfits have ever had much pressure on them to lift their game. If that changed, I’m sure we could get more homes built per year.

Treasury says average times for the approval of development applications vary by state, with Victoria and NSW experiencing the longest waiting times early this month of 144 and 114 days, respectively.

It shouldn’t surprise you that Treasury wants housing to be delivered in well-located areas where the demand is greatest.

Dense development in the “missing middle” of major cities, where households can reside closer to jobs in areas with higher quality amenities and infrastructure, has been limited by planning and zoning restrictions and slow release of infill land, Treasury says.

Global supply constraints and price shocks on imported building materials associated with the pandemic have added to the cost of construction, driving up the price of newly built homes. Although prices aren’t rising as fast as they were, they haven’t fallen back.

Shortages of building labour have also increased the prices of newly built homes and slowed the pace of construction. The growth in non-dwelling construction activity has drawn labour away from home building. The productivity of labour in construction has not improved since the early 2000s.

The industry blames these shortages on the drop-off in rates of skilled migration during the pandemic. But I wonder if the deeper problem is that the former ready availability of imported labour tempted the industry to save money by failing to train as many apprentices as they should have.

So, what’s the Albanese government doing about this mess? It’s finally grasped the nettle and is spending big – $32 billion, including $6 billion in this month’s budget – to “address historical underinvest in the housing system” and build 1.2 million new, well-located homes. We’ll see how they go.

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Wednesday, May 22, 2024

We need to talk (sense) about immigration

It’s a safe bet there’ll be much talk about immigration between now and the next federal election, due this time next year. Peter Dutton has seen to that. Trouble is, much of it will just be hot air, much of it will be misleading and much will reflect the vested interests of the person doing the talking.

And some of it will reveal us at our worst: our tendency to blame incomers for all our ills. The more ignorant among us will shout abuse at some poor soul they see on the street whose clothing or skin colour looks different.

But none of that says our immigration policy isn’t a legitimate subject for sensible debate. Personally, I’d like to see it a lot lower.

You know strange things are happening when the leader of the Liberal Party says he wants to slash immigration. The Libs are, and have always been, the party of high migration.

But they’ve fallen on hard times with the loss of so many heartland seats to the teals, and Dutton figures his best hope of winning is to pick up seats in the outer suburbs, where their social class says people should vote Labor, but their social values give them greater affinity with the conservatives.

It’s because many immigrants gravitate to the outer suburbs that the locals find it easier to blame them for traffic congestion and other overcrowding, rather than governments’ failure to build enough infrastructure.

Ordinary Australians have always tended to think there’s been too much immigration. But the Liberals support it because it’s what business wants. The easiest way to increase profits is to sell into a growing market. Consider what you’d want if you were in the business of building new homes.

In recent times, Labor has supported high immigration too, mainly because it doesn’t want to get offside with business.

Almost all economists support strong immigration. I suspect that’s because their obsession with economic growth makes them susceptible to the fallacy that bigger is always better. Not if it comes at the expense of quality.

The economists do have one sensible point to make. Many people fear the migrants will take all the jobs. But the dismal scientists refute this. The newcomers and their families add about as much to the demand for labour to produce more goods and services as they add to the supply of workers.

All this – the gap between voters’ doubts about immigration and the pressure on governments to keep it coming – helps explain what seasoned political observers know: the pollies professed enthusiasm for cutting immigration is a lot stronger during election campaigns than it is after an election’s become a receding memory.

As for Dutton’s proffered solution, it doesn’t amount to much and would do little to fix the problems he claims he wants to fix. By the same token, the government’s claims that his plans would hasten the end of the universe are exaggerated.

Here’s a tip. Any pollie banging on about what they intend to do to the “permanent migration” program either doesn’t know what they’re talking about or, more likely, is pretty sure you don’t. What affects the economy’s workings is not permanent migration so much as “net overseas migration”, which is arrivals minus departures (ignoring people coming or going on short visits).

This actually went negative when we closed our borders during the pandemic, but soared after we reopened them. Net migration exceeded 520,000 in the year to June 2023, and over the year to this June may be as much as 400,000.

This huge surge is what’s causing the fuss. A lot of the swing is explained by incoming overseas students, which the universities will tell you is a wonderful thing. It’s one of our biggest export earners, and the unis have come to rely on this income to fund much of their research work.

I have some sympathy for them. Successive federal governments have made them more dependent on overseas students by using this as an opportunity to limit the support the unis get from the budget.

Even so, it seems clear that the inflow of students needing somewhere to live has contributed to the recent acute shortage of rental accommodation and added to the jump in rents.

The Albanese government wants to see a big drop in net migration and, to this end, is talking about imposing caps on how many overseas students the unis can admit.

The unaffordability of home ownership is a good issue for the election campaign, but Dutton is drawing a long bow in linking it to immigration. Homes have become harder to afford over several decades for various reasons. The recent immigration surge won’t have made much difference.

What’s true is that the more people we let in, the more capital investment – in the form of homes, business equipment and public infrastructure – we need to meet their needs. When this investment fails to keep up with the growth in the population, problems arise and the benefits to the economy that the advocates of high immigration have promised don’t happen.

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Monday, May 20, 2024

How the budget was hijacked by a $300 cherry on the top

Talk about small things amusing small minds. It looked like a textbook-perfect exercise in budget media management by Anthony Albanese’s spin doctors. Until it blew up in the boss’s face. Trouble is, it wasn’t just the tabloid minds that got side-tracked. So did the supposed financial experts.

Budget nights are highly stage-managed affairs, as the spinners ensure all the mainstream media are focused on the bit the boss has decided will get the budget a favourable initial reception.

You pre-announce – or “drop” to a compliant journo – almost all the budget’s measures, big or small, nice or nasty. This time they even revealed the exact size of the old year’s surplus. But you hold back one juicy morsel, knowing the media’s obsession with what’s “old” and what’s “new” will guarantee it leads every home page.

I call it the cherry on the top. And this time it was the $300 energy rebate going to all households. A prize for everyone (except the pensioners, who last year got $500) and proof positive that Jim Chalmers feels their cost-of-living pain. (It would have been much better to announce the rejig of the stage 3 tax cuts, of course, but Albo had to play that card early, to help with a dicey byelection.)

How were the spinners to know the punters would be incensed when they realised it would even be going to Gina Rinehart? And get this: if a billionaire owned, say, 10 investment properties, they’d be getting 11 lots of $300. Outrageous.

The way some tabloids tell it, the punters were so offended they were rioting in the streets, demanding Chalmers stick their $300 up his jumper. It was the Beatles returning their MBEs.

Why wasn’t the rebate means tested? Perfectly good reason: because that would have been more trouble and expense than it was worth. Don’t bother mentioning: because, apart from being a popular giveaway, the rebate’s other purpose was to help reduce the consumer price index by 0.5 of a percentage point, and means testing it would have reduced the reduction.

How so many shock jocks and journos could get so steamed up about such a small thing is hard to explain. But what’s much harder to explain is why so many otherwise sensible economists got so steamed up about the wickedness and counterproductive wrongheadedness of it.

I think it’s a perfectly sensible device to hasten progress in getting inflation down to the target zone, and by no means the first time governments have used it. The temporary energy rebate will cost $3.5 billion over two years and the continuing increase in the Commonwealth rent allowance for people on social security will cost $880 million over its first two years.

So while it’s true that increased government spending adds to inflationary pressure, to argue furiously about $4.4 billion in an economy worth $2.7 trillion a year shows the lack of something the late great econocrat Aussie Holmes said every economist needed: “a sense of the relative magnitudes”. It’s chicken feed.

But the financial experts’ righteous indignation about what they see as an inflationary attempt to fudge the inflation figures seemed to utterly distort their evaluation of the budget and its effect on the macroeconomy.

The budget was a “short-term shameless vote-buying exercise” in which Labor abandoned all pretence of fiscal responsibility and went on a massive spending spree. The budget’s return to surplus had been abandoned, leaving us with deficits as far as the eye could see. We now had a permanent “structural deficit”. The hyperbole flowed like wine.

It’s true that the policy decisions announced in the budget are expected to add $24 billion to budget deficits over the next four years. But if, as the financial experts assert, getting inflation down ASAP is the only thing we should be worrying about, then it’s really what’s added in the coming year that matters most. Which reduces the size of Chalmers’ crimes to less than $10 billion.

It’s true, too, that the expected change in the budget balance from a $9 billion surplus in the financial year just ending, to a deficit of $28 billion in the coming year, is a turnaround of more than $37 billion. Clearly, and despite Chalmers’ denials, this changes the “stance” of fiscal policy from restrictive to expansionary.

But the financial experts seem to have concluded this development can be explained only by a massive blowout in government spending. Wrong. It’s mainly explained by the $23-billion-a-year cost of the stage 3 tax cuts.

Perhaps they were misled by the budget’s Table of Truth (budget statement 3, page 87) which, like everything in economics, has its limitations. The tax cuts don’t rate a mention. Why not? Because they’ve been government policy since 2018, and so have been hidden deep in the budget’s “forward estimates” for six years.

But whatever its main cause, surely this shift to expansionary fiscal policy puts the kybosh on getting inflation back down to the target range? Well, it would if shifts in the stance of the macroeconomic policy instruments were capable of turning the economy on a sixpence.

Unfortunately, the first rule of using interest rates to slow down or speed up the economy is that this “monetary policy” works with a “long and variable lag”.

The financial experts seem to have forgotten that managing the strength of demand – and fixing inflation without crashing the economy – is all about getting your timing right.

So is predicting the consequences of a policy change. Two years of highly restrictive monetary and fiscal policies won’t be instantly reversed by a switch to expansionary fiscal policy. As the new boss of the Grattan Institute, Aruna Sathanapally, has wisely noted, at the heart of the budget is the sad truth that the economy is weak, which is one reason inflation will fall.

The inflation rate peaked at just under 8 per cent at the end of 2022. By March this year it had fallen to 3.6 per cent. To me, that’s not a million miles from the Reserve Bank’s target range of 2 per cent to 3 per cent.

But the financial experts seem to have convinced themselves there’s a lot of heavy lifting to go. They even quote one brave soul saying the Reserve will need two more rate rises. I think it’s more likely we’ll get down to the target in the coming financial year, and that the move to expansionary fiscal policy will prove well-timed to help reverse engines and ensure the Reserve achieves its promised soft landing.

Chalmers’ decision to use the $300 rebate to reduce the consumer price index directly by 0.5 of a percentage point adds to my confidence. It’s particularly sensible if, as the financial experts have convinced themselves, the inflation rate’s fall is now “sticky”.

Those dismissing this decline as merely “technical” display their ignorance of how wages and prices are set outside the pages of a textbook. To everyone but economists, the CPI is the inflation rate. It’s built into many commercial contracts and budget measures.

It’s a safe bet this device will cause the Fair Work Commission’s annual increase in minimum award wage rates – affecting the bottom quarter of the workforce – to be about 0.5 of a percentage point lower than otherwise. And do you really think employers won’t take the opportunity to reduce wage rises accordingly? I doubt they’re that generous.

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Friday, May 17, 2024

Budget's message: maybe we'll pull off the softest of soft landings

When normal people think about the economy, most think about the trouble they’re having with the cost of living. But when economists think about it, what surprises them is how well the economy’s travelling.

It’s been going through huge ups and downs since COVID arrived in early 2020. By 2022, it was booming and the rate of unemployment had fallen to 3.5 per cent, its lowest in almost 50 years. Meaning we’d returned to full employment for the first time in five decades.

Trouble was, like the other rich economies, prices had begun shooting up. The annual rate of inflation reached a peak of almost 8 per cent by the end of 2022.

The managers of the economy know what to do when the economy’s growing too fast and inflation’s too high. The central bank increases interest rates to squeeze households’ cash flows and discourage them from spending so much.

The Reserve Bank started raising the official “cash” interest rate in May 2022, just before the federal election. It kept on raising rates and, by November last year, had increased the cash rate 13 times, taking it from 0.1 per cent to 4.35 per cent.

While this was happening, Treasurer Jim Chalmers was using his budget – known to economists as “fiscal policy” – to help the Reserve’s “monetary policy” to increase the squeeze on households’ own budgets, reducing their demand for goods and services.

Why? Because, when businesses’ sales are booming, they take the chance to whack up their prices. When their sales aren’t all that brisk, they’re much less keen to try it on.

The government’s tax collections have been growing strongly because many more people had jobs, or moved from part-time to full-time, and because higher inflation meant workers were getting bigger pay rises.

As well, iron ore prices stayed high, meaning our mining companies paid more tax than expected.

Chalmers tried hard to “bank” – avoid spending – all the extra revenue. So, whereas his budget ran a deficit of $32 billion in the year to June 2022, in the following year it switched to a surplus of $22 billion, and in the year that ends next month, 2023-24, he’s expecting another surplus, this time of $9 billion.

So, for the last two years, Chalmers’ budget has been taking more money out of the economy in taxes than it’s been putting back in government spending, thus making it harder for households to keep spending.

Guess what? It’s working. Total spending by consumers hardly increased over the year to December 2023. And the rate of inflation has fallen to 3.6 per cent in the year to March. That’s getting a lot closer to the Reserve’s target of 2 to 3 per cent.

The Reserve’s rate rises have been the biggest and fastest we’ve seen. Wages haven’t risen as fast as prices have and, largely by coincidence, a shortage of rental accommodation has allowed big increases in rents.

And on top of all that you’ve got the budget’s switch from deficits to surpluses. Much of this has been caused by bracket creep – wage rises causing workers to pay a higher average rate of income tax, often because they’ve been pushed into a higher tax bracket.

Bracket creep is usually portrayed as a bad thing, but economists call it “fiscal drag” and think of it as good. It acts as one of the budget’s main “automatic stabilisers”, helping to slow the economy down when it’s growing too quickly and causing higher inflation.

The Reserve keeps saying it wants to get inflation back under control without causing a recession. But put together all these factors squeezing household budgets, and you see why people like me have worried that we might end up with a hard landing.

Which brings us to this week’s budget. The big news is that in the coming financial year the budget is expected swing from this year’s surplus of $9 billion to a deficit of $28 billion.

This is a turnaround of more than $37 billion, equivalent to a big 1.3 per cent of annual gross domestic product. So, whereas for the past two financial years the “stance” of fiscal policy has been “contractionary” (acting to slow the economy), it will now be quite strongly “expansionary” (acting to speed it up).

Some people who should know better have taken this turnaround to have been caused by a massive increase in government spending. They’ve forgotten that by far the biggest cause is the stage 3 tax cuts, which will reduce tax collections by $23 billion a year.

The same people worry that this switch in policy will cause the economy to grow strongly, stop the inflation rate continuing to fall and maybe start it rising again. But I think they’ve forgotten how weak the economy is, how much downward pressure is still in the system, and how long it takes for a change in the stance of policy to turn the economy around.

Treasury’s forecasts say the economy (real GDP) will have grown by only 1.75 per cent in the financial year just ending, will speed up only a little in the coming year and not get back to average growth of about 2.5 per cent until 2026-27.

So, the rate of inflation will continue falling and should be back into the target range by this December. All this would mean that, from its low of 3.5 per cent – which had risen to 4.1 per cent by last month – the rate of unemployment is predicted to go no higher than 4.5 per cent.

That would be lower than the 5.2 per cent it was before the pandemic, and a world away from the peak of about 11 per cent in our last big recession, in the early 1990s.

So maybe, just maybe, we’ll have fixed inflation and achieved the softest of soft landings. Treasury’s forecasting record is far from perfect, to put it politely, but it is looking possible – provided we don’t do something stupid.

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Wednesday, May 15, 2024

Budget will make us better off now, but worse off later

It’s said you can tell a government’s true priorities from what it does in its budget. If so, the top priority of Anthony Albanese’s government is not to have any priorities.

Rather than focusing on fixing the most pressing of our many problems, his preference is to be seen doing a little to alleviate all of them. In this budget, (almost) every voter wins a prize.

Certainly, every powerful interest group gets something to placate it. Of course, when you’re handing out so many prizes, most of them aren’t all that big.

Unfortunately, it’s a strategy that works better politically – where every vote counts – than economically, where sticking to what you’re good at brings better returns.

Fortunately, however, this budget has been “back-end loaded”. Most of what’s likely to be wasteful spending will come sometime in the next 10 years. Most of the budgetary cost of the sensible decisions starts from the first day of the new financial year, in just seven weeks’ time.

So let’s start with the good half of the budget, and leave the bad stuff for later.

By far the greatest political pressure on the government is to ease the intense cost-of-living pressure that so many people are feeling. Since most of the pressure has been caused by rapidly rising prices, this is also the government’s most immediate economic problem.

The trouble for Treasurer Jim Chalmers is that the standard remedy for rapid inflation involves making the pressure worse to make it better. You use higher interest rates and a bigger tax bite out of people’s pay rises to make it harder for households to keep spending, which stops businesses from raising their prices as much.

This explains Chalmers’ repeated but contradictory statement that he wants to ease the cost of living without weakening the efforts – by the Reserve Bank and his own budget surpluses – to get inflation down.

But this is where Albanese’s predilection for the each-way bet actually makes sense. Chalmers has found a way to do the seemingly impossible: ease living pressures a bit, while weakening the inflation fight only a bit.

He’s done this, first, by introducing a $300 power-bill rebate for all households, increasing the rent allowance paid to people receiving welfare benefits, and freezing the cost of prescriptions for two years.

This not only helps those people; it also reduces the rise in the consumer price index somewhat. And this, in turn, brings closer the day when the Reserve Bank starts cutting interest rates.

But second, by his rejig of the stage 3 tax cuts. This may be old news, but it’s by far the biggest measure in the budget. Most wage earners will realise how big it is – and how much it helps – when it increases their take-home pay at the start of July.

Albanese and Chalmers took a tax cut the previous government had intended to be of real benefit only to those on incomes well above the average, and changed it to ensure all taxpayers got something.

See? Everyone gets a prize. Everyone on incomes below about $150,000 a year gets more; everyone above that gets less than first intended. As a measure to ease living costs, it’s now far more effective.

Why won’t this $23 billion-a-year tax cut weaken the inflation fight? Because it has been government policy since 2018. It’s likely effect on households’ spending has been built into the Reserve Bank’s decisions to raise interest rates 13 times. Good stuff.

But it’s when we turn to the longer-term Future Made in Australia plans that you see the folly of Albanese’s efforts to stay friends with every interest group on every side.

By far the most important task Albanese must accomplish to secure our economic future is to achieve a smooth transition from fossil fuels to renewables – most of it done by 2030 – without blackouts and avoidable jumps in the cost of electricity.

But, more than that, he must ensure our continuing income from exports by establishing new green, further-processing industries exploiting our new-found strength of being among the world’s cheapest producers of renewable energy. This can be what will keep us prosperous when the world stops buying our fossil fuels.

The government spending needed to get these green industries started is included in the Future Made in Australia project. Trouble is, so is money for a lot of crazy ideas, such as setting up in competition with China as a producer of solar panels.

Albanese’s problem is he wants to say yes to everyone and everything, not just stick to the main chance. He’s saying he can turn us into a renewable energy superpower with one hand while, with the other, he lets the gas industry steam on to 2050 and beyond.

This does not fill me with confidence in the Albanese government’s capability. Quite the reverse.

Read more >>

Monday, May 13, 2024

Labor's persistent refusal to fix the JobSeeker payment is shameful

Remarks by Treasurer Jim Chalmers seem to say there’ll be no one-off increase in the pitifully inadequate rate of unemployment benefits in Tuesday night’s budget. If this is wrong, I’ll be delighted to offer an abject apology. If it’s right, Anthony Albanese and his ministers should hang their heads in shame. They claim to be the good guys, but they aren’t.

And the unions – which, as recent changes in industry policy reveal, have great behind-the-scenes influence over Labor governments – should be ashamed of themselves as well, for their failure to get Albo and co. up to the mark. They claim to represent the interest of the workers, but it turns only those who have jobs. Those still looking for one are on their own.

Do you realise Australia has the lowest benefits for the short-term unemployed among 34 countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development?

The lowest? Really? Does that make us the poorest of all those countries? No, of course not. We’d be comfortably among the richest.

So how’s it explained? Well, perhaps we don’t mind if people in other countries think of us as among the stingiest of the rich countries. The kind of person who’d walk past someone in trouble without offering them help. The kind who thinks anyone without much money must be lazy.

Australians tend to think of people on the age pension as poor, but a single pensioner gets $556 a week, which is $170 a week more than the single adult rate of the JobSeeker payment.

In 1996, the dole was about 90 per cent of the age pension, but it’s been allowed to fall steadily and now, despite two small one-off increases in recent years, is little more than two-thirds of what the oldies get.

To cut a long story short, this is because, since the early days of the Howard government, the pension has been indexed to wage growth, while unemployment benefits remain indexed to the consumer price index.

By now, the dole is 26 per cent below the OECD’s poverty line, set at 50 per cent of median (dead middle) income. There are other ways to measure poverty, but the dole’s below all of them.

A common argument for keeping unemployment benefits low is that we don’t want to discourage the jobless from going to the bother of doing a paid job. Talk about treat ’em mean to keep ’em keen.

But this is self-justifying nonsense. The single dole is now just 43 per cent of the full-time minimum wage.

A better argument is that benefits are so low people can be left unable to afford the fares and other costs involved in seeking a job.

Chalmers’ excuse for not increasing JobSeeker is that “we can’t afford to do everything”. But if you believe that, you haven’t thought about it.

Of course we can’t afford to do everything, but a rich country like ours, with a federal budget that will spend more than $700 billion next financial year, can certainly afford to do any particular thing it really wants to.

That’s the point: you can include it among all the things you’ll do if you really want to. Economists are great believers in “revealed preference”: judge people not by what they say, but by what they do.

Budgets reveal a government’s true priorities. What it spends on is what it most wants to do; what it “can’t afford” is something it doesn’t really want.

So the real question is why the government doesn’t want to fix JobSeeker. Well, it’s no secret. It might be the right thing to do, but there are no votes in it. Indeed, there may be votes to be lost.

It’s normal to envy those doing better than we are. But Australians suffer from the strange illness of “downward envy”. “I have to go out to work, while those lazy blighters sit around at home with their feet up, enjoying daytime television.”

And, of course, any money Labor spends helping one of the most deserving groups in society is money it can’t spend trying to buy the votes of the less deserving.

So, terribly sorry, love to help, but just can’t afford it.

If you’re looking for evidence that neither side of politics is up to much, you’ve just found some. I fear you’ll get more on Tuesday night.

Read more >>

Friday, May 10, 2024

The economy is just the means to an end. So, is it working?

We spend a lot of time hearing, reading and arguing about The Economy, and we’ll be doing a lot more of all that after we’ve seen Tuesday night’s federal budget.

But while we’re waiting, let’s take a moment to make sure we know what we’re talking about. What’s the economy for? How does it work? What does it do? Who owns it? Who runs it?

Why am I suddenly so deep and meaningful? Because Dr Shane Oliver, AMP’s chief economist, has written a note saying the economy doesn’t seem to be giving us what we want.

As individuals, it’s easy to think of the economy as something that’s outside ourselves, something that does things to us, over which we have little control.

As individuals, that’s true. But if you take us altogether, it’s not true. Why not? Because if you took all the people out of the economy, there wouldn’t be an economy. What’s more, you wouldn’t need one.

You’d be left with a lot of homes and other buildings, roads, cars and machines that had been abandoned, were just sitting there and so were worthless.

So, in that sense, the economy belongs to all of us because it is us. It’s most of us getting up each morning, going to work and earning a living, and all of us spending what’s been earnt.

Most of us have paid work, some of us do unpaid work, while some of us are still getting an education and others are too old or sick to work. But all of us consume.

So don’t think of the economy as high finance beyond your understanding. It’s actually as basic as you can get. This is why it’s important to remember the economy is just a means to an end.

At its most elemental, the end we’re seeking is for the economy to provide us with food, clothing and shelter, plus a few luxuries. But all of us want to do more than barely subsist. We want our lives to bring us enjoyment.

Economists say we want all our earning and spending to bring us “utility”. A better word would be satisfaction. But it’s no stretch to say what we want from our lives is happiness. And it’s on happiness that Oliver finds we aren’t doing as well as we should be.

All this is why the best way to think about the economy is that it belongs to all of us. Legally, however, most of the capital – whether physical or financial – is owned by companies, big and small. So most of us are employed by companies.

Where does government fit in? Apart from employing a lot of workers, it owns most of the roads and other public infrastructure. It makes the laws that limit what businesses (and the rest of us) are permitted to do and the way we do it.

Governments discourage some business activities and – as we’ve seen with the Albanese government’s recent announcements – seek to encourage others.

But the central bank also uses its control over short-term interest rates to “manage” the strength of the private sector’s total demand for goods and services, encouraging it when unemployment is high, and – as now – discouraging it when inflation is high.

As well, the federal government uses its budget – government spending on one side, taxes on the other – to discourage or encourage private demand. Hence, all the fuss next week.

But how are we, and other rich countries, going in our efforts to use our economic activity – earning and spending – to keep us happy and getting happier? Not well, according to Oliver’s research.

For Australia, he finds that, though our real annual gross domestic product per person has increased fairly steadily over the past 20 years, the average score we give ourselves on our satisfaction with our lives (as surveyed by the World Happiness Report) has actually been falling over the same period.

It’s a similar story for the United States, where its real GDP per person has risen steadily since 1946, while the proportion of Americans describing themselves as “very happy” has fallen slowly over most of that period.

In particular, he finds that younger people in the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are the least happy age group. This is a major change from 20 years ago.

Why is this happening? We can all have our own theories, but I think the big mistake many of us – and certainly, most economists – make is to focus on improving our material standard of living: using our increasing income to buy bigger and better things. Homes, cars, smartphones, whatever.

Trouble is, our materialism puts us on a “hedonic treadmill”. We think buying a bit more stuff will make us happier and, at first, it does. But pretty soon the thrill wears off – we get used to our higher standard of living – and tell ourselves it’s actually the next new thing that will make us happy.

Many people use their pursuit of promotions and higher income to make them happier by raising their social status. But this, too, is a step up you can get used to. And, in any case, it’s a zero-sum game. If passing you on the status ladder makes me happier, why won’t being passed by me make you less happy?

Actually, as I explained in a book I wrote some years back, there’s a lot of evidence that what’s better at giving us lasting satisfaction is the quality of our relationships with partners, family and friends. Beats just buying more stuff or getting a promotion.

And while it’s true that the economy, and our small role in it, can be seen as just a means to an end, it turns out that “extrinsic” benefits – such as wanting to earn money because of the nice things it buys – aren’t as satisfying as “intrinsic” benefits: such as finding a job you enjoy doing, not just do for the money it brings.

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